Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission: Settlement Judges and Simplified Proceedings by Mullins, Morell E., Sr.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law
Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives
Faculty Scholarship
2001
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the
Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission: Settlement Judges and Simplified
Proceedings
Morell E. Mullins Sr.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact
mmserfass@ualr.edu.
Recommended Citation
Morell E. Mullins, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission: Settlement Judges
and Simplified Proceedings, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 9 (2000-2001).
ARTICLES
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Occupational Safety and





I. Defining Settlement Judge and Simplified Proceedings.. 560
A. The Settlement Judge ......................... 560
B. Simplified Proceedings ......................... 562
II. Overview of the OSHA System ..................... 563
A . Introduction .................................. 563
B. Statutory, Policy, Operational, and Legal Context of
OSHRC Adjudications ........................ 563
1. Statutory and Policy Background ........... 563
2. Operational and Legal Aspects ............. 565
C . H istorical Context ............................ 571
III. Important Differences and Similarities Between the
OSHA System and Other Programs and Agencies Using
A D R .. . ... .. . ... .. .. . .... .. . . . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . .... 57 4
A . Introduction .................................. 574
B. Differences from Government Procurement Disputes 574
1. Relationship of Parties .................... 574
2. Models, Analogues, and Traditions ........... 576
C. Differences from Regulatory Agencies Covering
Only One Kind of Industry ..................... 577
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, School of Law. This
Article is based on a report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United
States (Administrative Conference). The views expressed herein are solely those of the
author and not necessarily that of the Administrative Conference.
556 THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL
D. Differences from Most Agencies' Policy-Setting ...
E. An Important Similarity: External Constraints ....
F . C onclusions ..................................
IV. OSHRC Settlement Judges and Simplified Proceedings.
A. The Common Context Shared by Settlement Judges
and Simplified Proceedings: A Settlement-Prone Sys-
te m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. OSHRC Settlement Judge Procedures and Experi-
e n ce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. B ackground .............................
2. Actual OSHRC Experience and Operation...
3. Analysis and Synthesis ....................
a. G enerally ..........................
b. Factors and Variables ................
i. Factors in Deciding to Invoke the SJ
Proceeding .....................
(1) Knowledge, Awareness, and
Understanding ..............
(2) Confidence in SJs: Experience,
Expectations, and Perceptions.
(3) Willingness to Take Risks .....
ii. Factors in Successful Use of
SJ Procedures ..............
(1) T he S J .....................
(2) Type of Case ................
(3) The Parties .................
4. Sum m ary ...............................
5. Impediments to the Effective Use of SJs .....
C. OSHRC Simplified Proceedings .................
1. Contrast to SJ Procedures and Summary of
OSHRC Simplified Proceedings ............
2. Background and Context ..................
a. 1987 Proposed Rulemaking ...........
b. Burden of Proof and Affirmative De-
fen ses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Actual Experience and Operation ...........
a. Preliminary Explanation ..............
b. Estimates and Numbers ..............
c. DOL Regional Office "Policies" on Sim-
plified Proceedings ...................
d. Considerations Involved in Requesting or

































JUDGES AND SIMPLIFIED PROCEEDINGS
i. Preliminary Observation: Pro Se Par-
ties .. .. . . . . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . ... ... 6 29
ii. Considerations ................... 629
(1) Professional Responsibility and
Problems of Predicting Suitability of
a Case for Simplified Proceedings.. 629
(2) Alternatives to Simplified Proceed-
ings ........................... 6 30
(3) Calculated Risk Assessment: Vari-
ables and Factors ............... 632
(4) The Type of "Simplification" Im-
posed by Simplified Proceedings ... 634
e. Outcome of Litigated Simplified Proceed-
in g s .. . .. . . .. .. . . .. . .. .. .. . . .. ... .. 6 34
f. Pro Se Parties ...................... 635
g. Increasing W orkload ................. 639
4. ALJ Experience and Perspective ............ 640
a. Pro Se Parties ...................... 641
b. Compliance with 29 C.F.R. section
2200.206 ........................... 642
c. Actual Conduct of the Conference/Hear-
in g ................................ 6 4 3
5. Comparison of ALJ and DOL Perspectives... 644
6. OSHRC's "Guide to Procedures" .......... 647
7.- Summary Analysis and Synthesis: Incentives
and Impedim ents ......................... 649
8. Concerns for the Future ................... 650
a. Compliance with 29 C.F.R. section
2200.206 ........................... 651
b. Basic Concepts ...................... 651
i. The Purpose of Simplified Proceed-
ings: Cost Effectiveness or "Simple
Justice"? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ... 652
ii. Carts and Horses: Cases Suitable for
Simplified Proceedings ............ 656
V. Overall Conclusions ............................... 659
A . Settlem ent Judges ............................. 659
B. Simplified Proceedings ......................... 660
Author's Recommendations .............................. 660
1991]
558 THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL
INTRODUCTION
"[W]e have only begun to identify the kinds of disputes likely to be
amenable to the techniques of ADR."'
Although the impetus for "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR)
originated largely from efforts to correct shortcomings in the judicial
system,2 the extension of ADR concepts to federal agencies has been
both natural and inevitable. In some respects, federal agencies offer a
more fertile field for ADR than do the courts. If nothing else, formal
agency adjudications far outnumber the caseload of the federal
courts.4 Moreover, numerous federal agency actions involve informal
decisionmaking which is not preceded by any form of evidentiary hear-
ing, but may often result in litigation before an adminstrative tribunal
or judicial review by a federal court.5 There is also constant and perva-
sive agency rulemaking, which produces volumes of regulations having
the force and effect of law. As recognized by the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States (Administrative Conference), there are "a
myriad of government activities [and] the best [ADR] procedure for a
program, or even an individual dispute, must grow out of its own
needs."'
During the past ten years, a number of federal agencies have experi-
mented with ADR techniques. One of the most promising areas has
been the field of government contracting.' In addition, there have been
significant steps toward extending ADR to rulemaking. Recent
rulemaking proceedings for some eighteen federal rules reportedly have
1. Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Move-
ment, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 438 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Ray, Emerging Options in Dispute Resolution, 75 A.B.A.
J. 66 (June 1989); Riggs & Dorminey, Federal Agencies' Use of Alternative Means of
Dispute Resolution, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 125, 126 (1987); Sander, Varieties of Dispute Res-
olution, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
3. The word "formal" is used to signify adjudications involving the right to a full
evidentiary hearing, such as those proceedings governed by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1988).
4. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 43, 45-46 (3d. ed.
1988) (supporting conclusion that agency adjudications far outnumber traditional fed-
eral court cases).
5. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1:4 (1978) (provid-
ing discussion of formal versus informal adjudication in administrative law).
6. AGENCIES' USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ACUS REC-
OMMENDATION No. 86-3, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 (1991) [hereinafter ACUS RECOMMEN-
DATION No. 86-3].
7. Crowell & Pou, Appealing Government Contract Decisions: Reducing the Cost
and Delay of Procurement Litigation, Recommendation No. 87-11, 1988 ACUS 1139
[hereinafter Crowell & Pou Recommendation 87-11].
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involved negotiation in one way or another.8 Initiatives and the use of
ADR in other areas have been described in the growing body of litera-
ture on the use of ADR by administrative agencies. Perhaps most sig-
nificantly, congressional interest in legislation encouraging the use of
ADR by federal agencies culminated in 1990 with the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act.10
The subject of this Article is the use of settlement judges11 and sim-
plified proceedings12 in adjudications by the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (OSHRC), which has been something of a
pioneer among federal agencies in implementing ADR. After describ-
ing generally the settlement judge and simplified proceedings concepts,
and their relation to other forms of ADR, this Article: (1) gives an
overview of the statutory system and context in which these ADR de-
vices operate, namely in the adjudicatory system created by the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act;" (2) discusses important differences
and similarities between this adjudicatory system and the situations in
other agencies using ADR techniques; (3) examines in detail how set-
tlement judges and simplfied proceedings have been operating in actual
practice; and (4) offers conclusions and recommendations.
8. Cameron, Harter, Bingham, & Eisner, Alfernative Dispute Resolution with Em-
phasis on Rulemaking Negotiations, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 83, 96-97 (1990) (Colloquium,
Proceedings of the First Annual Review of the Administrative Process) (discussing ne-
gotiations in rulemaking involving hazardous waste management, asbestos-containing
materials in schools, financial assistance to local education agencies, flight-time limita-
tions, and rest requirements for airline personnel).
9. See, e.g., Edelman, Carr, & Simon, ADR at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
Pou, Federal Agency Use of ADR: The Experience to Date; Robinson, ADR in En-
forcement Actions at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in CONTAINING LE-
GAL COSTS: ADR STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATIONS, LAW FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT
(Fine ed. 1987); A Colloquium on Improving Dispute Resolution: Options for the Fed-
eral Government, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 399 (1987) (entire issue devoted to colloquium); Har-
ter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: The History, Needs and Future of a
Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1393 (1983) [hereinafter Harter, Dispute
Resolution]; Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Procedures and the
Administrative Process, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 141 (1987) [hereinafter Harter, Points on a
Continuum]; Riggs & Dorminey, Federal Agencies' Use of Alternative Means of Dis-
pute Resolution, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 125 (1987).
10. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736
(1990) (codified mainly at 5 U.S.C. § 581, with codification of miscellaneous provisions
in scattered sections of titles 9, 28, 29, and 41) See also Lavelle & Samborn, Congress
Now Considering Dispute Resolution Measure, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 5, 1990, at 1, col. 1
(supporting premise of increased interest in "Alternative Dispute Resolution" (ADR)
by Congress).
11. Rules of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.100-.102 (1991) [hereinafter 29 C.F.R.
§ 2200.xxx.].
12. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.200-.212 (1991).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
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I. DEFINING SETTLEMENT JUDGE AND SIMPLIFIED PROCEEDINGS
A. The Settlement Judge
Judicially encouraged settlements are nothing new. " However, the
judge who becomes too active in settlement negotiations incurs the risks
of departing from neutrality, appearing biased in favor of one party,
and losing effectiveness not only as a settlement facilitator1" but also as
an adjudicator. 16 If negotiations fail, and the judge proceeds to try the
case, prior judicial activism in encouraging settlement may lead to mo-
tions to recuse on grounds of bias, or furnish ammunition for appeals.'
7
In the administrative law setting, these problems are even more acute.
The adjudicative hearing officer, usually an administrative law judge
(ALJ), is, despite a large degree of independence, not a member of the
judicial branch of government. The ALJ or other administrative hear-
ing officer must be particularly scrupulous and sensitive in order to
avoid the appearance of favoritism. Statutory constraints on the ALJ's
conduct, such as prohibitions on ex parte contacts,' impose further
limitations on an ALJ's flexibility in the settlement context.
The settlement judge is a recently developed, but relatively well de-
fined, concept both recognized and recommended by the Administrative
Conference. 19 The settlement judge has been called "an ingenious de-
vice"20 because it preserves the real advantages of having a judge ac-
tively involved in the settlement process, while avoiding the serious
problems which can arise if the trial judge becomes an overactive par-
ticipant in settlement negotiations.
A settlement judge is simply an ALJ who: (1) is specially appointed
14. Brazil, Hosting Settlement Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 (1987); Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a
Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257 (1986).
15. See Brazil, supra note 14, at 49-50 (discussing importance of maintaining neu-
trality in negotiation process).
16. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1980) (mandat-
ing disqualification in proceedings where judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned).
17. Cf In re Corey, 892 F.2d 829, 838 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
111 S. Ct. 56 (1990) (distinguishing between extrajudicial information and knowledge
obtained during judicial proceedings).
18. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d) (1988). See 5
U.S.C. § 556(e) (1988) (limiting decision exclusively to matters on record).
19. AGENCY USE OF SETTLEMENT JUDGES, ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5, 1
C.F.R. § 305.88-5 (1991) [hereinafter ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5].
20. Joseph & Gilbert, Breaking the Settlement Ice: The Use of Settlement Judges
in Administrative Proceedings (May 20, 1988) [hereinafter JOSEPH & GILBERT RE-
PORT], reprinted in 1988 ACUS 281. The Joseph & Gilbert Report formed the basis
for ACUS RECOMMENDATION 88-5, supra note 19.
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for the sole purpose of facilitating settlement; (2) will not try the case
or have any formal decisionmaking authority in the case, unless the
parties so request; and (3) is drawn from the same agency as the trial
judge and therefore generally hears the same kinds of cases. 1 A settle-
ment judge is essentially a mediator with special status, expertise, and
flexibility. As a sitting ALJ, the settlement judge has the prestige of
position and the advantage of familiarity with the subject. Being spe-
cially appointed for the limited purpose of settlement negotiations, a
settlement judge can be flexible, employing techniques and methods
such as ex parte communications, off-the-record discussions, and assur-
ances of confidentiality. The ALJ who is responsible for actually decid-
ing the case could not use such tactics without running afoul of ethical
and statutory prohibitions. 2 Insulated from the actual decisionmaking
role, the settlement judge can facilitate settlements by evaluating the
merits of each case and candidly informing the parties of the likelihood
of their success. In this respect, the settlement judge can provide recal-
citrant or stubborn parties with a sometimes needed preview of what
might happen if the parties actually go to trial. Accordingly, the settle-
ment judge also performs as an analogue to the settlement-enhancing
functions of the "mini-trial,"2 3 advisory or non-binding arbitration, 4
and the summary jury trial.2 5
It must be emphasized, however, that the appointment of a settle-
ment judge should not be a routine matter. The settlement judge
should be reserved for special problem situations, where there are rea-
sonable prospects for settlement, but an impasse or barrier to settle-
ment has arisen, and the parties could benefit from the flexibility and
the more active intervention of a settlement judge. 2" The settlement
judge procedure should be used sparingly. It is not a substitute for
good-faith negotiations between the parties. If overused, it would not
only tax the limited pool of agency ALJs, but also distort the negotiat-
ing process.
21. Id.
22. See ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5, supra note 19 and 5 U.S.C. §
557(d)(1) (1988) (addressing ex parte communications).
23. Harter, Points on a Continuum, supra note 9, at 150.
24. Id. at 151; Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court-Adminis-
tered Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986).
25. See, e.g., Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods
of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 468 (1985); Lambros, The Summary Jury
Trial-An Alternative Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 JUDICATURE 286 (1986);
Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986).
26. JOSEPH & GILBERT REPORT, supra note 20, at 302-304.
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B. Simplified Proceedings
The OSHRC simplified proceedings, while generically serving a core
purpose of ADR, are not readily identifiable with any particular ADR
device or technique commonly included in the ADR lexicons. As the
name indicates, simplified proceedings aim to simplify the adjudicative
process. Their basic purpose is consistent with the goals of ADR, and
with the reasons commonly advanced for ADR-eliminating elaborate
procedures, minimizing formalities, and reducing the time, expense,
and other transactional costs of litigation. 7
Among other things, the OSHRC simplified proceedings eliminate
formal pleadings, ordinarily bar discovery, motions, or similar filings,
and prohibit interlocutory appeals. Hearings are conducted in accor-
dance with section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act, but the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.2 8 The concept itself is not rev-
olutionary. As one leading commentator has recognized, although
"[a]gencies have used informal 'modified hearings' for decades, given
the current interest and the growth of experience with alternative
means of dispute resolution, it is appropriate to ask when they can be
used and how they need to be adapted to meet the dictates of the ad-
ministrative process."29 Still, many summaries and lexicons"0 of ADR
terminology do not seem to specify simplified procedures as a distinct
form of ADR, although the concept of simplifying proceedings is well
within the basic ADR rubric. For instance, some mention is made of
"expedited procedures" in connection with small cases." The OSHRC
simplified proceedings could therefore be classified among the "case
management" techniques which are related to ADR in spirit if not
strictly in form.32 Other analogues which come to mind are New
York's simplified procedure for court determination of disputes3 and
27. ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 86-3, supra note 6.
28. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.200-.212 (1991).
29. Harter, Dispute Resolution, supra note 9, at 1411.
30. See ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 86-3, supra note 6; NATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES OF DIs-
PUTE RESOLUTION (App. 2: Lexicon) (Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolu-
tion and Public Policy) (1983), reprinted in ACUS SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY
USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 42-46 (1987) [hereinafter
ACUS SOURCEBOOK] (containing no mention of simplified proceedings).
31. CASE MANAGEMENT AS A TOOL FOR IMPROVING AGENCY ADJUDICATION,
ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 86-7, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-7 (1991).
32. See also Crowell & Pou Recommendation 87-11, supra note 7, at 36-37
(describing summary procedures for small contract claims).
33. See Carlisle, Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes Under
New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 95 (1988).
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the various kinds of small claims courts, 4 traffic courts, municipal
courts, and other tribunals of limited jurisdiction which are intended to
provide a forum for minor cases.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE OSHA SYSTEM
A. Introduction
Context is always important in understanding virtually any subject.
In the case of OSHRC's settlement judges and simplified proceedings,
some knowledge of the context in which these procedures operate is
crucial. The settlement judges and simplified proceedings do not stand
alone. They are part of an intricate statutory system which, in some
respects, is unique to administrative law. Their use and effectiveness
depend on a number of variables. These variables are linked to the na-
ture, policies, and operation of the overall system. Changes in policies
and operations elsewhere in the system will affect the frequency and
nature-the how often and the how well--of the use of settlement
judges and simplified proceedings.
Therefore, before focusing on the OSHRC settlement judges and
simplified proceedings, this Article must lay some preliminary ground-
work by providing an overview in Part II of the statutory system, and
examining, in Part III, some important differences and similarities be-
tween the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
system and the situation of other agencies where ADR is, or could be,
used.
B. Statutory, Policy, Operational, and Legal Context of OSHRC
Adjudications
1. Statutory and Policy Background
By any criteria, the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSH Act)35 in 1970 represented a significant milestone in admin-
istrative law. Substantively, it is the most comprehensive federal law
ever enacted to deal with occupational safety and health.36 Among its
stated congressional purposes is the OSH Act's role "to assure, so far
34. See Kulat, Et Al.: Hairy Tales from Chicago's Pro Se Court Where You Don't
Need a Lawyer to Help Solve Life's More Vexing Problems, 13 STUDENT LAW. 14, 15
(Sept. 1984) (mentioning different types of small claims courts and trend towards
experimentation).
35. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1988)).
36. M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 1 (2d ed. 1983 &
Supp. 1989).
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as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources
"37
Jurisdictionally, the OSH Act's coverage of employers and employ-
ees in the private sector is, with some exceptions, coextensive with the
full scope of the federal power to regulate commerce. 8 An estimated
eighty million employees intially were covered by the OSH Act. 9 How-
ever, that number has decreased substantially, since more than twenty
states have resumed direct enforcement responsibility for occupational
safety and health under state programs which satisfy the "state plan"
requirements of the OSH Act.'
Conceptually, the OSH Act follows a "law-enforcement" model, re-
quiring employer compliance with substantive regulations, "occupa-
tional safety and health standards," promulgated by rulemaking. 41
Moreover, the OSH Act imposes a "general duty" on each covered em-
ployer to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which [are] free from recognized hazards that are causing
or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees." '42
Provisions are made for inspections, abatement of violations, sanctions
including civil monetary penalties, and adjudication of disputed cases.'
One point should be emphasized at this juncture, a point which will
bear repeating later. The OSH Act is qualitatively different, in some
important respects, from the private-party civil litigation model which
lies at the foundation of most traditional ADR techniques. OSHRC
and its ALJs are not refereeing a dispute between private litigants. Al-
though frequently more complex litigation under the OSH Act is akin
to the enforcement of traffic regulations, building safety and fire codes,
37. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988).
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1988) (defining employer as "person engaged in a
business affecting commerce"). See Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission, 492 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying definition of employer).
39. H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1970).
40. For statutory provisions pertaining to state plans, see 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1988).
There seem to be 21 approved state plans where states have resumed direct responsibil-
ity for occupational safety and health. These states include. California, Indiana, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Tennessee. O.S.H. Rep. (BNA): Ref-
erence File 81:1003 (1989). The number of employees and employers subject to direct
federal enforcement jurisdiction therefore has decreased considerably. Precise figures
are not particularly crucial to this Article, but the substantial number of "state plan"
states, some of them populous and industrialized, does have considerable effect on the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) caseload, and thus
indirectly on the use of ADR.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 654-655 (1988).
42. Id. § 654(a)(1).
43. Id. §§ 657-660.
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and vehicle safety inspection laws. There are highly visible
prosecutorial duties and important legal requirements-such as satisfy-
ing a burden of proof-imposed on government officials charged with
representing the government in disputed cases. 4
Administratively, the OSH Act takes an almost unique direction by
creating two agencies, instead of a single agency, to carry out the en-
forcement scheme. The Department of Labor (DOL) is given the role
of promulgating substantive occupational safety and health standards,
conducting inspections and investigations, and prosecuting contested
cases."' The OSHRC is completely independent of the DOL and adju-
dicates contested citations and penalties. 46 One commentator has la-
beled this arrangement the "split-enforcement" model. 41 As will be dis-
cussed in Part III, this bifurcation is not without potential significance
as a factor in the actual use of settlement judges, simplified proceed-
ings, and other ADR techniques. This "split-enforcement" system re-
sults in a situation where there are two agencies with different perspec-
tives, institutional roles, and policies, which interact and may have
considerable impact on the implementation of any particular form of
ADR.
2. Operational and Legal Aspects
Adjudication by OSHRC and its ALJs occurs in an overall system
which has features of varying complexity. In addition to the statutory
"general duty" clause, there are several volumes of occupational safety
and health standards (standards) published in the Code of Federal
Regulations. One large block of these standards applies to virtually all
private employers: General Industry and Health Standards.48 Others,
applicable to particular industries, override the general industry stan-
dard in case of conflict.
49
Some of these standards are relatively precise and simple, involving
measurements or common sense precautions. For example, some gen-
44. See infra notes 80-87, 269-83 and accompanying text (discussing satisfying
burden of proof).
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 655, 657-659 (1988).
46. Id. §§ 659(c), 661.
47. Johnson, The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA
and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987).
48. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910 (1991).
49. See S. BOKAT & H. THOMPSON, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 67
(1988) (noting that general industry standards are superseded by those created for
specific industries). Examples of particular industry standards are found at 29 C.F.R. §
1915 (1991) (shipyards); id. § 1918 (longshoring); id. § 1926 (construction); and id. §
1928 (agriculture).
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eral industry standards are rather specific regarding "single" portable
wooden ladders, which are to be no longer than thirty feet, 50 and two-
section extension wooden ladders, which are to be no more than sixty
feet long.' 1 Common sense inspired regulations such as the one prohib-
iting the placement of a ladder in front of a door which opens toward
the ladder, unless the door is blocked, locked, or guarded.'2 Likewise,
"ladders shall not be placed on boxes, barrels, or other unstable bases
to obtain additional height.""
However, other standards are more open-ended, complex, or involve
judgment calls. Even the ladder standards sometimes have a distinct
element of open-endedness. For example, "[liadders with broken or
missing steps, rungs, or cleats, broken side rails, or other faulty equip-
ment shall not be used .... -" Machine guarding standards also pro-
vide the same type of example.
The point of operation of machines whose operation exposes an employee to in-
jury, shall be guarded. The guarding device shall be in conformity with any ap-
propriate standards therefore, or, in the absence of applicable specific standards,
shall be so designed and constructed as to prevent the operator from having any
part of his body in the danger zone during the operating cycle.'5
As to personal protective equipment, there are particular standards,
such as those involving eye and face protection,' 6 and a kind of "catch-
all" general standard, which provides, among other things,
"[p]rotective equipment, including personal protective equipment for
eyes, face, head, and extremities, protective clothing ... and protective
shields and barriers, shall be provided ... and maintained . . . wherever
it is necessary by reason of hazards of processes or environment.. .. ,57
"[A]II personal protective equipment shall be of safe design and con-
struction for the work to be performed."' 8 These are only some of the
less complex standards that may be encountered in cases contested
before OSHRC.
Thus, as pointed out in one textbook,' 9 there are various ways of
categorizing standards. Some are "specification" standards, which de-
tail the precise equipment, work processes, or materials required for
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.25(c)(3)(ii) (1991).
51. Id. § 1910.25(c)(3)(iii).
52. Id. § 1910.25(d)(2)(iv).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1910.25(d)(2)(viii) (emphasis added).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(3) (1991) (emphasis added).
56. Id. § 1910.133.
57. Id. § 1910.132(a).
58. Id. § 1910.132(d).
59. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1.
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compliance. Others are "performance standards" which are more flexi-
ble and provide the employer with latitude as to the precise method of
protecting employees from the hazard. Still others, such as the house-
keeping and personal protective equipment standards, are general and
somewhat open-ended.60 Standards concerning employee safety train-
ing, hazard communication, and record-keeping, involve educating em-
ployees in safety and health matters, transmission of information, and
maintaining documentation. 1
Inspections for compliance with standards and the general duty
clause generate a massive number of cited violations annually. In fiscal
year 1988, there were 174,396 alleged violations resulting from inspec-
tions.62 Moreover, the sheer number of standards, the great variety of
types of standards and kinds of requirements imposed, and the number
of cited violations, are not the only factors complicating the operational
and legal aspects of enforcement and adjudication.
The system for adjudicating contested cases can be challenging, de-
manding, and complex. If an inspection discloses alleged violations a
citation describing the violation is issued which includes a period for
abatement of the violation, and there is a notification of proposed pen-
alties, if any. A particular violation may be classified as willful,6" seri-
ous, 6 or other than serious,6 5 depending on a number of statutory fac-
tors and case precedents. The classification may affect the amount of
civil penalty proposed or finally assessed.66
An employer who disagrees with the citation or proposed penalties
can file, within fifteen days of receipt, a simple notice of contest.67 All
aspects of the citation and proposed penalties are subject to challenge,
if timely contested. In one way or another, employers may dispute the
existence of a violation, the time allowed for abatement of the violation,
the nature of the measures required for abatement, the characteriza-
tion of the alleged violation (willful, serious, or other), and the pro-
posed penalties.6 8 In addition, employees or their representatives can
60. Id. §§ 93, 94.
61. Cf. id. § 95 (discussing standards regarding employer's duty to train and edu-
cate employees).
62. 19 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1668 (Mar. 1, 1989).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1988).
64. Id. §§ 666(b), (k).
65. See id. § 666(c) (noting violations "determined not to be of a serious nature").
66. For a general discussion of the various categories of violation, see S. BOKAT &
H. THOMPSON, supra note 49, at 257-76.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1989).
68. For general discussions of notices of contest, see S. BOKAT & H. THOMPSON,
supra note 49, at 350-57; M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, §§ 271-278.
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elect party status if an employer files a notice of contest,69 sometimes
converting the litigation into a three-party affair. Furthermore, employ-
ees or their representatives are entitled to file a notice of contest as to
the reasonableness of the time allowed for abatement in a citation.70
Considerable litigation has resulted over the rights of employees with
regard to settlements and other matters; by and large, the rights of
employees or their representatives in OSHRC litigation have not been
treated expansively.71 For the sake of simplicity, this Article will not
attempt to deal separately with whatever rights employee representa-
tives may have with respect to OSHRC litigation, settlement judges,
and simplified proceedings. The matters discussed in this Article will
focus on litigation resulting from employer notices of contest, because
employer contests form the vast bulk of the day-to-day litigation in the
system.
Except for simplified proceedings, OSHRC procedural rules require
the DOL's lawyers to file a relatively detailed complaint after receipt of
a notice of contest. 72 This complaint requirement established by
OSHRC regulations in 1986 represents something of a departure from
the conventional "notice pleading" prevalent in judicial tribunals and
many federal agency adjudications.
This requirement is significant in terms of ADR, and will be dis-
cussed at greater length elsewhere in this Article.73 However, for back-
ground purposes, the following points should be noted. Although ex-
pressly intended as a device to impel better preparation of cases for
trial, 74 this hybrid "fact pleading" requirement is remarkably in tune
with the goals of ADR and strikingly in accord with the findings and
recommendations of a special task force appointed by the chief judge of
the District Court for the Northern District of California in 198 2 .7b
A consensus gradually developed in the committee. It became convinced that the
place where the most could be saved is in the formative stages of litigation. It is
in those stages that patterns and expectations are set and thus it is in those
69. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2200.20(a) (1991).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2200.38 (1991).
71. For a discussion of employee rights relative to litigation and contested proceed-
ings before OSHRC, see S. BOKAT & H. THOMPSON, supra note 49, at 468-80, and M.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, §§ 204, 279, 368, and 369.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.35 (1991).
73. See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text (addressing requirement of De-
partment of Labor (DOL) attorneys to file detailed complaints after receipt of notice of
contest).
74. See 51 Fed. Reg. 32,007 (1986) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2200 (1986)) (ex-
plaining final rule).
75. Brazil, Kahn, Newman, & Gold, Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental
Effort to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDICATURE 252, 279 (1986).
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stages where an infusion of intellectual discipline, common sense, and more di-
rect communication might have the most beneficial effects. The committee iden-
tified several facts of early litigation life that make it difficult for lawyers and
clients to resolve disputes efficiently. One is notice pleading. Complaints and an-
swers often do not communicate a great deal about the parties' positions and
what supports them .... These pleading practices have at least two ill effects on
the cost of litigation: parties must use discovery to learn their opponent's basic
position and to assay its underpinnings; and the scope of ... discovery ... is very
broad because the scope of the litigation, as presented through the pleadings, is
so broad .... Another problem is that some lawyers and litigants seem to find it
difficult to squarely face their own situations early in the life of a lawsuit. Some-
times counsel have difficulty developing at the outset a coherent theory of their
own case.... Sometimes litigants and lawyers are so pressed by other responsi-
bilities that they can bring themselves to systematically analyze their own cause
only when some external event forces them to do so.7
Intended or not, the "hybrid fact pleading" imposed by OSHRC
serves an important "case management" purpose closely related to
ADR. It is also one of several factors in the larger context of the en-
forcement and litigation system which affects the use of simplified
proceedings.
77
If a case is not settled, an OSHRC ALJ hears and decides the
case.78 The AL's decision is subject to review by OSHRC, and
OSHRC's decision, whether in the form of declining to review and
thereby letting the AL's decision become the final OSHRC decision or
by grant of review and its own decision, is subject to judicial review."
As could have been predicted, a substantial and somewhat complex
body of legal doctrines and precedents has emerged from litigation
before OSHRC over the past two decades. The developments most rele-
vant to ADR seem to be very closely linked to the "law enforcement"
model of the system. These developments involve matters such as the
Secretary of Labor's (Secretary) burden of proof, the elements of a
prima facie case, and the availability of affirmative defenses to alleged
violations. In order to understand better the context in which the
OSHRC settlement judge and simplified proceedings operate, a brief
discussion of the elements of the system is necessary.
Even a casual reading of two standard textbooks8" on occupational
safety and health law indicates that OSHRC takes seriously the Secre-
tary's burden of proof and has recognized a substantial number of af-
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text (explaining changes in rules
governing pleadings).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1988).
79. Id. §§ 660-661 (1988).
80. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36; S. BOKAT & H. THOMPSON, supra note 49.
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firmative defenses. Some of the more significant points regarding the
burden of proof and affirmative defenses are summarized below:
- In cases involving occupational safety and health standards, the
Secretary's burden of proof includes establishing that: (1) the cited
standard applies to the condition;81 (2) the employer failed to comply
with the requirements of the standard; (3) there was potential or actual
employee exposure to the hazard posed by the violation; and (4) the
employer knew or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have
known of the condition constituting a violation.8
- The type of standard involved will affect the particular evidence
necessary to satisfy the prima facie burden of proof. Standards that
specify the precise equipment, work processes, or materials required for
compliance may require a different kind of evidence than "performance
standards" which are more open-ended and leave the employer some
latitude as to the precise method of protecting employees from hazards.
Other standards, such as the housekeeping and personal protective
equipment, standards, are general and even more open-ended.8"
OSHRC's own procedural rules use the term "general standards" '84 to
refer to standards "under which the obligation of the employer is con-
tingent upon the existence of a hazard, [and to standards that do not]
specify a means of abatement and [do] not provide a specific perform-
ance criterion."'85 Still other standards, such as those involving em-
ployee safety training, hazard communication, and record-keeping, may
involve evidence in the form of documents and information within the
possession of the employer.8 6
- In cases involving the general duty clause, the Secretary's prima
facie burden of proof includes establishing: (1) that the employer failed
to render the workplace free of "recognized" hazards; (2) that the haz-
ard was "recognized" in the industry or by the employer; (3) that the
hazard was causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm;
and (4) that there are specific, feasible measures which are likely to
reduce the hazard.
87
81. See Hoggatt, Inc., 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1642 (1988) (citing simplified pro-
ceedings case in which AU declined to allow DOL to amend citation which cited inap-
plicable standard).
82. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, §§ 102-127; S. BOKAT & H. THOMPSON, supra
note 49, at 376.
83. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, §§ 93-94.
84. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.35(d) (1991) (citing "[aldditional requirements for com-
plaints alleging violations of general standards").
85. Id.
86. Cf M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 95 (detailing employee training and
education).
87. S. BOKAT & H. THOMPSON, supra note 49, at 114-38; M. ROTHSTEIN, supra
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- The potential substantive defenses which could be raised are vir-
tually unlimited.8
- OSHRC's rules are literally open-ended as to what constitutes
"an avoidance or an affirmative defense" which supposedly is to be
raised in the employer's answer to the Secretary's complaint. The perti-
nent rule states: "Such matters include, but are not limited to, the fol-
lowing: creation of a greater hazard by complying with a cited stan-
dard; ... [and] infeasibility of compliance *"89 These OSHRC
rules list at least nine such defenses.
- Textwriters have identified a substantial number of "defenses." 90
Among the more significant or complex are: (1) res judicata; (2)
vagueness where the standard is general or open-ended and the exis-
tence of a hazard must be established; 91 (3) unpreventable employee
misconduct; (4) impossibility of compliance; (5) compliance with the
standard cited would create a greater hazard than noncompliance; (6)
technological infeasibility; (7) economic infeasibility; and (8) when the
citation is laid under the general duty clause but a specific standard
applies.
- At multi-employer worksites, such as construction worksites, the
proof and affirmative defense picture is even more complicated, involv-
ing matters of employer control of the conditions creating hazards and
employee exposure.92 A substantial percentage of simplified proceed-
ings cases arise in the construction industry.93
On the surface, the adjudicative process appears simple and straight-
forward-a citation which includes an abatement period and a pro-
posed penalty; a notice of contest; an adjudication before an OSHRC
ALJ which is subject to review by OSHRC; and a subsequent judicial
review. In actual operation, however, the process is considerably more
complicated.
C. Historical Context
The history of the OSH Act and its enforcement are an important
part of the context in which the settlement judges and simplified pro-
note 36, §§ 141-149.
88. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, §124.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.36(b) (1991) (emphasis added).
90. S. BOKAT & H. THOMPSON, supra note 49, at 397-41; M. ROTHSTEIN, supra
note 36, §§ 109-124.
91. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 114.
92. See id. § 161 (stating "multi-employer responsibility is one of the most difficult
areas of OSHA law"). See also S. BOKAT & H. THOMPSON, supra note 49, at 411-17.
93. See Appendix (summarizing over 40 OSHRC and administrative law judge
(ALJ) decisions reported in BNA's Occupational Safety and Health Cases).
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ceedings operate. That history can be summarized in two
words--controversial and fluid.
One academic observer summarized the first ten years of OSHA's
experience succinctly:
OSHA has experienced profound difficulties .... From the outset the Act's im-
plementation has been hampered by underfunding, poor administration, misdi-
rected enforcement, and relentless assaults by critics. Moreover, since 1977, as
the federal government has moved to implement the goals of the Act more force-
fully, the criticism of OSHA has intensified. Serious questions regarding
OSHA's expense, effectiveness, and priorities have been raised . . ..
The OSHRC, though less controversial than OSHA, likewise was
not free from perceived problems. "The Commission has been troubled
by a lack of unanimity of its members, a lack of consistency in deci-
sions, a lack of clarity in opinion writing, and an inability to decide
cases promptly.
95
The second decade of the OSH Act's history was a bit more placid.
To describe most of the 1980's another commentator coined the term
"President Reagan's OSHA." 9  More specifically, the tone and pace
for the inspection/prosecutorial phase of enforcement during much of
this decade was set by Assistant Secretary of Labor (OSHA) Thorne
Auchter (1981-1984). This era placed great emphasis on: (1) a more
cooperative relationship with employers; (2) education and training; (3)
on-site consultations; and (4) delegation of increased authority to local
OSHA area directors to settle enforcement disputes before they be-
came contested cases formally submitted to OSHRC.97
Controversy, however, did not go away. Critics pointed to the re-
duced number of workplaces subject to inspection under the new poli-
cies, the forty-two percent decline in the number of citations for serious
violations, and the enforcement emphasis on record-keeping violations
rather than substantive hazards." As summed up by one commentator
near the end of the decade:
[Under a program begun in October 1981,] if a company maintained an injury/
illness rate below the national average for manufacturing, any OSHA inspection
would consist only of a review of the company's own records.
Because this records-only [inspection] policy put a premium on low injury
rates, OSHA launched a controversial program to enforce the Act's records-
94. Rothstein, OSHA After Ten Years: A Review and Some Proposed Reforms, 34
VAND. L. REV. 71, 72 (1981).
95. Id. at 115 (footnotes omitted).
96. Goldsmith, President Reagan's OSHA, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 633 (1989).
97. CONG. Q., FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 413-14 (5th ed. 1986); OSHA
Compl. Guide (CCH) 10,190 (1981).
98. CONG. Q., FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 414 (5th ed. 1986).
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keeping requirements. . . . By citing a company for numerous willful record-
keeping violations, OSHA could accumulate the per-instance penalties to create
mega-fines. Consequently, until recently, record-keeping violations have resulted
in the largest proposed penalties in the history of the Act. For the most part,
employers were justifiably enraged by the agency's 'overkill' on paperwork issues
that had little direct bearing on worker safety and health."
As noted by this same commentator, however, toward the end of the
1980's, OSHA extended the use of its large proposed civil penalties
into more substantive safety and health areas, resulting in proposed
penalties which ranged from $1.5 million to $5.11 million in particular
cases.
100
During the 1980's, OSHRC also underwent a number of changes.
However, the most dramatic and the most obvious changes stemmed
from a drastic decline in the number of contested cases. At the end of
1980, there were forty-four OSHRC ALJs located in nine different cit-
ies, with 7,515 new cases received during that year. 01 During 1981,
incoming cases plunged from the 1980 high of 7,515 to 2,751.102 In
1982, the decline continued with 1,242 new cases and an ALJ cadre of
twenty four.103 However, in recent years, the caseload has been gradu-
ally increasing. In 1988, the number of new contested cases climbed to
2,746, with a total ALJ complement of eighteen. 04
This abbreviated treatment of the history of the OSH Act's imple-
mentation elucidates several points of relevance to settlement judges,
simplified proceedings, and ADR in the OSHRC setting generally.
Principally, these procedures do not operate in a vacuum. It is debata-
ble, of course, whether OSHA's inspection, enforcement, and pre-con-
test settlement policies during the 1980's were the sole cause of the
decline in contested cases reaching OSHRC. Nevertheless, the correla-
tion between the policies and decline forcefully indicates that the poli-
cies of the inspection/prosecutorial arm are an important variable
which can affect the number of cases and the kinds of cases before
99. Goldsmith, supra note 96, at 639-40.
100. Id. at 640-41.
101. 1980 THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH,
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 2 (all PRESIDENT'S
REPORTS are on file with The Administrative Law Journal).
102. 1981 THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH,
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 3 [hereinafter 1981
PRESIDENT'S REPORT].
103. 1982 THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH,
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 2.
104. 1988 THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH,
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 3, 5 [hereinafter 1988
PRESIDENT'S REPORT].
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OSHRC. Consequently, the number and nature of the cases where set-
tlement judges, simplified proceedings, and other forms of ADR might
be employed are affected by policies beyond OSHRC's control. There-
fore, if ADR is to be used in the OSH Act system, coordination be-
tween the inspection/prosecutorial arm and OSHRC would seem
imperative.
III. IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE
OSHA SYSTEM AND OTHER PROGRAMS AND AGENCIES USING ADR
A. Introduction
ADR techniques cannot be uprooted from one setting and trans-
planted wholesale to another. A technique or approach which operates
successfully in one agency may be disastrous if superimposed on an-
other. Perhaps the most certain way to insure failure in using ADR is
to disregard the very real differences among federal agencies and pro-
grams. The Administrative Conference has stated very aptly, "the best
procedure for a program, or even an individual dispute, must grow out
of its own needs.
10 5
In several important respects, the OSH Act adjudicative system is
different from other federal programs in which ADR has been evolving
with considerable success. These differences do not mean that ADR is
irrelevant or unsuitable in the OSHA setting. Actually, these differ-
ences offer significant opportunities to experiment, develop, and extend
ADR techniques into new territory. However, these differences must be
considered carefully in designing and implementing ADR within each
particular system.
B. Differences from Government Procurement Disputes
1. Relationship of Parties
One of the earliest and most promising areas for the application of
ADR in administrative law has been disputes arising out of government
procurement and contracting. The problems and basic "landscape" of
government contract appeals litigation have been described in a recent
Administrative Conference Report.' 6 However, the relationship be-
tween the parties to a contract dispute is substantially different from
the relationship between the parties under the OSH Act scheme.
In goverment contracting, there is a commercial transaction between
105. ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 86-3, supra note 6.
106. Crowell and Pou Recommendation 87-11, supra note 7.
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the parties. There is nothing inherently adversarial in the relationship.
Indeed, the underlying relationship is voluntary, bilateral, cooperative,
and often very symbiotic. Would-be contractors compete against each
other for the privilege of dealing with the government. Insofar as can
be determined, there is no competitive bidding among employers for
the privilege of being inspected under the OSH Act.
In contracting, the relationship between the parties literally begins
with accord and agreement-a contract. Any dispute arises later. To a
large extent, the working relationship between company managers and
government officials is primary. From the perspective of company and
government managers, legal relationships established by a contract are
very secondary.
Moreover, disputes which culminate in "litigation" can impair ongo-
ing or future commercial relationships between the parties. If one party
prevails in litigation, the outcome may be so unsatisfactory to the other
party that future dealings are difficult if not impossible. The party who
"wins" the litigation often loses that intangible known as good will, and
risks losing a customer or provider of goods and services.
In short, there are strong extra-legal incentives for reaching accord
in contract disputes, including but not limited to future relationships.
Perhaps the most important service performed by ADR in government
procurement is to repair an existing commercial relationship.1
0
7
In contrast, the OSH Act system involves government-imposed regu-
latory requirements. There is no underlying commercial transaction .or
relationship. Although there is a strong mutual interest in workplace
safety and health, the relationship hardly can be called voluntary and
symbiotic. The relationship contains a degree of inherent adversariness
because of possible citations, monetary sanctions, and expensive abate-
ment measures. No matter how cordial the opening conference with an
OSHA compliance officer might be, inchoate disputes and adversari-
ness exist at the outset of the relationship.
Nor is the relationship on-going. Inspections are more or less spo-
radic. A government contractor ordinarily hopes for another contract.
An employer ordinarily will not hope for another OSHA inspection.
The extra-legal incentives for reaching accord in a dispute under
OSHA do not include the prospects of future profits on the one hand,
and future procurement of goods and services on the other. There are
no continuing or future commercial relationships which provide an in-
107. See Rich, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Opening Doors to Settlement,
Chemical Week, Aug. 14, 1985, at 28-30, reprinted in ACUS SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 30, at 71-73 (explaining importance of maintaining commercial relationships).
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centive to use ADR; the incentives go more to avoiding future entan-
glements with OSHA. Accordingly, ADR in the OSH Act system
would serve a very different function than it would in government pro-
curement disputes. ADR in the OSH Act system does not repair an
existing commercial relationship. It may, however, serve to mitigate
and "soften" the adversarial aspects of the regulatory relationship.
2. Models, Analogues, and Traditions
Another important difference between contract procurement and
OSHA is found in the radically different models on which the two are
based, and in the ADR analogues and traditions related to those mod-
els. ADR in government contracting can draw on abundant models,
analogues, and traditions in the private sector. Despite statutes, regula-
tions, and bureaucracy, a contract with the government is still a con-
tract. The essence of the transaction is commercial. A contract is a
business relationship, as well as a legal relationship. 10 8 Citation is
hardly needed for the proposition that commercial arbitration, commer-
cial mediation, mini-trials, and other ADR techniques pre-date and are
available models for government contract dispute resolution. 9 A major
theme of the recent Administrative Conference study on the use of
ADR in government procurement litigation is that ADR "methods suc-
cessfully help resolve private conflicts raising questions similar to those
heard by [Boards of Contract of Appeals]," 110 and that "many govern-
ment contract cases resemble those others where ADR has been ap-
plied successfully." '' ADR techniques in government procurement can
draw from a well developed, and still developing, wealth of innovations
and techniques in analogous private commercial dispute resolution.
In contrast, the OSHA system is largely based on a "law-enforce-
ment" model. The government inspects for compliance with the law,
requires correction of conditions violating the law, and can impose
sanctions for non-compliance. The dispute is public, not private. The
dispute is between a government agency and a citizen or company.
Available analogues include enforcement of traffic laws, building codes,
and other "police power" regulations. ADR certainly has no wealth of
models readily available from the private sector in these areas. For the
most part, the predominant available model remains the "plea bar-
108. Id. at 30, 73.
109. See ACUS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 672, 683, 689 (reprinting materi-
als from American Arbitration Association).
110. Crowell and Pou Recommendation 87-11, supra note 7, at 9.
111. Id. at 11.
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gain," negotiated with the agency or the prosecutorial authority.
Even in those communities where prosecutors and criminal courts
have used ADR in "community dispute settlement" programs to deal
with minor crimes, the target has been "minor crimes between people
with continuing relationships."11 In other words, these programs focus
on cases which are criminal in theory, involving conduct chargeable as
assault, petty theft, or harassment, but which often are the by-product
of disputes and troubled relationships between individuals.1 3 Under the
OSH Act system, an employee complaint may trigger an inspection,
but any underlying friction between the employer and its employees is
largely irrelevant to the existence of workplace hazards and noncompli-
ance with the law. Resolving a neighborhood dispute may render a
criminal charge moot; resolving labor disputes will not cause a hazard-
ous condition to disappear. The application of ADR to agencies operat-
ing under the "law enforcement" model simply has no strong or obvi-
ous analogues in the private sector.
C. Differences from Regulatory Agencies Covering Only One Kind
of Industry
Many federal agencies are concerned primarily with regulating con-
ditions in one kind of industry. Examples include the Federal Commu-
nications Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission." 4 In a number of these agencies, the regulatory focus is
on economic matters, such as rate-setting and licensing. Some of the
industries have a long history of being closely regulated public utilities.
Although there are considerable differences among these agencies, they
have in common a "vertical" model of jurisdiction over certain kinds of
industries. This model results in some crucial differences between the
agencies and OSHA.
In terms of relationships between the agency and the regulated in-
dustry, there is a continuing and more or less pervasive regulatory over-
sight. This close relationship has led to criticisms that agencies have
been "captured" by the very industry they are supposed to control, al-
though such contentions often reflect considerable oversimplification.' 5
112. L. SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS, FAMI-
LIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 119 (1990).
113. Id. at 121.
114. For a good summary of these and other federal agencies' jurisdiction and mis-
sions, see CONG. Q., FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY (5th ed. 1986).
115. See Frohnmayer, Regulatory Reform: A Slogan in Search of Substance, 66
A.B.A. J. 871, 872 (1980) (regarding "capture theory").
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However, the working relationship between agency and industry under
such regulatory regimes is a relationship of continuity and constant
interaction.
This has implications for ADR in those agencies which would not
apply in the OSH Act context. The relationship between such agencies
and their regulated industries is in some respects similar to the rela-
tionship between contracting agencies and contractors. There is an
ongoing relationship with considerable continuity and stability. Conse-
quently, within the system itself, there are strong incentives to accom-
modation. Antagonism and harsh adversariness are counterproductive
on both sides. Metaphorically, the industry and the agency must live
together and must take a long-range view. The incentives for coexis-
tence and cooperation, rather than hostility and confrontation, are
strong. These incentives make for an atmosphere where ADR tech-
niques and mechanisms are likely to be used, even though the agency
and the industry officials may never have heard the term "alternative
dispute resolution."
In addition, the nature of regulation in many other agencies may be
qualitatively different from that of the OSH Act system. Industries of
the same kind will be more homogeneous and, therefore, will confront
similar problems which are more susceptible to regulatory solutions
that can be applied uniformly throughout the system. Under the OSH
Act system, the regulated industries are very heterogeneous. Many
workplace hazards and conditions vary radically from industry to in-
dustry. The construction industry, for example, presents unique safety
problems stemming from the fact that the workplace literally changes
hourly as the building progresses.
Furthermore, many other agencies primarily are concerned with the
economic or special aspects of the regulated homogeneous indus-
try-rates, routes, broadcast frequencies, and return on investment.
Under the OSH Act, economics are secondary and the regulated indus-
tries are a heterogeneous collection of diverse interests with widely dif-
ferent workplace conditions.
D. Differences from Most Agencies' Policy-Setting
The so-called "split-enforcement" model established under the OSH
Act has advantages and disadvantages.116 One point is fairly clear,
however. The existence of a separate, independent adjudicative agency
116. See generally Johnson, The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions
from the OSHA and the MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 315 (1987) (analyz-
ing "split-enforcement" model).
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has consequences for the implementation of ADR under the OSH Act.
Under most regulatory systems, there is a single, ultimate poli-
cymaking authority, whether a cabinet official or an independent board
or commission. Although in most agencies this policymaking authority
must respect the independence of ALJs and may be limited in its con-
trol of particular adjudications by law11 or by simple considerations of
public relations and fairness, a unified policy can be imposed regarding
such matters as ADR. All-components of the agency can be consulted,
with policy differences debated and resolved internally, before proposed
rulemaking or other steps are taken. In short, the ultimate policymak-
ing authority in most agencies can decide that certain ADR techniques
will be used in certain situations, and everyone else in the agency is
expected to quietly accept and implement the policy throughout the
system. In a "split-enforcement" system, there are two independent
policymakers, heading two agencies, whose personnel may be imple-
menting two different sets of policies.
Perhaps more importantly, if there are features in some other part of
the enforcement or adjudicative system which could adversely affect
the implementation of ADR policies, appropriate adjustments can be
made by a single policymaking authority. In other words, policies
within a single agency can be coordinated so that the enforcement and
prosecutorial arms, for instance, are not at odds with the adjudicative
hearing or appeals component. To take a simple example, an agency
that decides to reduce the paperwork and documentation previously re-
quired for the settlement of a case does not have to be concerned about
cooperation from its own adjudicative branch. 118
Unfortunately, the impact of one of the two agencies' policies upon
ADR is not always going to be. obvious. Incentives and disincentives to
use the ADR machinery established-by the adjudicative agency can be
affected by the policies of the enforcement agency and vice-versa. New
inspection priorities, new programs, reallocation of resources, and other
policy changes in the enforcement arm will affect the nature and num-
ber of cases contested before the adjudicative agency. For example, the
availability of informal, pre-notice-of-contest conferences with OSHA
area officials could be expected to reduce the number of contested
cases. However, at the same time those informal conferences also sub-
stantially reduced the number of cases where simplified proceedings
117. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(2), 5372, 7521 (1988).
118. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing explicit judicial
recognition of DOL's authority to withdraw contested citation).
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-would otherwise have been requested. " 9
None of this detracts from the value of a statutorily independent ad-
judicative agency. It does, however, point to the need for tailoring
ADR mechanisms and techniques to the unusual enforcement system
that exists under the OSH Act. ADR mechanisms established by one
agency in a "dual enforcement" system may be rendered useless by
policies of the other agency which are outside its control.
E. An Important Similarity: External Constraints
There is one feature that the bifurcated OSH Act system shares with
virtually all other agencies: neither the DOL nor the OSHRC are free
agents. Without statutory authority the DOL could not promulgate le-
gally enforceable safety and health standards and the OSHRC could
not adjudicate anything. Although, like all agencies, they have a con-
siderable range of authority which can be implied from their respective
statutory mandates, there are judicially enforceable limits on that
authority.
Moreover, there are abundant extra-legal constraints. The DOL and,
to a somewhat lesser extent, the OSHRC are demonstrably subject to
media, interest group, and congressional scrutiny. Merely browsing
through the index to one of the periodicals devoted to occupational
safety and health will disclose numerous examples of this scrutiny of
agency policies and actions. 2 Congressional scrutiny is constant and
sometimes touches on matters clearly related to ADR. For example,
the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study of the infor-
mal conferences at area director's offices."" The reaction of those
outside the agency to changes in enforcement, settlement, and ADR
policies must be taken into account in making and implementing those
policies.
119. See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text (explaining area directors' role
in settlements).
120. See 18 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 793 (Sept. 7, 1988) (detailing OSHA "mega-
fine" enforcement strategy criticized by National Safe Workplace Institute); id. at 799
(raising congressional inquiry regarding promotion of individual to position of OSHA
deputy administrator); 18 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1045 (Oct. 19, 1988) (articulating So-
licitor of Labor response to General Accounting Office (GAO) study: "Getting Away
with Murder In the Workplace: OSHA's Nonuse of Criminal Penalties for Safety Vio-
lations"); id. at 1047 (elaborating union protest, including 3,200 foot long list of com-
panies alleged to have violated toxic chemical regulations).
121. See infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text (discussing role of area direc-
tors in settlements).
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F. Conclusions
All of the above notwithstanding, ADR is still significant in the OSH
Act context. However, the fundamental premise is that the particular
features of the OSH Act system must be taken into account in devising
ADR techniques and machinery. The ADR experience and machinery
of other agencies cannot be superimposed mindlessly on the OSH Act
system. Adaptation, evolution, and experimentation are necessary. The
ADR techniques and machinery must flow from, and be compatible
with, the experience and nature of this particular regulatory context.
Moreover, given the inherent regulatory, investigative, legalistic, and
adversarial elements of the OSH Act system, ADR may be quite im-
portant as a means to reduce tensions and frictions within the system.
Very few people who have ever received a ticket for speeding, failing to
stop at a stop sign, or driving with malfunctioning turn signals, are
happy about it. An OSH Act citation can be much more serious and
much more expensive. A certain amount of antagonism is a natural
response, especially if one feels unfairly treated.
The inherent frictions and adversariness of the OSH Act system can
be tempered. OSHRC could be an indispensable mediating influence
for workable accommodations without compromise to safety and
health. OSHRC is detached from both parties, independent and adjudi-
cative. Its adjudicative role makes it a natural focal point for develop-
ing ADR techniques and machinery in cases which have been con-
tested. However, great care must be exercised. OSHRC's credibility as
a neutral adjudicator is crucial. The development, implementation, and
viability of ADR techniques within the adjudicative setting largely de-
pends upon OSHRC and its ALJs.
IV. OSHRC SETTLEMENT JUDGES AND SIMPLIFIED PROCEEDINGS
A. The Common Context Shared by Settlement Judges and
Simplified Proceedings: A Settlement-Prone System
Taken as a whole, the OSH Act enforcement and adjudicative sys-
tem is extremely pro settlement. About 60,000 to 70,000 OSHA in-
spections occur annually, 2 with approximately 170,000 alleged viola-
tions being found.12 3 The great bulk of the cited violations are not
contested. For example, OSHRC statistics for fiscal year 1988 reported
122. See 18 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 859 (Sept. 21, 1988) (citing statistics reported for
fiscal year 1986 and 1987).
123. See 18 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1668 (March 1, 1989) (reporting fiscal year 1988
statistics).
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2,746 new cases received.12 4 Although many of these cases probably
involved notices of contest challenging more than one cited violation, it
is safe to conclude that no more than fifteen percent of the alleged
violations are contested before OSHRC.
Of the cases actually contested before OSHRC, about ninety percent
are resolved, ordinarily by settlement without a hearing before the
ALJ. However, OSHRC rules do require settlement agreements to be
approved by the ALJ,2 so OSHRC tallies cases settled as also being
"decisions." Thus, of 2,279 decisions rendered by ALJs in fiscal year
1988, 154 were rendered after a hearing (approximately seven per-
cent).12 The rest presumably were settlements. Of 1,813 decisions ren-
dered by ALJs in fiscal year 1987, 190 were issued after a hearing
(approximately 10.5% ).127 Therefore, the number of cases actually liti-
gated in hearings before an OSHRC ALJ represent a mere fraction of
the violations alleged in citations issued by OSHA. There are a number
of factors which account for this low number. As will be discussed
briefly below, the more obvious factors making a system conducive to
avoiding formal litigation include: (1) extra-legal factors, primarily the
"costs," in the broadest sense of the word, of litigation, coupled with;
(2) the availability of informal conferences with the OSHA area direc-
tor, prior to filing a notice of contest; (3) the DOL's own policies; (4)
judicial precedents relevant to settlements; (5) the OSHRC rules and
policies encouraging, settlement; and (6) the interaction of all these
factors.
First, the extra-legal factors providing an incentive against filing a
notice of contest are easy to comprehend as a matter of common sense,
although difficult to document in rigorous empirical fashion. Simply
put, the most obvious disincentive to filing a notice of contest is the
"cost" of contesting the notice compared to the potential benefits. 28
Many citations involve violations which would be upheld if contested.
Even if a viable dispute may exist, the amount of civil penalty directly
at stake is likely to be far less than the financial expense of contesting a
citation. If a lawyer is not retained, and the civil penalty is more than
$1,000, a company appearing pro se through one of its management
officials inevitably sacrifices the time of its officials and witness-employ-
ees.'2 9 Moreover, the less tangible "costs" of contesting a citation may
124. 1988 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 104, at 5.
125. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.100(b)-(c) (1991).
126. 1988 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 104, at 5.
127. Id.
128. See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 271 (raising disincentives to contests).
129. Sand, Contesting "'Blockbuster" Citations: Recent Decisions in Several Areas,
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be considerable: potentially adverse publicity, 130 a fear that contesting
a citation will increase the possibility of future inspections or inspec-
tions at other company worksites,' 13 potential workplace friction with
unions or non-unionized employees, and the risk of being perceived as
insensitive to workplace safety and health.
The burdensome "costs" of full litigation are not exclusively
shouldered by the employer. The government's resources are finite, and
its agencies are staffed by human beings. Every inspector who has to
testify at a hearing is an inspector who is not at a workplace looking
for hazards to employee safety and health. Every government attorney
trying a case which could legitimately have been settled has been di-
verted from other cases. Even more importantly, every contested viola-
tion represents a possible hazard which, if the notice of contest has
been filed in good faith, does not have to be corrected before the litiga-
tion process has run its course.'
Second, closely related to these general extra-legal factors is the
availability, especially since 1980, of informal conferences with the
area director. By joint memorandum dated September 8, 1980, the So-
licitor of Labor and the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational
Safety and Health authorized OSHA's area directors to enter into in-
formal settlement agreements with an employer prior to notices of con-
test being filed.' 3 With area directors being authorized to reduce pen-
alties, modify abatement dates, reduce the characterization of the
violation, such as from serious to other-than-serious, and even withdraw
a citation,' 4 OSHA itself provided a significant ADR mechanism. Al-
though notices of contest must be filed within fifteen days after the
citation or notice of proposed penalties is served, 35 this still leaves time
for many disputed violations and penalties to be resolved by informal
conference with the area director. A pro se employer, therefore, can
avoid most of the costs associated with litigation if a conference with
the area director is successful. Moreover, if there are disputed matters
which cannot be resolved within the fifteen-day period, an employer
still has an opportunity to continue negotiations with the area director
after filing a formal notice of contest with OSHRC. Generally, if there
14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 123 (1988).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 123-24.
132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(b), 666(d) (1988). See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 298
(discussing problems stemming from provisions).
133. 10 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 533 (Oct. 16, 1980).
134. Id. at 552 (giving text of Joint Memorandum).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 659(b) (1988).
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is reason to believe that a settlement is likely, the area director can
request authority to continue negotiations while the case is still in the
pleadings stage, in an effort to settle the matter.13
The impact of these policies was reflected by the immediate drop in
the number of contested cases which occurred after their implementa-
tion in 1980. After the first two months, the notice of contest rate had
declined from twenty-eight percent to fourteen percent, and the aver-
age number of contested cases received by OSHRC had declined from
an average 160 new cases per week to sixty new cases per week. 13 7
During calendar year 1981, OSHRC also reported 2,751 new cases, as
compared to the previous year's total of 7,515.18 Of course, most of the
cases informally settled with OSHA prior to the notice of contest prob-
ably would be among the ninety percent of those cases settled after
notice of contest anyway, but the availability of informal conferences is
most certainly a factor conducive to early settlement.
In sum, many disputed violations and proposed penalties never ripen
into a full-fledged notice of contest and litigation because they are re-
solved informally at the area director's level. 13 9 As noted in a recent
text oriented to the practicing attorney, "it is the general experience
that an employer may obtain a reduction in the Secretary's proposed
penalty of 50% in settling an OSHA citation."4"
A third important factor is the DOL's own policies. In addition to
settlement authority at the area director level, other DOL. policies can
directly or indirectly influence the number of contested violations and
penalties. For the first half of the 1980's, for example, various pro-
grams recognizing firms with excellent safety programs, making ex-
emptions from routine inspections, providing consultative visits by
OSHA inspectors, and providing a generally cooperative atmosphere,"4
probably had both a direct impact on reducing notices of contest and
136. 10 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 553 (Oct. 16, 1980).
137. OSHA Compl. Guide (CCH) 1 10,191 (Apr. 1981).
138. 1981 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 102, at 3.
139. It should be noted that the implementation of these policies has not been free
from criticism. A General Accounting Office (GAO) study of 150 randomly selected
informal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) settlements during
1983 indicated that the average penalty reduction was more than 50%. The study also
found that the proposed penalties had been reduced in all but one of the cases. Of the
946 violations alleged in the 150 cases, however, only 24 had been reduced in charac-
ter, such as from serious to other-than-serious, and 15 withdrawn.
OSHA Compl. Guide (CCH) T 11,472 (Jan. 1985) (summarizing INFORMAL SETTLE-
MENT OF OSHA CITATIONS: COMMENTS ON THE LEGAL BASIS AND OTHER SELECTED
ISSUES, GAO/HRD-85-11 (Oct. 26, 1984)).
140. S. BOKAT & H. THOMPSON, supra note 49, at 316.
141. CONG. Q., FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 414 (5th ed. 1986).
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an indirect effect of setting the overall tone for agency enforcement
activity. When the assistant secretary fosters a program which commits
resources to some 25,000 consultative visits a year by agency inspec-
tors, under which employers are not cited for violations, 42 the number
of enforcement inspections and cited violations necessarily will de-
crease. As described by one source, Assistant Secretary Auchter "initi-
ated a policy of settling potentially contested cases in a way that elimi-
nated the hazard but precluded the involvement of the Commission. 1 43
By April 1985, three percent of the citations were being contested com-
pared to twenty-two percent in 1980.'14 Moreover, the "voluntary com-
pliance" policies during this same period also limited many enforce-
ment inspections to review of an employer's own records if the
employer's injury/illness rate was below the national average for man-
ufacturing. 4 5 This policy, in turn, led to an emphasis on record-keeping
violations, numerous citations for "willfull" violation of record-keeping
requirements, and penalties much larger than those proposed for viola-
tions which had resulted in death or serious injury. 46 In short, as the
inspection arm's policies change so do the number and kinds of cases
which are contested.
A fourth factor which emerged during the 1980's was explicit judi-
cial recognition of DOL's authority to withdraw a citation which had
been contested, and implicit recognition of substantial authority in the
DOL to settle disputed cases. In a brief per curiam opinion, the Su-
preme Court indicated that the Secretary's decision to withdraw a cita-
tion was not reviewable by OSHRC.
47
It is the Secretary, not the Commission, who sets the substantive standards for
the workplace, and only the Secretary has the authority to determine if a citation
should be issued to an employer. - . . A necessary adjunct of that power is the
authority to withdraw a citation and enter into settlement discussions with the
employer.... The Commission's function is to act as a neutral arbiter and deter-
mine whether the Secretary's citations should be enforced over employee or
union objections. Its authority plainly does not extend to overturning the Secre-
tary's decision not to issue or to withdraw a citation.
The Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the Commission can review the Secretary's




145. Goldsmith, supra note 96, at 639.
146. Id. at 640; Sand, Contesting "Blockbuster" Citations: Recent Decisions in
Several Areas, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 123, 124 (1988). See 16 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA)
916 (Jan. 21, 1987) (discussing $1.38 million proposed penalties against Union
Carbide).
147. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3 (1985).
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untary settlements with employers in violation of the Act, thus unduly hamper-
ing the enforcement of the Act. Such a procedure would also allow the Commis-
sion to make both prosecutorial decisions and to serve as the adjudicator of the
dispute, a commingling of roles that Congress did not intend .... '"
Although the case itself was more narrowly concerned with withdrawal
of citations, the Court seemed to go out of its way to mention that the
DOL should not be discouraged from seeking settlements.
Finally, OSHRC has never been hostile to settlements. However, its
early rules and policies did impose several conditions required for
OSHRC approval of a settlement. For instance, at one time OSHRC
rejected settlement agreements containing exculpatory language rela-
tive to the fact of violation, 149 although it later retreated from this posi-
tion. 150 In 1986, OSHRC deleted from its rules a provision that al-
lowed approval of a settlement agreement "when it is consistent with
the provisions and objectives of the Act." 151 Responding to an objection
to this deletion, OSHRC stated: "The Commission believes that dele-
tion of this provision from the Commission's rules is in keeping with
the Commission's limited role in reviewing settlement agreements.
'1 52
Current OSHRC rules of procedure are notably lacking in substan-
tive content requirements:
(a) Policy. Settlement is permitted and encouraged by the Commission at any
stage of the proceedings."'
(b) Requirements. The Commission does not require that the parties include any
particular language in a settlement agreement, but does require that the agree-
ment specify the terms of settlement for each contested item, specify any con-
tested item or issue that remains to be decided . . . , and state whether any
affected employees who have elected party status have raised an objection to the
reasonableness of any abatement time. Unless the settlement agreement states
otherwise, the withdrawal of a notice of contest, citation, notification of proposed
penalty, or petition for modification of abatement period will be with
prejudice.
5
The net result of the factors discussed above has been a system
where ninety percent of the cases are resolved without formal litigation.
Settlement is the norm in this system. The attitudes and expectations
of lawyers and parties familiar with the system are geared toward set-
148. Id. at 6-7.
149. Matt J. Zaich Construction Co., 1 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1225 (1973).
150. Farmers Export Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1655 (1980).
151. 51 Fed. Reg. 32,013 (1986) (quoting prior rule at 29 C.F.R. § 2200.100(a)
(1991)).
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.100(a) (1991).
154. Id. § 2200.100(b).
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tlement, and as the Joseph & Gilbert Report indicates, expectations
and attitudes are an important element in achieving settlement. 165
Most litigating lawyers are aware of a phenomenon which occurs when it be-
comes clear that a case will be settled. There is an attitudinal change, sometimes
partially or wholly marked, when difficulties and disagreements become things to
be understood and ironed out; from then on effort is expended on resolving differ-
ences rather than developing them into adversary positions.'"
In a system where settlement is the norm, experienced parties, par-
ticularly the DOL officials and their lawyers, are likely to begin with
the attitude that the contested case can be worked out and there is not
even a need on their part for an "attitudinal change." Moreover, law-
yers in cases contested before the OSHRC, particularly the DOL law-
yers, not only develop a mind-set inclined toward expectations of settle-
ment, but also necessarily gain some degree of expertise in negotiating
and settling ninety percent of the contested cases. Techniques for arriv-
ing at alternatives, adjustments, and compromise become part of the
experienced lawyers' working tools. To a certain extent, then, litigating
any case of a type which is usually settled represents a departure from
the norm.
Overall, the settlement judge procedures and simplified proceedings
operate in the context of a system which is already very conducive to
resolving cases without full and formal litigation. The various "costs"
of formal adjudication, the policies of the prosecutorial agency, and the
encouragement of the adjudicative agency provide substantial incen-
tives and opportunities for settlement. This settlement-prone environ-
ment does have some consequences, however, affecting the use of settle-
ment judges.
B. OSHRC Settlement Judge Procedures and Experience
1. Background
OSHRC's rules governing settlement judge (SJ) procedures actually
pre-date the Joseph & Gilbert Report by almost two years. The pro-
posed rule was published in June 1986.157 Described in the notice of
proposed rulemaking as "innovative and experimental,'1 8  the
OSHRC's final SJ rule was published on September 8, 1986, as one
component in a comprehensive revision of its rules of procedure." 9
155. ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5, supra note 19, at 21, 22-23, 28-31.
156. Id. at 24.
157. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,184, 23,193, 23,207-08 (1986).
158. Id. at 23,193.
159. Notice of Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,002 (1986) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §
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The SJ procedures apply to notices of contest by employers and ac-
tions for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.' 60 Whenever
"there is a reasonable prospect of substantial settlement with the assis-
tance of mediation by a Settlement Judge,"61 any party can move for
the appointment of a SJ. With the parties' consent, the OSHRC chief
ALJ or the chairman can sua sponte assign a SJ. It is worth emphasiz-
ing that the OSHRC explicitly uses the term "mediation" in describing
the SJ process.
Although there are minor differences in details, the OSHRC SJ pro-
cedures are generally consistent with the key procedural recommenda-
tions of the Joseph & Gilbert Report.12 Either party can veto the use
of a SJ. 6 3 The SJ proceedings are limited to forty-five days in dura-
tion,"" unless extended at the request of the SJ for another twenty
days. 6 The SJ is to confer with the parties, may suspend or allow
discovery while assigned to the case, and is expressly authorized to
communicate privately with each party's attorney or other representa-
tive regarding concessions and the reasonableness of the party's posi-
tion.' Discussions are usually by telephone 6 ' but provision is made
for face-to-face conferences.' 68
To the extent a regulation can accomplish this feat the rule also re-
quires the parties "to be completely candid with the Settlement Judge
so that he may properly guide settlement discussions."' 9 The SJ also is
given rather open-ended authority, appropriate to the mission, to
"make such other and additional requirements of the parties and per-
sons having an interest in the outcome as to him shall seem proper in
order to expedite an amicable resolution of the case."'' 7 0 The SJ pro-
ceedings can be terminated if a party fails to coopeiate.' 71 The confi-
dential nature of the SJ proceedings is maintained by: (1) providing
that no evidence of statements or conduct in SJ proceedings is admissi-
2200.101 (1991)).
160. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.101(a) (1991).
161. Id. § 2200.101(a)(2) (emphasis added).
162. See ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5, supra note 19, at 40-47 (summariz-
ing various recommendations).
163. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.101(a)(2) (1991).
164. Id. § 2200.101(a)(3).
165. Id. § 2200.101(d)(1).
166. Id. § 2200.101(b).
167. Id. § 2200.101(c)(1).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.101(c)(1) (1991).
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ble in any subsequent hearing, except by stipulation of the parties; 172
(2) prohibiting later use in litigation of documents disclosed in the set-
tlement process unless obtained through appropriate discovery or sub-
poena;173 (3) prohibiting the SJ from discussing the merits of the case
with any other person;"74 and (4) prohibiting the SJ from being called
as a witness in any hearing of the case.7 5 If the case remains un-
resolved, in whole or part, the SJ cannot serve as the presiding ALJ,
unless requested by the parties.'
7
1
In terms of the characteristics of the adjudicating body's overall
docket, the OSHRC caseload meets two of the three criteria suggested
by the Joseph & Gilbert Report, as conditions precedent for establish-
ing an SJ procedure: (1) a large proportion of the cases present factual
issues which are not of major precedential importance; and (2) reme-
dies under the OSH Act are susceptible to gradation and compro-
mise. 77 Under the OSH Act there is considerable room for adjusting
the amount of monetary penalty; the violations may be characterized as
to degree, such as willful, serious, other than serious, and repeated; and
even the details of abatement may be subject to compromise.
However, OSHRC SJ proceedings take place in a setting which only
partially meets the third Joseph & Gilbert criterion---crowded dockets
with relatively few cases being settled. 78 As noted elsewhere in this
Article, 79 there is a ninety percent settlement rate, and settlement is
something of a norm for contested cases before the OSHRC. This high
settlement rate does appear to have affected the use of SJ proceedings,
and the perspective of some DOL attorneys and OSHRC ALJs regard-
ing SJ proceedings.
As a matter of considerable relevance to the implementation and op-
eration of the SJ procedures during the first three years of their exis-
tence, it should be noted that the original proposal in 1986 generated
objections and controversy from some key quarters. Five commentators
on the proposed SJ rule-the Secretary of Labor and four of the
OSHRC's own ALJs-opposed its adoption, contending that there was
no need for a SJ procedure. 8 ' OSHRC disagreed, stating:
172. Id. § 2200.101(c)(2).
173. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.101(c)(2) (1991).
174. Id. § 2200.101(d)(3).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5, supra note 19, at 39-40.
178. Id. at 39.
179. See supra notes 126, 127 and accompanying text (providing statistics of ALJ
decisions resolved by settlement and those actually litigated).
180. 51 Fed. Reg. 32,014 (1986).
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[Tihere are a substantial number of cases in which use of the Settlement Judge
procedure can result in settlement of the case and avoidance of needless litiga-
tion. The Commission anticipates that this will occur, most commonly, in cases
where, at some time during the pre-hearing stage of the litigation, the parties
realize that they do not really want to go to trial but would prefer some other
means of resolving their dispute. The Commission believes that, if the option of a
mediated settlement is provided expressly and is available to the parties, they
will utilize the procedure."' 1
However, the OSHRC also took a cautious posture which did not
exactly get the SJ procedure off to a running start. In the explanatory
preface to its final rule, OSHRC "emphasized . . . that the rule has
been adopted and, particularly at the outset, will be implemented, on
an experimental basis. The procedure will be used sparingly at first un-
til problems can be worked out.
' 182
The new SJ procedures thus began with some handicaps: (1) almost
one-fourth of OSHRC's own eighteen ALJs183 were demonstrably
unenthusiastic about the procedures; (2) the DOL, the prosecutorial
arm of the adjudicative system, initially was opposed to using SJs; (3)
OSHRC itself suggested that SJs should be used sparingly; (4) there
was a long history of ninety percent settlement rates in any event; (5)
since the total caseload annually, at that time, was around 2,000, with
a ninety percent settlement rate, this meant that only about 200 or so
cases would be realistic candidates for SJ procedures; and (6) SJ pro-
ceedings, by their nature, should be relatively infrequent. In light of
such handicaps, the most surprising feature of the OSHRC experience
has not been the small number of cases in which SJ procedures have
been invoked, but the fact that a base of experience, some successful
use, and continuing, perhaps growing, support, exists for SJ procedures
at all.
It must be emphasized that with a total caseload of two or three
thousand cases in which only about ten percent ordinarily go to full
hearing, there should be only a relative handful of SJ proceedings. A
substantial upsurge in the number of SJ requests might be cause for
concern, indicating the possibility that the procedure is being used ex-
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. The OSHRC Annual Report for 1986 states that there were 18 ALJs em-
ployed and two of these were the Chief ALJ and the Deputy Chief ALJ. 1986 THE
PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 4 [hereinafter 1986 PRESIDENT'S REPORT].
ASSUMING THAT THE OBJECTIONS TO THE SJ PROPOSAL DID NOT COME FROM THE CHIEF
ALJ, IT IS LIKELY THAT ONE-FOURTH OF THE SITTING ALJs WHO PRESIDED OVER THE
VAST MAJORITY OF OSHRC CASES ALREADY HAD EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE SJ
PROCEDURES WERE UNNECESSARY.
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cessively and in situations where it is not particularly appropriate, effi-
cient, or useful. The SJ procedures are intended to be used when there
is some form of impasse or barrier to settlement. Nevertheless, the
small numbers should not detract from the significance of the proce-
dure and the importance of its availability. SJ procedures are for ex-
ceptional situations. Without SJ procedures, the only alternative in
those exceptional situations would be full litigation and an imposed res-
olution, rather than resolution by the parties.
However, the exceptional nature of SJ procedures itself signifies one
inherent problem which could be christened the "out-of-sight-out-of-
mind" syndrome. In the OSHA context the commonly used tools are
bilateral negotiations supplemented to a greater or lesser degree by or-
dinary ALJ encouragement to settle. These tools work, and have
worked rather successfully for more than fifteen years, in a system
where only about ten percent of the contested cases actually go to hear-
ing anyway.
Telling attorneys and ALJs experienced in working with the com-
monly-used tools that they should use the SJ procedures is akin to tell-
ing someone who regards himself as one of the world's ten best-dressed
men that he should consider buying a new suit. Those who are accus-
tomed to bilateral negotiation of settlements under the OSH Act sim-
ply may not appreciate the potential benefits of using a specialized pro-
cedure of recent vintage."" Needless to say, the private attorney who
seldom handles a contested OSHA case and who does not study the
OSHRC rules of procedure may not know about the SJ alternative at
all.
2. Actual OSHRC Experience and Operation185
The following account is based on the recollections of OSHRC ALJs
and DOL attorneys who provided information for this study during the
first six months of 1990. Human memory being imperfect, it should be
emphasized that the numbers below reflect estimates, unless otherwise
indicated.
184. Due to the confidentiality of the interviews conducted in researching this Arti-
cle, much of the following material is not supported by specific interview cites.
185. Summaries of all interviews conducted by the author in preparation of this
Article are on file both with The Administrative Law Journal and the author. This
Article does not cite to the names of ALJs, attorneys, and paralegals who were inter-
viewed during the author's research. The need for this form of confidentiality stems in
part from the generally confidential and sensitive nature of the mediation process and
in part from the OSHRC regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.101(c)(2) (1991) (forbid-
ding settlement judge to discuss merits of cases with any ALJ or other person).
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The number of SJ proceedings during the past two or three years
probably is larger than the total number recalled by those who pro-
vided information. However, the exact numbers are secondary to the
goal of obtaining information concerning the way in which the SJ pro-
cedures have been operating in actual practice.
Of the twelve ALJs contacted in the OSHRC field offices, five indi-
cated that they had not served as an SJ. The other seven estimated,
with varying degrees of certainty, the number of cases in which they
had served as an SJ. A total of about fifteen SJ proceedings can be
estimated as a reasonably conservative figure, but some of these were
reported as occurring rather soon after the SJ procedures took effect.
Recollections of the earlier and less memorable cases were hazy. These
ALJs provided fairly detailed information on six SJ proceedings.
Supervisory attorneys, Counsel for OSHA (Counsel), in six of the
eight regional solicitors' offices of the DOL were contacted. In addition,
information was sought from seven staff attorneys. Two of the six
Counsels reported no SJ cases, although one of them recalled that there
had been experimental use of the procedure in one case initiated by
OSHRC prior to the actual publication of the SJ rule in 1986. Four of
the staff attorneys had never been involved in an SJ procedure, and two
of the others had been contacted precisely because it was known that
they had been involved in SJ proceedings. In total, the Counsels and
attorneys recalled about nine SJ proceedings and provided fairly de-
tailed information concerning five of them. Of these five, three were the
same cases reported in some detail by the ALJs. These three cases pro-
vide, of course, an interesting opportunity to study the actual operation
of SJ procedures from the differing perspectives of the litigator and the
AL.
Overall, most of the observations, analysis, and recommendations of
the Joseph & Gilbert Report are fairly consistent with the OSHRC
experience as related by those who provided information for this Arti-
cle. Where it seemed to be effective, the SJ procedure did overcome
barriers to settlement posed by the adversarial situation, the attitudes
of the parties, and the parties' lack of appreciation for how the deciding
ALJ might view the case.186 Some of the OSHRC SJ cases could serve
as textbook models of how the process should work.
However, the Joseph & Gilbert Report may have understated or un-
deremphasized at least two important factors in the SJ process: (1) the
interest and aptitude of the appointed SJ,187 and (2) the need for the
186. See ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5, supra note 19, at 30-33.
187. Id. at 21.
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SJ to invest work and effort in becoming familiar with the case. 8' Al-
though the Joseph & Gilbert Report did not neglect these factors, the
OSHRC experience and the information obtained in this study, limited
as it is, indicates that they can be absolutely crucial.
Two of the most interesting cases resolved by an SJ involved trench-
ing standard violations. The first will be referred to as Case A, partly
in keeping with the spirit of the confidentiality of the SJ process, and,
in any event, because the DOL attorney who described the proceedings
did not remember the exact case name or docket number.
As described, Case A involved the death of an employee in a trench-
ing cave-in. Here, the SJ seems to have "broken the ice" by giving the
parties a candid "preview" of how an ALJ would regard the facts and
law of the case. The employer was a subcontractor at the excavation
site and the issues were fact-intensive, involving the classification of the
violation as "willful" and the employer's control over the exposure of
his employee to the hazardous violation at the worksite. A penalty of
about $48,000 had been proposed. The employer's attorney was partic-
ularly adamant regarding the classification of the violation as "willful."
The SJ appeared to be familiar with the evidence in the case, met pri-
vately with each party, and then jointly with them, candidly evaluating
the case as he saw it. The DOL attorney credited the SJ with helping
the parties to overcome a major hurdle in the case-the mixed legal
and factual issues of what constituted a "willful" violation of the stan-
dard and the requisite control. The SJ was described as candid but not
arrogant. He analyzed the evidence, simplified the issues, and commu-
nicated his perception of the evidence in the course of private meetings
and a joint conference which took a total of about two hours. One re-
sult was that the SJ's view of the case apparently convinced the em-
ployer's attorney that the violation as charged could be established.
The case settled with a reduction of approximately $16,000 in the pro-
posed penalty.
Another positive result attributed by the DOL attorney to the SJ
procedures was his perception of an improved relationship with the em-
ployer's attorney for settlement in future cases involving the attorney's
other clients. Although not discussed in the Joseph & Gilbert Report,
in retrospect the potential for this phenomenon seems natural. It is dis-
tinctly possible that an. attorney representing members of the regulated
industry after a positive experience with SJ proceedings, though not
necessarily a favorable result, would have more confidence in the good-
faith negotiating position of the DOL attorney. If the attorneys on both
188. Id. at 35.
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sides know that the SJ procedure is available, then a powerful check
exists against crude negotiating ploys such as posturing and bluffing.
The attorneys would realize that posturing and bluffing can be tested
by invoking the SJ procedure. Somewhat ironically, over the long run
this knowledge might reduce the actual number of times SJs are in-
voked by informed attorneys who acquire confidence in the bona fides
of the positions maintained by their adversary.
Case B involved a more recent trenching case and in many respects
could serve as a textbook example of SJ proceedings. There were no
fatalities; however there were citations for two "serious" and one
"other-than-serious" violations. In this case, the problems confronting
the SJ were somewhat more complex because the dispute was very
fact-intensive, turning on the application of the evidence to the stan-
dards in question. Again, the "preview" aspect appears to have been
crucial. However, because of the fact-intensive nature of the dispute,
the SJ had to do more preparation in order to be sufficiently familiar
with the case to be a credible mediator and "predicter." The SJ indi-
cates that he studied the file and materials obtained from the parties as
if he were actually preparing to hear the case. This was necessary be-
cause, among other things, the trenching standards themselves are
fairly complex with a substantial number of varying requirements de-
pending upon such factors as the type of soil in which the trench is
being dug. 189 Nor was the preparatory work limited to the SJ. He had
the parties furnish copies of their file materials to him, in the spirit of
laying "all cards on the table." Therefore, the SJ had an opportunity to
study documents, pleadings already filed, photographs, reports regard-
ing soil samples, and the positions of the parties. He also did a com-
puter search on all OSHRC trenching violation cases. Having
researched the law and studied the positions of the parties, and after
some preliminary coordinating calls and discussions, the SJ held a tele-
phone conference call with the parties, including the vice-president of
the employer-corporation, a few days after receiving the materials from
the parties. From the SI's perspective, the lengthy conference call
(about an hour-and-a-half) involved tough, step-by-step negotiation on
a number of key disputed factual issues. He indicated that the SJ pro-
cedure in this case could not have succeeded without both parties fur-
nishing to him their file materials so that he could take a "frank and
reasoned position" on the disputed matters. The ALJ also indicated
that all SJ proceedings would not necessarily require this much prepa-
ration, but that preparation commensurate with the nature of the dis-
189. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.651, .652 (1991).
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puted issues would be necessary. The SJ also indicated that he liked
the "feel of the process." This was the first case in which he had served
as a SJ, and he had gone into the process determined to make it work.
A true settlement resulted in the sense that both parties yielded some-
thing from their previous positions. For example, one of the violations
was, in effect, reduced from "serious" to "other-than-serious," and the
penalties were reduced. The employer receded from its earlier position
that there had been no violation. Prior to the SJ proceedings the parties
had been at a virtual impasse. As recounted by the DOL attorney, the
SJ's methodology included, among other things, a frank appraisal of
the evidence in terms such as, "If I were the trial judge, this is what I'd
be looking at, this is what would impress me, and this is what would
not." The SJ pointed out weaknesses in the cases of both parties, giving
them a candid "preview." The employer's attorney indicated that both
he and the DOL attorney believed they had strong cases. He neverthe-
less felt that the case was one which should be negotiated and one in
which the parties and their negotiations would benefit if they were able
to discern where the OSHRC "was coming from." He stated that the
SJ had done a fine job in handling the case, and noted that the tele-
phone conference call and the whole procedure had saved his client
time and expense. In addition, it should be noted that the SJ, when
interviewed, expressed a strong pro-settlement attitude in general. He
indicated that settlements should be encouraged and mentioned his
practice of raising the possibility of settlement in all cases prior to pre-
hearing conferences, at pre-hearing conferences, and even after
hearings.
In two other cases, Cases C and D, the SJ procedure seems to have
been helpful in dealing with another factor noted by the Joseph & Gil-
bert Report-the attitude of the client as an obstacle to the attorneys'
settlement negotiations.1 90 In Case C, both the SJ and the DOL attor-
ney recalled the case which essentially had reached an impasse on the
amount of civil penalties. However, the case also involved potential sub-
stantive complexities because there were many citations involving haz-
ard communication and safety training standards, and the violations
fell into the so-called "egregious" category. The proposed penalties to-
taled approximately $400,000. During a one-hour conference call, the
SJ pointed out that it looked like an actual trial of the case could be
very long and drawn out, involving relatively new standards and viola-
tions, some of which might be difficult to prove. The SJ apparently
emphasized the relatively small size of the company, the fact that it
190. ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5, supra note 19, at 26-27.
1991]
596 THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL
was already in some financial difficulties, and the ALJ and OSHRC's
range of discretion in assessing penalties. Even if a large penalty was
assessed, the government might have "to stand in line," so to speak,
with a lot of other creditors. The SJ also reminded both parties that the
case would have to be set for hearing in the relatively near future. The
SJ's evaluation and "preview" in this case probably significantly influ-
enced the DOL attorney's client to agree to a dramatically reduced
penalty, approximately $30,000. In the absence of such a "preview,"
the DOL authorities could have been without much justification in ap-
proving such a reduction.
Case D, a recent case in which a settlement had been reached but
the paperwork was incomplete at the time of interview, involved a vio-
lation of the "general duty" clause, pertaining to exposure to toxic sub-
stances in confined spaces. The central issues involved operational and
other changes necessary to abate the violation, matters on which spe-
cial technical expertise would be needed. There were several conference
calls, and the SJ asked the parties to call him every two weeks to report
on the progress of their negotiations. The SJ indicated that much of the
problem in this case was the attorneys' need to get the clients' approval
on technologically complex matters. He recognized that the clients
would have to be "sold" on a settlement and that the attorneys would
have to do much of the "selling." He also indicated that the SJ proce-
dure could be helpful in cases where the attorneys were willing to set-
tle, but the clients were reluctant. The SJ's evaluation and views could
be impressed on the clients, shifting the onus for potential break-
through initiatives in negotiations to the SJ.
Another very recent case is particularly notable for the technique
used by the SJ. The case arose out of an accident resulting in perma-
nent, crippling injuries to an employee. A scaffold was involved, and
civil personal injury litigation was pending. The violations alleged in-
volved improper employee training and improper inspection of the scaf-
folding. There were issues involving application of the standards to the
facts of the particular case. For example, the building had been under
construction and was in the process of being turned over to the owner
for occupancy. The standard itself required inspection every thirty
days.
At the outset of the SJ procedures the parties were not inclined to-
ward settling the case. An initial telephone conference call was fruit-
less. The SJ arranged for an in-person conference, which included both
the attorneys and the principals. The SJ used an innovative technique
loosely based on procedures used in a federal district court. He con-
ducted the proceedings in a room which had an adjoining chamber. He
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began by having both parties summarize their side of the case from
their respective viewpoints. Then he met with each side separately, for
about fifteen minutes at a time. The procedure seems to have been very
efficient and very effective.
The SJ used his private conferences with the parties to address a
cluster of related matters. During the first conference with the parties
representing the government, he concentrated on their legal theories of
liability under the standards and indicated his reservations about those
theories. He indicated what he believed to be significant problems, and
indicated how he would view those problems if he were the deciding
ALJ. Then, after about fifteen minutes, he adjourned that conference
and conducted a similar conference with the employer's representatives,
where he concentrated on problems with their defenses. Next, he recon-
vened the government's representatives, this time concentrating on
facts and evidentiary matters. Strengths and weaknesses in proof were
pointed out. Likewise, in the next separate session with the employer's
representatives the SJ addressed problems of proof, such as reconstruc-
tion of the accident and witnesses.
A key feature of this "rotating" technique was that it kept the mo-
mentum going in the process while allowing the parties to confer after
each segment and assess their position. By narrowing the issues, and
maintaining some mild pressure for intensive re-examination, the pro-
cess became dynamic.
While the technique certainly is not a cure-all or universally applica-
ble, it proved very effective in this instance. Instead of a lengthy con-
ference, after which everyone went home and thought about it, the par-
ties had time to confer on discrete aspects of the case, reassess their
positions, and consider the issues which had been broken down into
manageable segments. The opportunity for the parties to confer among
themselves provided an immediate "reality check," as the SJ put it.
However, as the SJ emphasized, it is crucial that the parties do not
feel they are being "railroaded" into a settlement. They must feel they
are. part of the process and involved in the resolution of the case. A
"blunt" approach can backfire. Therefore, the particular technique
used in this case requires finesse by the SJ, and works best when the
principals, not just the lawyers, are present. However, the strongest as-
pect of the system is the way in which the rotating conference offers
opportunities for a party's representatives to confer among themselves.
This not only lends dynamism to the process, but allows an alert SJ to
recognize, through the party's reactions during the next round of dis-
cussion, whether he might have erred on the side of bluntness. If so,
more finesse can be applied. If the parties simply adjourned after a
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group conference, with only one meeting with each side, the SJ would
be less likely to recognize any signals demonstrating that a shift in ne-
gotiating tactics might be advisable. After the parties had left for the
day, it would be too late.
In the case being examined, however, the dynamics of the process
had early results. By the end of two conferences both sides were in a
"settlement mode." The agenda decidedly had shifted to achieving set-
tlement. The parties definitely were motivated to settle, and the confer-
ences, using the same format, shifted to a focus on how to settle. One
alleged violation was withdrawn, and the wording of the other citation
was modified, with the amount of proposed penalty remaining the
same. The SJ also made sure that a settlement agreement was drafted
during the session so that the parties agreed on the precise wording of
the agreement before the proceedings ended.
Again, the particular technique used in this case is not foolproof, but
it does demonstrate at least two important points. First, an SJ must be
alert to the possibilities of innovative techniques and well versed in dif-
ferent approaches to conducting a conference. The SJ needs some mas-
tery over a fairly broad range of strategies and techniques. Second, the
settlement process should be no less dynamic than an actual trial. Set-
tlements achieved by crude horse-trading may not lead to a very satis-
factory resolution of the dispute. Getting the parties involved, keeping
them moving, and motivating them to reassess their positions instills a
sense of participation which, as this case suggests, can be very effective
and efficient. Trial of the case probably would have taken two days, a
thick transcript, post-hearing briefs, and approximately a week to write
the AL's decision. Moreover, by assuring that the representatives of
the principals were present, potential further delays were avoided.
There was no need to wait for a week or two while the attorneys
"sold", or perhaps even failed to "sell", the settlement to their respec-
tive clients.
In two cases where information from both the ALJ and DOL attor-
.neys was obtained, the SJ procedures did not, as such, result in a settle-
ment. However, the parties requested that the SJ continue to serve as
the regular hearing ALJ. Both cases eventually settled, one virtually on
the day of the hearing. Both involved a large number of cited violations
and substantial proposed penalties.
Not all SJ procedures are always successful. One case involving a
penalty under $1,000, noise violations, and disputed facts regarding the
operation of fork lift trucks, seems to have been a complete failure. The
SJ procedure did not result in settlement, and the net result was a two-
month delay in resolving or hearing the case.
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However, interest in using SJs seems to be growing. The OSHRC
Chief ALJ has reported that at least three more SJ proceedings, not
discussed in this Article, were pending as of June 20, 1990.
3. Analysis and Synthesis
a. Generally
Although there were variations in the detailed accounts of particular
cases and in the perceptions and opinions of the participants, there was
a fair degree of consensus regarding key factors and variables in decid-
ing to invoke SJ proceedings, and in the successful and unsuccessful
use of the SJ technique. Several factors are crucial to invoking a SJ
proceeding: (1) knowledge, awareness, and understanding of the proce-
dure; (2) the individual's confidence in the procedure; and (3) the indi-
vidual's willingness to take some risks associated with the process. Cru-
cial factors in the successful use of the SJ proceedings are: (1) the
attitude, personality, and effort of the SJ; (2) the type of case; and (3)
the parties' own situations and attitudes.
b. Factors and Variables
i. Factors in Deciding to Invoke the SJ Proceedings
(1) Knowledge, Awareness, and Understanding
As elementary as it sounds, parties cannot invoke a procedure which
they do not know exists. Many employers' attorneys may not be aware
that the SJ procedure even exists unless they litigate frequently under
the OSH Act. One ALJ indicated that it was rare for the parties to
even bring up the possibility of a SJ and expressed the opinion that the
ALJs might need to take a more active role in suggesting it.
Closely related to the lack of knowledge about the SJ procedure is
the lack of awareness about the procedure. An attorney may "know" in
the abstract that a seldom-used procedure exists, but still may not be
"aware" of it, in the sense of being alert to the possibilities of its use in
a particular case. Related to knowledge and awareness of the SJ proce-
dure is the factor of understanding its key distinguishing features and
the advantages of those features. An attorney who understands the na-
ture of the SJ procedures is in a position to invoke them in appropriate
situations, neither ignoring nor over-using them. At one extreme were
those who seemed to understand clearly the nature of the SJ proce-
dures. One of the DOL attorneys who seemed to be most knowledgea-
ble and enthusiastic about SJ procedures also demonstrated an excel-
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lent understanding of the advantages, disadvantages, and limits of the
procedures. This attorney understood rather clearly that: (1) the SJ
procedures are designed for impasse situations, for example, where the
lawyer or client was "adamant" in adhering to a weak position; (2) the
SJ is essentially a mediator, a role which requires skill and preparation;
(3) there are some kinds of cases where the parties can "sort through"
complex or disputed issues better and more effectively "around a table"
with a SJ; and (4) the SJ is of no benefit in situations where the parties
are likely to negotiate successfully.
At the other extreme, one ALJ mentioned a case where the em-
ployer's attorney had totally misunderstood the nature of the SJ pro-
ceedings. Somehow, the attorney had formed the impression that the
only way to settle a case was to invoke the SJ proceedings.
In between these extremes, the information gathered in the course of
preparing this Article indicated varying degrees of understanding of the
process. There were ALJs who indicated, directly or indirectly, that
they believed the SJ procedures added very little because they are very
similar to the regular ALJ procedures. At least one ALJ raised the
possibility that, at least in some of the early SJ cases, the parties had
invoked the SJ procedures in order to avoid or delay filing detailed
pleadings, or utilized the SJ proceedings as something of a general de-
laying tactic. From the other side of the bench, some DOL attorneys
also indicated that there was little difference between SJ procedures
and the conduct of those ALJs who are somewhat active in encourag-
ing settlements. One indicated that there was little reason to take a
case out of its normal track if the ALJ was giving the parties plenty of
time to negotiate a settlement themselves. Some of those interviewed
indicated that they could not recall any case where there had been a
need for a "mediator" in the sense of the full SJ model, or where they
had encountered any scenario of the "recalcitrant client" who was im-
peding an attorney's settlement efforts. Two attorneys who had been
involved in SJ proceedings indicated that the SJ really had not used the
full range of techniques available: their perception was that the SJ
"didn't do much" or "never was 'actively' involved."
None of the above should be regarded as criticism of those involved.
However, among the SJs and the attorneys there appears to be a some-
what hazy notion of how and when a SJ could be most valuable, and
precisely what a SJ could do that a regular ALJ could not do.
Given OSHRC's limited resources and its small number of ALJs,
optimum use of SJs requires a realistic appreciation of the key differ-
ences between the settlement-inducing powers and limits of an ALJ
and a SJ. A SJ is more than a new face in the negotiations, a substitute
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for the assigned ALJ, or a tactic to gain time.
(2) Confidence in SJs: Experience, Expectations, and Perceptions
A key factor in invoking the SJ procedures is the attorney's confi-
dence in the procedure. This confidence, or lack of it, is a result of a
number of elements. The primary factors are the attorney's experience
with ALJs generally and his expectations for, and perceptions of, the
SJ process. For example, attorneys who conclude that the SJ "did not
do much" or "did not become actively involved," will not perceive the
SJ process as being very different from the ordinary pre-trial settle-
ment process; they will have low expectations relative to any future use
of SJs. Those expectations will be communicated throughout the par-
ticular regional office very quickly, and the institutional memory will
work against future use of SJs.
A more serious problem of confidence can arise for attorneys who
have formed a negative perception regarding certain ALJs on the basis
of experience in past hearings and litigation. These attorneys will lack
confidence in those ALJs' ability to function as SJs. Under the present
system SJs are assigned on a rotational basis; often an individual was
designated to serve as the SJ in their office for a six-month period. The
parties cannot select a particular ALJ to serve as the SJ because seri-
ous problems of unbalanced workloads might arise if the parties could
select a SJ.'9 ' With no assurance of who will be appointed SJ, some
attorneys will be inclined against invoking the SJ procedures because
they perceive no advantages. They perceive only the negative possibili-
ties of an unfavorable SJ armed with the power of ex parte contacts
and the authority to probe and comment on the merits of their case.
The present time limits on the SJ process also could be classified as a
factor which influences the confidence level in the SJ process. Under
present rules, the SJ process is limited to a total of sixty-five days.192 If
a case is complex, involving a union and many cited violations and is-
sues, one could conclude that sixty days probably would be insufficient
for proper mediation.
However, the time-limit problem poses something of a conundrum.
191. If the parties could choose SJs like parties choose arbitrators the same kind of
situation might arise which occured with labor arbitrators. In the late 1970's it was
estimated that 90% of collective bargaining agreement arbitrations were heard by 10%
of the available arbitrators. R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RE-
LATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 1979) (citing 1977 LABOR RELATIONS
YEARBOOK 206 (1978)).
192. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.101(a)(3), 2200.101(d) (1991) (allocating 45 days for
SJ process and giving Chief ALJ power to grant 20-day extention if parties consent).
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On the one hand, the SJ process loses all credibility if it is used as a
device to delay litigation. A time frame of limited duration is crucial in
order to assure that the SJ process is efficient and effective. On the
other hand, this situation brings to the surface a factor too often under-
emphasized by ADR enthusiasts. In a difficult case mediation is time
consuming and labor intensive. If the system is unwilling to invest and
risk time, talent, and effort in the mediation of complex and difficult
cases, mediation should not even be attempted in those cases. Although
it may be an extreme and unusual example, one instance of complex,
time-consuming mediation in the field of urban planning involved
twenty-three group meetings during a period of ten weeks.193
Fortunately, in the context of the time limits on the SJ process, at
least two possibilities exist for handling the problem under current
OSHRC rules. First, there is a general waiver provision in the OSHRC
rules. Under 29 C.F.R. section 2200.107, "[iun special circumstances
not contemplated by the provisions of these rules or for good cause
shown, the Commission or Judge may, upon application by any party
• . .waive any rule or make such orders as justice or the administra-
tion of the Act requires."1 94 The OSHRC Chief ALJ also has sug-
gested an intriguing possibility, for creative use of the SJ in complex
cases involving many cited violations, such as the so-called "egregious"
cases. Nowhere do the OSHRC SJ rules absolutely require the SJ to
tackle the entire case. The SJ process is not an all-or-nothing concept.
In fact, the rules are rather explicit. "The Judge shall confer with the
parties on subjects and issues of whole or partial settlement of the
case." 9 "The Judge shall seek resolution of as many of the issues in
the case as is feasible."1 96 As suggested by the Chief ALJ, it is entirely
possible that a SJ could take a "slice" of a case and run it through the
SJ process, perhaps a "cross-section" of representative violations, which
could give the parties an effective preview of key or typical parts of
their cases.
In addition, another possibility is reflected in the way in which the
parties responded to the problem in an actual case which involved,
among other things, so many cited violations that the complaint alone
was more than 150 pages long. The parties requested that the SJ con-
tinue serving as the ALJ assigned to hear the case. A settlement, al-
193. L. SINGER, supra note 112, at 139.
194. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.107 (1991) (emphasis added).
195. Id. § 2200.101(b)(1) (emphasis added).
196. Id. § 2200.101(b)(4) (emphasis added).
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though at the last minute before the hearing, ultimately resulted.
(3) Willingness to Take Risks
An employer's attorney interviewed in connection with a SJ case he
had handled accurately pinpointed the core problem and risk in settle-
ment negotiations generally: "No one likes to make the first move." He
described his decision to invoke the SJ procedure as "a delicate call."
This expresses the essence of another important factor, rather intangi-
ble and highly personal to the individual attorneys involved: a willing-
ness to take risks associated with settlements in general, and with the
use of the SJ procedure in particular.
No responsible attorney wants to be perceived by the other side as
negotiating from a position of weakness. To "make the first move" en-
tails the risk of being perceived as admitting some weakness in one's
case. If dealing with a pro se respondent or an attorney with whom
they have had no previous contacts, the DOL attorneys may have some
reservations about taking the settlement initiative. This is not a prob-
lem with attorneys who are familiar with the OSHRC system and
know that ninety percent of the contested cases are settled. The expec-
tation there is one of a negotiated settlement.
However, the DOL attorneys and private attorneys who work regu-
larly with OSHA have a special problem if they invoke the SJ proce-
dures. It must be emphasized that none of the individuals contacted for
this Article expressed the problem in quite this way, but from the inter-
views there gradually emerged an impression of a sense of reluctance to
admit that the norm of bilateral negotiations had failed. In a system
where ninety percent of the contested cases are negotiated bilaterally to
settlement, invoking the intervention of a SJ borders on appearing to
admit that one's own negotiating skills have failed. There may be some
reluctance, at least subconsciously, to invoke an exceptional and ex-
traordinary procedure which suggests a departure from the norm.
Another problem peculiar to the SJ procedure also could have some
impact on the system's effectiveness. Candid disclosures about one's
case, including inevitably the disclosure of some elements of one's anal-
ysis and strategic thinking, are necessary for effective functioning of
the SJ process. However, disclosures involve very real risks touching
upon delicate considerations of professional responsibility. Although the
OSHRC rules of confidentiality in the SJ process mitigate these con-
cerns, no rules can protect completely against the subtle and indirect
benefits which a skilled adversary can gain, quite ethically, from the SJ
process. The attorney who invokes the SJ procedure must consider the
19911
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possibility that the SJ will not achieve a settlement and the case will go
to trial. The disclosures, and the "preview" on the merits, often so inte-
gral and crucial to successful use of the SJ process, can also suggest
ways in which the adversary can strengthen his case.
ii. Factors in Successful Use of SJ Procedures
(1) The SJ
The individuals who furnished information for this study, and all
other sources of data, confirmed a truism, but it is a truism which is
worth confirming. The single most important factor in the SJ process is
the SJ. After all, if the parties have been unable to achieve settlement
among themselves, it simply stands to reason that the outcome of the
SJ process hinges on the SJ. But what is it about the SJ that makes the
process successful or not? What qualities and characteristics and ac-
tions affect the outcome?
To the extent that there were common denominators among the
DOL attorneys who voiced an opinion, it was the importance of the SJ.
There were variations on two sometimes overlapping themes: the im-
portance of the personality and abilities of the SJ and what the SJ did
or should do. In terms of the personality and abilities of the SJ, signifi-
cant phrases elicited during the interviews included: a skilled negotia-
tor; one who can keep a dialogue going; one who can concisely articu-
late an analysis which is sensible to the parties; a "people person" who
has an ability to deal with people, to listen, and to get to the heart of
the issue, without insulting anyone; an inclination to get involved; an
ability to establish rapport; and candidness. In terms of what the SJ
did or should do, the following characteristics were mentioned: keep a
dialogue going; know about the case; get to the heart of the issue; listen
to the parties; do not insult the parties; get involved and tell the parties
how he perceives the case; establish rapport; be well prepared; point out
what he would consider if he were the ALJ; and point out the strengths
and weaknesses of the parties' positions.
The ALJs themselves tended to agree, directly or indirectly, but
there was less emphasis on attitude and personality and more emphasis
on what the SJs did or should do. Among the factors the ALJs men-
tioned directly were: the SJ's attitude; getting the parties in. the proper
settlement frame of mind; going into the process determined to make it
work; setting an agenda; giving the parties goals and homework; keep-
ing their feet to the fire; and maintaining the dignity of the proceedings
but avoiding rigid formalities. There were also some remarks which in-
directly, and probably unintentionally, reflected the importance of the
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attitude and techniques of the SJ. Among the ALJs, there was some
mention of: (1) the fact that the SJ process could require more time
and preparation than some ALJs might want to invest; (2) a concern
about proper weight and credit in the AL's statistics for handling SJ
cases; and (3) a summary of the ALl's procedures as SJ-giving the
parties an initial talk, encouraging settlement, or discussing with them
alternatives to settlement such as delay, costs, and confrontation.
Some felt that the SJ procedure did not add much to the system and
was very similar to regular procedures. This opinion was not un-
founded. An ALJ who wants to facilitate and prod parties toward set-
tlement can exert considerable pressure. Inflections of voice, body lan-
guage, ambiguous remarks, hypotheticals, reminiscences about past
cases or cases read, and rhetorical questions can, up to a point, have
the same impact that a SJ can have. However, these are all ambiguous
and potentially irritating signals. One virtue of the SJ procedure is that
the SJ can go beyond the "up to a point." The SJ has no need to be
Delphic, just diplomatic.
There was a consensus, however, on the importance of the SI's atti-
tude, personality, interpersonal skills, and preparation. This consensus
supports the Joseph & Gilbert Report's point that not every ALJ nec-
essarily has the aptitude for, and interest in, being a SJ.197 The consen-
sus as to the importance of the Si's preparation, particularly among
the attorneys who had appeared before SJs, emphasizes a factor which
may not have received sufficient attention in the past. A SJ has to do
enough homework to be familiar with the case and to appear credible
to those whose dispute he is mediating. The perception of the parties
regarding the SJ's efforts are very important. A recent book 98 on ADR
has indicated, anecdotally at least, the importance of this factor. "The
parties were impressed by the mediators' willingness to put in long
hours in order to learn the necessary terminology."' 99 The SJ who dem-
onstrates a lack of preparation communicates an indifferent attitude,
and he may be totally ineffective unless he is later able to counteract
the parties' impression of his indifference.
One of the most interesting aspects of the SJ cases studied involves
situations in which the parties requested the SJ to continue as the pre-
siding and deciding ALJ, after the period for completing SJ proceed-
ings had elapsed. The OSHRC Chief ALJ confirmed that it was not
unusual for the parties to request that the SJ stay on the case as the
197. ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5, supra note 19, at 21.
198. L. SINGER, supra note 112.
199. Id. at 139.
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deciding ALJ. This Article's sources indicated that the SJ continued on
as the ALJ in four cases. It appears that those cases all ultimately were
settled.
Although outside the scope of this Article, such developments, and
the ADR experience generally, may call for a re-examination of what
makes for a good adjudicator and what conduct by an adjudicator will
be acceptable to the parties. The traditional and popular image of the
proper judge as a detached, somewhat aloof individual who is rigorous
in his logic and self-discipline may need to be tempered a bit. Rapport,
trust, respect, empathy, an ability to communicate sympathetically, and
other virtues may be more important than the mechanics of avoiding ex
parte contacts and the like.
Closely related to the SJ's personality and preparation is the SJ's
basic mind-set or judicial philosophy. No particular questions, inter-
views, or sources of information specifically gave rise to the following
observations. However, the cumulative impact of various comments,
statements, remarks, and even casual conversations resulted in the dis-
tinct, but subjective, impression that ALJs tend to fall into one of two
philosophical camps: (1) those who adhere generally to the more tradi-
tional view of the adjudicator as primarily and foremost an umpire,
who knows that most cases will settle but realizes the occasional need
to encourage the parties to settle as a matter of case management; and
(2) those who adhere to a slightly different model with a somewhat
greater emphasis on resolving disputes and managing a caseload effec-
tively. This impression, supported by remarks of some DOL attorneys
and ALJs, is reflected in the fact that they would like to see more ALJs
get involved in the settlement process.
Although ALJs' perceptions of their role in the SJ process differs,
one point is clear. The ALl's opinion regarding his role in the process
is a significant factor or variable in SJ proceedings. An ALJ who is
unaccustomed to an active role in the negotiating process, whose prior
conditioning and outlook have attuned him to the predominately "um-
pire" role, will be uncomfortable when serving in the more activist role
of a SJ. Those who enjoy attempting to resolve disputes, who believe
that many cases could be resolved through means other than trial and
that ALJs do not always put the case in a settlement posture, will be
more comfortable in the SJ role.
(2) Type of Case
The type of case was also explored and mentioned during the inter-
views. The opinions fell into two categories. There were individuals
[VOL. 5:555
JUDGES AND SIMPLIFIED PROCEEDINGS
who, based on their experience, expressed views which were consistent
with the Joseph & Gilbert Report.20 0 These individuals viewed the
most likely candidates for SJ proceedings to be cases involving: (1) the
amount of penalties; (2) the classification of violations, such as wilfull
versus serious, or serious versus "other"; (3) unsophisticated respon-
dents; (4) no major legal issues; (5) issues which would take a lot of
time to resolve during trial; and (6) a large number of violations or
issues. They viewed the least likely candidates to be causes involving:
(1) major legal issues; (2) complex facts; (3) credibility issues; and (4)
parties who were not genuinely interested in settlement.
However, a few individuals who had been involved in the SJ process,
including the OSHRC Chief ALJ, had a somewhat more expansive
view of the potential for SJ proceedings. One DOL attorney concluded
that SJ proceedings could, if used properly, be valuable in almost any
kind of case including those with many complex problems, numerous
issues, and even unique or novel issues; the "feeling" was expressed
that cases with such issues were of a sort which the parties could "sort
through" better with a SJ around a table than by using traditional
techniques. An ALJ believed that most or at least a large percentage of
cases could lend themselves to the successful use of SJs. Likewise, the
Chief ALJ, having seen reports from all SJs, expressed the view that
SJs could be effective in complex cases involving arcane subjects or
even a new standard.
The number of actual cases on which there was enough data to ven-
ture an analysis was small. Therefore, any conclusions must be very
guarded. For cases where fairly definite information was available,
however, some of the most successful cases involved a relatively limited
range of fact-oriented issues applying a substantive regulation to the
particular facts of the case. This was the case with the two trenching
cases described earlier in this Article. Others involved penalties or dis-
puted matters which, to the extent that they were recalled, did not in-
volve policy, precedent-setting issues, or particularly complex, arcane
subject matter. Nevertheless, there were some issues which involved:
(1) highly technical aspects of the employer's operation; (2) special
technical expertise and expert witnesses; or (3) a relatively new
standard.
Accordingly, opinions and cases in which information was available
indicate that the SJ procedure works well, all other factors being equal,
in cases presenting factual issues of limited precedential value. This is
especially true with cases which have issues involving the application of
200. See ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5, supra note 19, at 39-40.
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law or regulations to the facts of the individual case. However, the
available information and opinions indicate that the type of case, in
terms of the type of issue, is not a factor which would outweigh or
overwhelm other variables, notably the ability and effort of the SJ and
the parties themselves.
Upon reviewing the information received from various individuals
during the course of this study, a few other miscellaneous but interest-
ing points emerged. First, ALJs who had served as SJs varied consider-
ably in estimating the time and additional number of SJ cases which
they believed they could handle without cutting into their regular
caseload. One ALJ did not offer a precise figure, but indicated that
some SJ proceedings are not particularly time consuming, while others,
if handled properly, might require more time than some ALJs might
want to invest. Another, whose service as a SJ in one case involved
primarily a one-hour conference, concluded, of course, that a signifi-
cant number of cases could be handled in this way without interfering
with the time available for other cases. Another indicated that, in light
of generally increasing caseloads, more SJ proceedings would further
encroach on time available for other cases. Another estimated a capac-
ity to absorb approximately ten SJ cases while maintaining their cur-
rent workload. Overall, and discounting the fortunate ALJ whose SJ
proceedings took only one hour, the ability of the present ALJs20 1 to
absorb a significant number of SJ proceedings without detriment to
their other cases seems to be limited.
Second, of the ALJs who had served as SJs, two of those who were
most supportive of the SJ procedures also indicated that they had had
cases during the last two years which could have benefitted from the
use of a SJ. One stated, "Yes, especially after three or four hours [of
hearing] the case." Another stated that the SJ process could be benefi-
cial in a number of cases, but it depended to a large extent on the
lawyers. Others were more or less negative, or voiced no opinion as to
the expansion of the SJ program.
(3) The Parties
As indicated generally by the Joseph & Gilbert Report, no true set-
tlement technique can be imposed successfully on parties who are com-
pletely against settlement. By giving each party absolute "veto" power,
the rules governing SJ procedures contemplate parties who have not
entirely rejected the possibility of settlement. This brings into play the
201. - There are approximately 18 ALJs, two of whom are committed to substantial
administrative duties as Chief ALJ and Deputy Chief AL.
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factor or variable of the parties themselves.
Among those interviewed, the parties' attitude and approach did not
go unmentioned. Both an ALJ and a DOL attorney affirmatively indi-
cated that the SJ procedure would be least likely to succeed in a case in
which one or both parties were not using the proceedings properly or in
good faith. Others commented on the importance of the parties' cooper-
ation in the outcome of SJ proceedings.
As with ALJs, litigators and parties share a range of temperaments
and outlooks. Although it is probably more accurate to speak in terms
of extremes along a spectrum of possibilities, it is convenient and accu-
rate to conclude that some are more settlement-prone than others. Of
course, a party's position in a particular case may be dictated by exter-
nal forces, the demands of the situation, or policy considerations. But
over the long-term, the more an attorney actively enjoys the profes-
sional challenge of settling a case and resolving a dispute, the more
likely he is to be a positive factor in successfully using the SJ proce-
dures. The more combative, aggressive, adversarial, and prone to a win-
lose philosophy, the less likely he is to be a positive factor in the SJ
procedures.
All lawyers regularly involved in practice before the OSHRC are ori-
ented towards settlement. But attitude and personal philosophy can
make a difference in successful use of SJ procedures. At one extreme,
the attorney who approaches every case with the sincere attitude of
"how can we resolve this case," keeping in mind the goal of protecting
peoples' lives and health, and who believes that virtually all cases po-
tentially can be settled, stakes out a "high ground." It is more difficult
to be adversarial and stubborn in the face of such a position. An im-
passe, if one occurs, is more likely to be the result of good faith differ-
ences which can benefit from mediation, rather than the result of stub-
born adherence to hardened adversarial positions.
4. Summary
Overall, the OSHRC experience with SJs confirms several basic
points, conclusions, and recommendations of the Joseph & Gilbert Re-
port. The SJ procedures are a valuable adjunct which, when properly
used, can facilitate and achieve settlements in cases which would other-
wise go to a hearing. The "preview" aspect of SJ proceedings seems to
be particularly effective and dramatic in its impact on the parties.
A most interesting development has been the emergence of cases in
which SJ proceedings did not result in immediate settlement, but may
have facilitated eventual settlement, particularly in cases involving nu-
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merous violations. With hindsight, this seems to be a natural offshoot
of the SJ process. Perhaps the SJ has "thawed" the settlement "ice,"
rather than "broken" it. Of course, no one can say with any degree of
certainty that a particular case would have settled anyway without the
mediation and intercession of a SJ. However, it is significant that the
parties themselves sometimes have requested the SJ to continue as the
deciding ALJ in the case, and that all of those cases were later settled.
Some kind of chemistry was at work in those cases. Although the
OSHRC SJ rules provided for the parties to make such a request, it
was apparently not foreseen that it would be invoked very often. The
Chief ALJ described this development as "surprising."
Not quite as surprising was the infrequency with which the SJ proce-
dure has been invoked. In terms of absolute numbers, SJs should be
seldom used. The whole idea behind the SJ procedure is its extraordi-
nary, exceptional nature. It supplements rather than displaces the par-
ties' settlement negotiations. In the context of OSHRC litigation, with
a ninety percent settlement rate, the absolute number of SJ cases
should be modest. This fact does not detract from the importance of
the availability of the SJ procedure, however.
If anything, there is a slight risk that encouragement of SJ proceed-
ings could jeopardize the system. Both in terms of the capacity of the
limited number of OSHRC ALJs to absorb additional workload in the
face of rising numbers of contested cases, and in terms of disappointed
expectations, too many SJ proceedings could be worse than too few. It
would only take a few unsuccessful SJ proceedings to solidify and in-
crease the perception that the SJs do not add much to the process.
At any rate, there are certain factors and variables which seem sig-
nificant in a party's threshhold decision to invoke the SJ proceedings.
First, and most obvious, a party must know that the procedure exists.
Second, but not quite so obvious, a party must be alert to the possibility
of using the SJ procedures and have a solid understanding of how the
SJ differs from the ALJ in terms of powers and authority. Third, and
closely related, a party must have confidence in the SJ procedure.
Successful use of the SJ procedure hinges primarily upon the SJ,
assuming that the parties are proceeding in good faith, have reached
some impasse, and are genuinely interested in resolving the dispute
short of full litigation. It should be emphasized that this latter qualifi-
cation is not phrased in terms of the parties being interested merely in
achieving a settlement. Aside from a few individuals who are obsessive-
compulsive exhibitionists, lawyers and clients prefer settlement to the
hazards and stress of a courtroom. But they prefer to get settlements
on their own terms, thinking of settlements in terms of what they get,
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rather than what they might have to give. The process stands or falls
on the SI's attitude, skills, preparation as a mediator, and his use of the
additional available tools.
5. Impediments to the Effective Use of SJs
The main impediments to the effective use of SJs can be summarized
as follows: (1) among those who do not regularly handle OSHA cases,
a lack of knowledge exists that SJ procedures are available; (2) among
those who regularly handle OSHA cases, a tendency exists to be insuf-
ficiently alert to the possibilities of using an SJ because it is an ex-
traordinary procedure intended for exceptional situations; (3) it oper-
ates in a system where ninety percent of the cases are settled anyway;
and (4) a perception exists that the ability of a SJ to facilitate settle-
ment is not dramatically greater than that of an ALJ, which is sympto-
matic of an insufficient understanding or appreciation of the difference
between SJs and regular ALJs, particularly the additional powers and
authority of a SJ.
C. OSHRC Simplified Proceedings
1. Contrast to SJ Procedures and Summary of OSHRC Simplified
Proceedings
In contrast to the SJ procedures, OSHRC's simplified proceedings
are a very different kind of ADR mechanism. The use of a SJ tempora-
rily removes the case from the litigation mainstream for intensive medi-
ation efforts by a specially assigned ALJ. A party participating in the
SJ procedure surrenders virtually no procedural rights, and the SJ pro-
cedure does not alter the rest of the litigation process. Simplified pro-
ceedings, however, involve the waiver of potentially important rights
and can modify significantly the litigation process itself.
The essence of an OSHRC simplified proceedings case lies in what it
eliminates; what it does not allow or require the parties to do. There
are no pleadings, no complaint, and no answer.20 2 The only documents
initially informing the parties of each other's positions are the citation,
which may contain little more than a close paraphrase of the standards
allegedly violated, and the respondent's notice of contest, which may be
a simple blanket statement contesting all citations and proposed penal-
ties. Pre-trial discovery is not allowed except by order of the ALJ.203
202. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.205(a) (1991).
203. Id. § 2200.210.
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OSHRC's policy guidance to its ALJs on discovery is fairly clear. The
"purpose" section of the OSHRC simplified proceedings rules states
that "discovery is generally not permitted."" 4 This limitation goes be-
yond discountenancing complicated and time-consuming depositions.
Requests for admissions or production of documents, and even rela-
tively simple interrogatories, are discouraged if not largely precluded
under the simplified proceedings rules. Pre-trial motions are likewise
discouraged,"' and interlocutory appeals of an ALJ's rulings are not
permitted.2"6 If the case actually goes to hearing, the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not apply. 0 Although the OSHRC rules provide for dis-
continuing simplified proceedings and resuming conventional proceed-
ings, a showing of "sufficient reason" or consent by all parties is re-
quired before the motion will be granted.10
In lieu of pre-trial discovery, the parties are expected to engage in
discussions to address settlement, narrowing of issues, an agreed state-
ment of issues and facts, any defenses, witnesses, exhibits, motions,
"and any other pertinent matter."209 These unstructured discussions
are supposed to occur within a reasonable time before a "conference/
hearing," which is, as its name implies, a hybrid proceeding divided
into two phases: a conference, followed by a hearing.21 0 The OSHRC
rules indicate that both phases normally are scheduled to occur on the
same day.21
However, there are some categories of cases which are not eligible
for simplified proceedings. OSHRC has long recognized that simplified
proceedings are appropriate only in less complex and relatively simple
cases.212 Viewing certain generic types of cases as inherently complex,
OSHRC has made cases arising under section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act,
the general duty clause, and various health standards ineligible for sim-
plified proceedings. 1 3 For cases involving all other standards, the rules
204. Id. § 2200.200.
205. Id. § 2200.205(b).
206. Id. § 2200.211.
207. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.207(c)(1) (1991).
208. Id. § 2200.204.
209. Id. § 2200.206.
210. Id.
211. Id. § 2200.207(a). In 1982, OSHRC explained its amendments to the rules
for simplified proceedings and stated its intention, "that the conference and hearing not
be separated without good reason and that in most cases hearings will continue to be
held at the conclusion of the conference." 47 Fed. Reg. 29,525, 29,527 (1982). •
212. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,106, 70,109 (1979) (discussing eligibility for simplified
proceedings of health cases as compared to non-health cases); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION, A GUIDE TO PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 14-17 (Rev. Nov. 1988).
213. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.202 (1991) (exemplifying alleged violations of standards at
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draw no lines based on complexity, the need for discovery, or on any-
thing else related to the facts and issues of the case. Any party may
request simplified proceedings by written communication: "I request
simplified proceedings" is sufficient. This request must be filed within
ten days after notice of docketing is received. 14 A copy of the request
must be sent to all parties because any other party, usually the Secre-
tary of Labor, may veto simplified proceedings by responding with and
serving on the other parties a written objection within fifteen days after
the request is served.2 15 An objecting party need not give any reason for
the veto: " 'I object to simplified proceedings' will suffice."
216
The request for simplified proceedings, and any veto, must therefore
be made very early in the case. As will be discussed later, 1 7 this time
factor has significant implications for the use of simplified proceedings.
The decision to request or object must be made at a time when the
parties have little information and are least able to assess the potential
complexity of the case as it might later develop.
2. Background and Context
As early as 1973, OSHRC Commissioner Timothy Cleary suggested
that informal proceedings be made available in OSHRC adjudica-
tions. 18 Commissioner Cleary seemed to have in mind the situation of
the pro se employer and employee representative. He expressed concern
because "formal hearings . . . sometimes present complex procedural
issues that are bewildering to a layman not represented by counsel.
This real possibility may make contesting employers and employees re-
luctant to exercise their statutory rights, and thus, in effect, deny them
their 'day in court.' "219 He also suggested "that there are many situa-
tions, particularly when violations that are not serious are involved,
[where the parties would prefer] an informal conference-type proceed-
29 C.F.R. § 1910.94 (ventilation), § 1910.95 (occupational noise), § 1910.96 (ionizing
radiation), and § 1910(z) (toxic and hazardous substances)).
214. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.203(a)(1)-(2) (1991).
215. Id. §§ 2200.203(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). This does not mean 15 working
days. Under OSHRC rules regarding computation of time, intervening Saturdays, Sun-
days, and federal holidays are included in the computation of the time limit unless the
period is less than 11 days. Therefore, the actual time in which to respond to a request
for simplified proceedings would be less than 15 normal working days. Id. § 2200.4(a).
216. Id. § 2200.203(b)(3).
217. See infra notes 301-03 and accompanying text (discussing consideration of
interaction between attorney's professional responsibilities and calculated risk which is
inherent in requesting or agreeing to simplified proceedings).
218. Cleary, Pleading and Practice Before the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission, 24 LAB. L.J. 779, 787 (1973).
219. Id.
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ing."220 Recognizing that adjudication is adversarial in character, Com-
missioner Cleary also voiced hopes that informal proceedings would re-
duce the antagonism that often- accompanies formal adversary
proceedings. 21
Commissioner Cleary's views are set out in some detail because they
provide a contrast to the reasons given for establishing simplified pro-
ceedings in OSHRC's original notice of proposed rulemaking in 1978.
As described in the explanatory materials for the notice of proposed
rulemaking:
The purpose of these proposed simplified rules is to eliminate unnecessary
paperwork, reduce expenses to the parties and the Agency, and make Commis-
sion adjudication less complex and time consuming. It is hoped that the proce-
dure is simple enough so that parties need not necessarily retain legal counsel to
guide them through what might appear to be complex procedural rules. The
Commission looks upon the rules ... as experimental."'
The "purpose" described in the regulation itself was "to provide simpli-
fied procedures for resolving contests .. . so that parties before the
Commission may save time and expense while preserving fundamental
procedural fairness. The rules shall be construed and applied to accom-
plish these ends."22
Cleary's common sense, human concerns have a somewhat different
focus than the Federal Register's pedestrian recital of vague economic
considerations. The formal rulemaking emphasized transaction costs
rather than the human element and the possibilities for tempering the
adversariness of the litigation process.
The basic concept of simplified proceedings was hardly controversial.
However, various commentors expressed misgivings224 about the pro-
posed rule. The proposed rule contained many features of the present
simplified proceedings, such as the elimination of pleadings, restrictions
on discovery, and the ineligibility of cases arising under the general
duty clause and various health standards.2 As one justification for
eliminating pleadings, OSHRC noted that the complaint, under then-
prevailing rules of pleading, alleged little more than what was set out
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 43 Fed. Reg. 36,855 (1978).
223. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,112 (1979) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2200.200 (1991)) (em-
phasis added).
224. For example, some doubted that the proposed rule would achieve the stated
goals. Others voiced concern about the impact of the rules, as proposed, on a party's
rights. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,106, 70,108-9 (1979) (explaining final action adopting rules).
225. 43 Fed. Reg. 36,855-56 (1978).
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in the original citation. 22 6 The only parties who could invoke simplified
proceedings would have been parties who filed notice of contest,
thereby excluding the Secretary of Labor. Furthermore, under the pro-
posal, "other parties," usually the Secretary of Labor, could not object
to the use of those proceedings.
227
In response to comments received during the rulemaking process,
OSHRC established the present procedure for vetoing the use of sim-
plified proceedings. 228 Because of various concerns raised in the com-
ments, OSHRC adopted the rules on an experimental basis, for a one-
year period of evaluation.229
The experimental period bore mixed results. During the first three
months, requests for simplified proceedings were filed in 262 cases, ap-
proximately twenty-two percent of the incoming cases. All but one of
the requests came from respondents. DOL attorneys vetoed 101 of the
requests, 2 0 about 38.6%. Of the remaining 161 which were not vetoed
by the DOL, the OSHRC granted 105 requests. Denials by the
OSHRC itself involved reasons such as ineligible types of cases or late
filings.213 OSHRC officials voiced concern over what they perceived as
a low volume of requests.
2 2
During OSHRC's experimental period, another development further
reduced the number of contested cases where simplified proceedings
otherwise might have been invoked. Effective October 1, 1980, OSHA
area directors were authorized by the DOL to enter into informal set-
tlement agreements, prior to notice of contest being filed.2 33 By Novem-
ber 1980, the average number of contested cases docketed at the
OSHRC had dropped to sixty per week, reduced from 160.234 Accord-
ing to a GAO report, 11,841 cited violations were settled at the area
director level during fiscal year 1981, some 10.6% of the total number
of violations cited by the OSHA. 235 However, as the GAO report also
226. Id. at 36,856.
227. Id.
228. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,106, 70,108-09 (1979).
229. Id. at 70,109.
230. 10 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 200 (Jul. 17, 1980).
231. Rothstein, supra note 94, at 122 n.330 (citing Empl. Safety & Health Guide
(CCH) 480, at 11 (Jan. 1980)).
232. 10 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 200 (Jul. 17, 1980).
233. 10 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 533 (Oct. 16, 1980). See also supra notes 133-36 and
accompanying text (discussing area director's role in settlements).
234. OSHA Compl. Guide (CCH) 10,190 (Mar. 1981).
235. Report to Chairman, Subcomm. on Manpower and Housing, of the House
Comm. on Govt. Operations, INFORMAL SETTLEMENT OF OSHA CITATIONS: COM-
MENTS ON THE LEGAL BASIS AND OTHER SELECTED ISSUES, GAO/HRD-85-11 (Oct.
26, 1984), at 12.
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indicated, most of these settlements involved lowering the civil penalty.
Of the 150 files reviewed by GAO, OSHA area directors downgraded
the classification of the violation in less than three percent of the cases
and dropped a charged violation in less than two percent of the
cases.2
36
During 1981, an article marking the tenth anniversary of the OSH
Act asserted: "While at one time simplified proceedings may have alle-
viated the burden placed on employers cited for relatively trivial mat-
ters, OSHA enforcement and adjudication is now increasingly technical
and complex. In short, simplified proceedings is an idea whose time has
come and gone. "237
The author's announcement of the demise of simplified proceedings
was premature. Enforcement and adjudication certainly had become
more technical and complex. Nevertheless, a residuum of less complex
cases would remain, and not all of these could be expected to settle
informally at the area director level.
As part of its evaluation of the experimental period, OSHRC re-
quested comments on the actual operation of the rules. Among other
things, OSHRC expressed particular interest in comments regarding:
(1) expansion of the "ineligible" list; and (2) the elimination of a
party's power to veto a request for simplified proceedings.23 8 "Virtually
all of the comments opposed the elimination of a party's right to object
to simplified proceedings. '"39 In terms of increasing the number of
standards on the ineligible list, the comments suggested there was no
need to enlarge the list "as long as parties retain the right to object to
simplified proceedings."24 OSHRC agreed and the final rules re-
mained essentially the same as the rules governing simplified proceed-
ings today.
It must be emphasized again that the OSHRC simplified proceed-
ings do not exist in a vacuum. In order to understand the consequences
and implications today of invoking, and agreeing to, simplified proceed-
ings, one must contrast the situation in 1982 with the situation which
later developed.
In 1982, a party who invoked or agreed to simplified proceedings
surrendered few meaningful procedural rights. As OSHRC itself had
indicated, the Secretary of Labor's complaint alleged "little more than
what is set forth in the citation. Answers usually deny the substantive
236. Id. at 13.
237. Rothstein, supra note 94, at 122.
238. 46 Fed. Reg. 51,933-34 (1981).
239. 47 Fed. Reg. 29,526 (1982) (amending rules for simplified proceedings).
240. Id. at 29,525-26.
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portions of the complaint."241 Therefore, in 1982, eliminating the
pleadings was a minor matter.
As far as discovery was concerned, in 1982 OSHRC's general proce-
dural rules allowed interrogatories and depositions pursuant only to a
special order from the ALJ, 242 although requests for admissions could
be made without special order. 243 Therefore, limiting discovery affected
only requests for admissions, because special orders were required al-
ready for other forms of discovery. In 1986, when OSHRC thoroughly
revised its procedural rules regarding all cases other than simplified
proceedings, the larger context in which simplified proceedings oper-
ated changed significantly.2 44 With regard to discovery, one text-writer
noted, "[a]fter 15 years of discouraging discovery, the 1986 revisions of
the Commission's Rules of Procedure specifically authorize a wide
range of discovery." 24 OSHRC stated that a "mix" was authorized,
including "depositions permissible only by agreement between the par-
ties or with the approval of the Commission or the Judge; 25 requests
for admissions and 25 interrogatories permissible without approval; and
all other forms of discovery permissible without approval. '246
Likewise, the rules governing pleadings changed considerably in
1986. "The new rules impose strict requirements on pleadings, particu-
larly complaints. '' 247 OSHRC shifted from a generalized "notice"
pleading which permits vague, conclusionary assertions in the pleadings
to "a hybrid rule that requires specific pleading of the factual bases of
some elements of an alleged violation ... 24 specifically: (1) that the
cited standard applies to the workplace conditions; (2) that the em-
ployer failed to comply with the standards or the general duty clause;
and (3) that employee exposure to violative conditions be addressed.2 49
More stringent requirements also were imposed on the answer by re-
quiring allegations of facts which serve as the basis of affirmative de-
fenses.23 ° OSHRC's justification for the new pleading requirements was
summarized as follows:
241. 43 Fed. Reg. 36,856 (1978).
242. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 374.
243. Id. § 373.
244. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,184, 23,194 (1986).
245. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 371.5.
246. 51 Fed. Reg. 32,009 (1986).
247. Id. at 32,006.
248. Id.
249. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.35 (1991).
250. Id. § 2200.36. The new hybrid fact pleading requirements, whether intention-
ally or not, also serve indirectly to enhance settlement and ADR. See supra notes 73-
75 and accompanying text (discussing study noting possibility that "notice-pleading"
contributes to inefficient dispute resolution).
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[Blecause the present rules do not demand more detail than the citation con-
tains, the Solicitor's Office generally files a standardized complaint. As a result
. . . problems with the Secretary's case that could be discovered and corrected at
an early stage are frequently overlooked and the proceedings are unnecessarily
prolonged. And because the typical answer broadly denies the only substantive
allegation of the complaint-that violations occurred as described in the cita-
tion-the pleadings do not narrow the issues significantly. The Commission
therefore cannot rely on the notice pleadings of the federal rules to accomplish in
its proceedings the function of defining and narrowing issues.281
In short, the potential consequences of requesting and agreeing to
simplified proceedings changed in 1986. Today, a party requesting or
agreeing to simplified proceedings gives up at least two potentially sig-
nificant benefits of conventional procedures: pleadings that provide at
least some factual information about the other party's version of the
case and pre-trial discovery as a matter of right. Moreover, simplified
proceedings now lose the "early focus" and early narrowing of issues
which can be achieved by fact-oriented pleadings at the outset of the
case.
In order to have an adequate perspective on the context in which
simplified proceedings operate, two other significant background com-
ponents must be considered. The first involves OSHRC's proposed
rulemaking in 1987 to amend the rules governing simplified proceed-
ings and the comments received in response to that proposal. The sec-
ond involves further consideration of such mundane, but crucial, mat-
ters such as the burden of proof and affirmative defenses, which apply
with equal force in both simplified proceedings and conventional
litigation.
a. 1987 Proposed Rulemaking
During the rulemaking which led to major revisions of OSHRC's
procedures in 1986, OSHRC deferred considering any changes to sim-
plified proceedings.2 52 It returned to this subject in 1987. The major
thrust of the proposed amendments was to remove the Secretary of La-
bor's absolute veto power over requests for simplified proceedings. In
addition, the proposal would have allowed late filing of a simplified pro-
ceedings request upon a showing of good cause; reduced the time pe-
riod for objection to ten days; and made general duty clause cases eligi-
ble for simplified proceedings.253
251. 51 Fed. Reg. 32,002, 32,007 (1986) (emphasis added).
252. See 52 Fed. Reg. 4,917 (1987) (explaining development of proposed rules on
simplified proceedings).
253. Id. at 4,918.
[VOL. 5:555
JUDGES AND SIMPLIFIED PROCEEDINGS
The proposed rule did not mention the Secretary of Labor by name.
"The most significant changes would strengthen the role of the Com-
mission when the parties cannot agree on whether to use simplified
proceedings or conventional proceedings in trying a case."254 The same
special committee, composed solely of OSHRC officials and ALJs,
which had conducted the study underpinning the 1986 rules changes,2 55
reported that where they had been used, simplified proceedings had
worked well. "The committee noted, however, that simplified proceed-
ings were sparingly used, largely because of the widespread use of the
absolute veto .. . The committee also recommended a change in
the rules that would give OSHRC and its judges "the final word on
whether the rules should be utilized in a particular case after an elec-
tion is made by one of the parties. 257 OSHRC agreed that "[t]he
Commission's experience under its existing procedural rules has re-
vealed that simplified proceedings are underutilized, primarily because
the present rules give any party a veto over the use of simplified pro-
ceedings. 258 Objections to a request for simplified proceedings would
have been resolved by the Chief ALJ or the judge to whom the case
had been assigned. 25 9 However, the proposed "test" governing the
judges' discretion had nothing to do with the complexity or difficulty of
the case. Instead, the following standard based on the rather vague
contours of "due process" was proposed. "If the objecting party shows
that, under the circumstances of the case, simplified proceedings would
deny due process to the objecting party, the Judge shall order that the
case be conducted under conventional rules."' 260 The proposed rule con-
stantly orbited around "due process." For instance, "[p]roposed
paragraphs (b)(3) and (d) of section 2200.203 and proposed
paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 2200.204 state a single criterion for
parties and judges to apply when a party objects . . . : that simplified
proceedings would, 'under the particular circumstances of the case,'
deny due process. '"261
The only mention of the complexity or substance of cases tried under
simplified proceedings appears in connection with the proposal's treat-
254. Id. at 4,917 (emphasis added).
255. Id. See 51 Fed. Reg. 23,184 (1986) (stating committee consisted of two
OSHRC ALJs, OSHRC General Counsel, Deputy General Counsel, and Executive
Director).




260. Id. at 4,920 (emphasis added).
261. 52 Fed. Reg. 4,918 (1987).
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ment of the categorical exclusions. The ineligibility of health standards
cases essentially would have been unchanged "because of the potential
complexity of the legal issues that are presumed to be involved.
' 2 2
General duty clause cases would have become eligible for simplified
proceedings because "[w]hile some 5(a)(1) cases are extremely com-
plex and difficult to resolve, others are relatively simple and well suited
to hearing under simplified proceedings. ' 23
The DOL, and some representatives of employers, responded nega-
tively. " An assistant counsel for a corporation commented that,
among other things,
It]he proposed amendments create a "Catch-22" situation: At the outset of the
case, without the benefit of fact pleadings and discovery to determine the com-
plexity and nature of the issues, let alone to learn what facts and issues may be
in dispute, the objecting party is required to justify ...why he will need the
safeguards of fact pleadings, discovery, and the Rules of Evidence."'
The DOL's comments were extensive and highly critical of the pro-
posed rule.
OSHRC's seeming reticence about explicitly mentioning the Secre-
tary of Labor in its proposal did not go unnoted. "Although the Com-
mission's proposal does not so state, we believe there can be little doubt
but that it is employers who most frequently request simplified proceed-
ings, and the Secretary who most frequently opposes their use."2 66
The reason for this pattern is simple and straightforward. The Secretary, as more
fully discussed below, bears the initial burden of establishing all of the elements
of a prima facie violation. He also must be prepared to rebut an employer's
affirmative defenses, the burden of proof of which, under evolving case law, is
becoming easier and easier for employers to meet.
2 67
The DOL's comments and discussion of the relevant case law are too
extensive for detailed treatment here. However, the comments, citing
specific cases, specifically mentioned the frequent need for answer and
discovery when there were issues such as: employer knowledge; unpre-
ventable employee misconduct; the adequacy of employee training, em-
ployer instructions, or supervision of employees; economic and techno-
262. Id.
263. 52 Fed. Reg. 4,917, 4,918 (1987).
264. 16 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1222 (Apr. 15, 1987). One industry association, the
Eastern Contractors Association, supported the proposal.
265. Letter from Lynn E. Pollan, Assistant Counsel, Bunge Corporation, to Gen-
eral Counsel, OSHRC, at 3 (Apr. 2, 1987).
266. Letter from George R. Salem, Solicitor of Labor, to Earl R. Ohman, General
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logical feasibility of compliance; customary practice in the industry,
such as personal protective equipment standards; and, in general duty
clause cases, recognition in the industry of the hazard, as well as feasi-
bility and likely utility of specific abatement measures.2 6 8 The DOL's
comments made a counter-proposal, suggesting a possibility that sim-
plified proceedings might be accorded as a matter of right in cases
where: (1) the amount of proposed penalty was the only item at issue;
(2) the only issue was whether the employer's conduct constituted a
violation as alleged in the citation; and (3) the employer stipulated as
to coverage, OSHRC jurisdiction, actual or constructive knowledge of
its supervisory employees regarding the condition allegedly violating
the OSH Act, and that it has no affirmative defenses.26 9
OSHRC has taken no further action on the proposal. However, the
proposed rulemaking may have left behind an unfortunate legacy. A
year earlier, OSHRC rulemaking had imposed new, rather detailed,
hybrid fact-pleading requirements. OSHRC justified those require-
ments, at least in part, by arguing that mere notice pleading had con-
tributed to defective case preparation and to the failure of the DOL to
discover and correct problems at an early stage of the case.270 Coming
soon after the imposition of the new requirements for hybrid fact
pleading, the 1987 proposal may have seemed, at best, inconsistent.
The same DOL attorneys who, under the regime of mere notice plead-
ing had not discovered and corrected problems in the early stages of a
case, would handle more simplified proceedings, where there were no
pleadings or discovery as a matter of right. For an unpredictable, but
certainly substantial, number of cases, OSHRC proposed to discard the
new fact-pleading requirements. It proposed a virtual right to simplified
proceedings upon request, without much apparent regard for: (1) the
actual complexity of a case; (2) the actual suitability of a case for sim-
plified proceedings; (3) the need for early development and narrowing
of the issues; (4) whether a respondent, usually an employer, was ap-
pearing pro se or represented by counsel; (5) the anomaly of proposing
a legalistic "due process" test for denying objections, especially the
government's objections, to simplified proceedings; (6) the obvious re-
dundance of a "due process" standard in light of OSHRC's already-
existing constitutional duty to afford due process; (7) the vague
countours of the prevailing principles for determining "what process is
268. Id. at 6-7.
269. Id. at 9-10.
270. 51 Fed. Reg. 32,002, 32,007 (1986).
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due;" '71 (8) the appearance of extreme one-sidedness in the proposal;
and (9) the government's burden of proof and its ability to meet affirm-
ative defenses.
With hindsight, the proposed rule was unlikely to elicit cooperation.
OSHRC's proposal may well be a concrete example of a generic prob-
lem with notice-and-comment rulemaking. Notice-and-comment
rulemaking by its very nature can lead to misperceptions and misun-
derstandings, for there is only a published proposal and an invitation
for comment in writing. 272 Under pure notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing, there is no opportunity for face-to-face discussions but only
paperwork. There is no opportunity to clarify one's intentions or to dis-
pel misunderstandings. As one writer has observed, "[tioday's rulemak-
ing process often encourages parties to dig in and take extreme posi-
tions, and provides little chance for accommodating conflicting
interests. '273 So, when OSHRC's explanatory statement referred to
how the proposal "would strengthen the role of the Commission, "274
and the fact that it was based on an internal OSHRC Committee's
recommendation to give the Commission "'the final word ... *, -2 the
Department of Labor might be expected to react negatively.
The proposed use of a "due process" touchstone for denying objec-
tions to simplified proceedings may well have been intended only to
stimulate comments. But it shifted from one extreme to another-from
absolute veto power to a near absolute right to simplified proceedings,
tempered only by a "due process" standard in any eligible case. This
proposed rule might even have appeared to contain the potential for
seriously hampering the prosecutorial arm in a number of cases. This
would be the case where information and documents were under the
control of an adverse party who was alert to the benefits of invoking
proceedings which would minimize pre-trial disclosure. At any rate,
from the standpoint of the prosecutorial arm, the proposal undoubtedly
appeared to offer nothing positive.
271. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (establishing three-part test to
include consideration of: (1) private interest which will be affected by governmental
action; (2) risk of erroneous deprivation of private interest under procedures used and
probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) governmental
interest involved).
272. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988) (stating requirements of proposal in Federal Reg-
ister and opportunity for persons to express their views of proposal in writing).
273. Pou, Federal Agency Use of "ADR": The Experience to Date, CONTAINING
LEGAL COSTS: ADR STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATIONS, LAW FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT
264 (E. Fine, ed., CPR Legal Program, 1988), reprinted in ACUS SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 30, at 101.
274. 52 Fed. Reg. 4917 (1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2200 (1991)).
275. Id.
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Overall, the tenor of the DOL's comments was strongly critical and
in some places hostile. "The proposed rules for simplified proceedings
cannot be viewed in a vacuum but must be evaluated in light of the
pronounced tendency of the Commission to affirm citations only upon
employer admissions or the clearest, most unequivocal factual
showings. 276
Whether the comments accurately described OSHRC's "tendency"
to affirm citations is largely immaterial. The expressed perception,
however, does matter. Given the perception that OSHRC demands
strong evidence, those responsible for setting litigation policy in the
prosecutorial arm are unlikely to encourage the use of any procedure
which dilutes the agency's power to obtain evidence. Likewise, any re-
ceptivity to altering the status quo, which might have been latent in the
prosecutorial arm, was not encouraged by the nature of the proposal.
The proposal and its timing were not likely to induce anyone in the
prosecutorial arm toward considering the potential value of greater use
of simplified proceedings. In a phrase, the proposal seems to have been
all stick and no carrot.
b. Burden of Proof and Affirmative Defenses
The complexities of litigation also affect the use of simplified pro-
ceedings. Proof of an alleged violation often depends on an almost inde-
terminate number of variables.177 One important variable is the cited
standard itself. There are literally volumes of standards in the Code of
Federal Regulations. Many of these standards have an open-ended as-
pect to them." 8 Others call for information or documents in the posses-
sion of the employer. 79
Another important variable is the facts in a given case. In cases in-
volving occupational safety and health standards, the Secretary's bur-
den of proof often hinges on establishing potential employee exposure
and actual or constructive knowledge of the conditions. The Appendix,
summarizing approximately forty reported simplified proceedings cases,
indicates the vicissitudes of proof and the factual variables which may
be encountered even in a "simple" case. The addition of "general duty
clause" cases to those eligible for simplified proceedings would intro-
276. Salem Letter, supra note 266, at 6 n.4.
277. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (discussing Secretary's burden
of proof).
278. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text (explaining different standards
and their classifications).
279. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (classifying standard of evi-
dence necessary to satisfy prima facie burden of proof).
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duce even more variables concerning the "recognition" of the hazard,
the likelihood of death or serious physical harm, and the existence or
not of specific feasible abatement measures.2 80
Affirmative defenses introduce another set of variables. The potential
substantive defenses that could be raised are virtually unlimited. 81
OSHRC's own rules do not purport to exhaust the possibilities, at least
at the pleadings stage. The rule states, "[sluch matters [affirmative de-
fenses and matters in avoidance] include, but are not limited to, the
following: creation of a greater hazard by complying with a cited stan-
dard; [and] .. .infeasibility of compliance .... -282 The OSHRC rules
list at least nine such defenses. 83
To understand how these variables interact on a more tangible level,
a short lesson or case study may be helpful. To return to the very sim-
ple subject of ladders,284 some of the ladder standards are truly simple.
Portable wood stepladders must have uniform parallel spacing, not
greater than twelve inches, between the steps.2 85 Other ladder stan-
dards are more open-ended. "A metal spreader or locking device of suf-
ficient size and strength to securely hold thefront and back sections in
open positions shall be a component of each stepladder. ' ' 281 Or, "lad-
ders shall be maintained in good condition at all times, the joint be-
tween the steps and side rails shall be tight, all hardware and fittings
securely attached, and the movable parts shall operate freely without
binding or undue play. ' 28 7 Or, "safety feet ... shall be kept in good
condition to ensure proper performance.' 288 The potential areas for
dispute under such standards are fairly obvious. However, the potential
value of obtaining information regarding the contesting party's reasons
280. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, §§ 141-149; S. BOKAT & H. THOMPSON, supra
note 49, at 114-38 (explaining general duty clause).
281. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 124.
282. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.36(b)(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
283. Id.
Such matters include, but are not limited to, the following: creation of a greater
hazard by complying with a cited standard; exemption under section 4(b)(l) of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. 653 (b)(1); failure to issue a citation with reasonable prompt-
ness; infeasibility of compliance; invalidity of the cited standard; preemption of
section 5 (a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 654 (a)(1), by a specific standard; pre-
emption of a standard by a more specifically applicable standard under 29
C.F.R. 1910.5(c)(1); res judicata; the six-month limitation period in section 9(c)
of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 658(c); or unpreventable employee conduct.
Id.
284. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (showing that some regulations
are from common sense, while others involve complexity and judgment calls).
285. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.25(c)(2)(i)(b) (1991).
286. Id. § 1910.25(c)(2)(i)(f) (emphasis added).
287. Id. § 1910.25(d)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
288. Id. § 1910.25(d)(1)(iv) (emphasis added).
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for contending that the ladder was "in good condition," or that the
movable parts satisfied the requirement of operating freely "without
binding or undue play" is less obvious.
Even a "simple" alleged violation of a ladder standard has potential
for complications given the possibility of affirmative defenses and a
burden of proof which often hinges on the information possessed by the
employer. There may be an obviously defective ladder at the workplace
with two or three rungs missing, but where it was located in the work-
place and who might have been exposed to the hazards of using it
might be less obvious. Thus, in one case, a citation was vacated because
"[tihe ladder which was in the storage area was not in use, and the
ladder which was observed in the skinning room belonged to an electri-
cian who was wiring a lift hoist. ' 8 9 In another case, there was no evi-
dence found to contradict the employer's assertion that the ladders had
been located in the building when the employer acquired the building,
"but were neither needed nor used by employees.""' In yet another
case, the ALJ found that a ladder with a broken side rail had been
brought into the employer's plant on the day before the inspection, that
the employer had no knowledge of its presence until the moment of
inspection, and that the ladder had never been used at the worksite. 9 1
The potential for complications increases when the construction indus-
try standards pertaining to ladders are at issue because of the multi-
employer nature of the worksite.2 92
Most of the cases mentioned above pre-date OSHRC's current rules
regarding hybrid fact pleadings. Therefore, they arose and were de-
cided under a procedural regime where the pre-trial development was
similar to the procedures which are used in simplified proceedings. The
main point, however, is that potential complications and problems of
proof can arise in facially simple cases. It takes very little reflection to
realize that the cases mentioned and cited above required more than an
occurrence witness and often involved information possessed by the
other party.
289. Midwest By Products, Inc., 3 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1408, 1408 (1975).
290. Alpha Poster Service, Inc., 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1883, 1885 (1976).
291. Allied Equipment Co., 5 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1401, 1402 (1977).
292. See E.J. Conti, Inc., 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1780, 1781 (1986) (involving
citation for violation of 29 C.F.R. §§ 1926.450(b)(8), (b)(12) (1991) where compliance
officer testified that he observed two employees using defective ladder, but "Conti's
supervisor had his back to those employees [and] Conti's witness testified that its em-
ployees had their own ladders"); John R. Hughes Construction Corp., 10 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 1989, 1990 (1982) (showing citation upheld on circumstantial evidence, where
compliance officer did not observe employees using ladder); Austin Power, Inc., 9
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1502, 1504 (1981) (noting ladder did not lead to area where em-
ployees were working and had been withdrawn from service).
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If further confirmation is needed to demonstrate the complexities
which are inherent in proving any case, no matter how facially simple,
the Appendix should be sufficient evidence. It summarizes more than
forty reported simplified proceedings cases. Conflicts in testimony, af-
firmative defenses, open-ended or "general" standards, and most of the
variables already discussed seem prevalent.
Some cases do in fact turn out to be simple enough to dispense with
pleadings and discovery. In particular cases, the issues may be simple.
Moreover, even before 1986, simplified proceedings probably were
under-utilized because the DOL used its absolute veto power with con-
siderable frequency. 93
However, determining which particular case is suitable for simplified
proceedings, in light of the potential complexities of proof and affirma-
tive defenses, is another matter. It is far easier to evaluate a judgment
call in hindsight than it is to be the person who has to make the judg-
ment call in the first place.
3. Actual Experience and Operation
a. Preliminary Explanation
A somewhat different approach will be used in discussing simplified
proceedings than was used in addressing the experience with, and oper-
ation of, the SJ procedures earlier in this Article. The reasons for the
differences should be fairly obvious. Simplified proceedings have a
longer history than SJs, and this history has been more controversial
and has produced more friction. Also, the SJ has been the subject of a
definitive study, 94 which provides criteria and touchstones for consider-
ing the actual operation of SJ procedures in a particular agency. More-
over, SJ procedures involve a distinct phase of a case, a temporary de-
tour for mediation efforts.
293. See 52 Fed. Reg. 4,917 (1987) (suggesting primary reason for underutiliza-
tion was veto power). Nevertheless, it should be recalled that during the first few
months of operation under simplified proceedings, the DOL vetoes were not automatic.
Less than 40% of the requests for simplified proceedings were vetoed during this pe-
riod. 10 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 200 (1980). Furthermore, as indicated in the Appendix,
the BNA service reported decisions in 11 simplified proceedings cases docketed in
1980, and seven docketed in 1981. This total of 28 reported cases strongly suggests that
there were a substantial number of other simplified proceedings cases which were set-
tled and did not result in reported decisions. In addition, another nine decisions result
from cases docketed in 1980 and 1981, but not reported in BNA's service. In short, the
DOL veto became more frequent after a year or two of experience with simplified
proceedings.
294. Acus RECOMMENDATION No. 88-5, supra note 19, at 39-47 (setting out rec-
ommendations for criteria and procedures for use of SJs).
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In contrast, simplified proceedings involve the entire case. The cir-
cumstances that may be suitable for simplified proceedings are nebu-
lous and simplistically defined. 2 5 The criteria by which the outcome of
simplified proceedings may be evaluated are indefinite and relative to
the evaluator. For instance, an ALJ and the OSHRC might consider a
simplified proceedings case successful if it results in a settlement or
decision several months sooner than a conventional case. A pro se party
might feel some psychological satisfaction at having his "day in court,"
and evaluate the proceedings favorably if he prevails on part of the
case.
Although simplified proceedings have generated a fair number of re-
ported cases, many of these are decisions from the early 1980's.196
Moreover, the reported decisions merely reflect the final outcome of
particular cases. "Case studies" of reported cases are unlikely to be
very enlightening. The final ALJ or OSHRC decision masks an intri-
cate set of variables which explains little or nothing about the initial
decision to veto or agree to simplified proceedings.
Accordingly, this Article will concentrate on certain matters which
seem, on reflection, to be of significance in understanding the actual
operation of simplified proceedings. Among these matters are: (1) in-
formation regarding the actual number of cases where simplified pro-
ceedings are requested; (2) DOL regional solicitors' policies on simpli-
fied proceedings; (3) considerations which should be involved in
requesting or agreeing to simplified proceedings; (4) the actual outcome
of reported ALJ and OSHRC cases where simplified proceedings were
used; (5) the pro se nature of most requests for simplified proceedings;
(6) the impact of an increasing caseload on the use of simplified pro-
ceedings; (7) an analysis of ALJs' experience with, and perspectives on,
simplified proceedings; (8) a comparison of AL's and DOL's perspec-
tives; and (9) the OSHRC's recently revised "Guide to Procedures,"
which is aimed primarily at the non-lawyer, pro se party.
b. Estimates and Numbers
Because the "under-utilization" of simplified proceedings is relevant
to its success and the need for corrective measures, there is some need
for data regarding the number of cases in which simplified proceedings
actually are being requested. However, statistics are not maintained re-
garding the number of cases in which simplified proceedings have been
295. See infra notes 373-81 and accompanying text (discussing what cases are suit-
able for simplified proceedings).
296. See Appendix (listing some relevant OSHA cases).
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requested. 97 The lack of readily available statistics at the outset of this
study led to some interesting estimates. DOL supervisory attorneys sug-
gested figures ranging from a low of eight to ten percent of the incom-
ing cases requesting simpified proceedings, to a high of twenty-five per-
cent. ALJs' estimates, in terms of absolute numbers, ranged from a low
of eight or ten of their assigned cases per year, to a high of fifty.
Fortunately, OSHRC provided a more precise nationwide figure for
a two-month sampling period. 9 8 An OSHRC-conducted review of 646
cases which became final during March and April of 1990, showed em-
ployer-filed requests in eighty-seven of those cases-about 13.5%. The
DOL filed objections in fifty-seven of the eighty-seven cases-about
65.5 %. An interesting feature of the OSHRC survey was the number
of cases in which DOL had requested simplified proceedings: seven
cases from four different regional offices, a miniscule percentage but
not without potential significance. Again, the files reviewed were those
which had become final during March and April of 1990. This means
that the requests, objections, agreements, and other related events oc-
curred prior to March and April. If nothing else, this information con-
firms that some regional solicitors' offices have been in a period of re-
evaluation and greater willingness to experiment with simplified
proceedings.
c. DOL Regional Office "Policies" on Simplified Proceedings
Apparently, the Solicitor of Labor has not imposed a rigid policy on
the regional solicitors regarding simplified proceedings. The DOL OSH
counsels and the other individuals in the regional solicitors' offices (re-
gional offices or offices) who were contacted differed in their approach
to simplified proceedings. Individuals in six of the DOL's eight regional
offices and two of the regional sub-offices were contacted.
Overall, the regional offices contacted, with one exception, indicated
some degree of flexibility in responding to requests for simplified pro-
ceedings. Only one office reported a firm policy against agreeing to sim-
plified proceedings in any and all cases. The degree of flexibility in
most of the other offices, however, was limited.
297. If a request is not vetoed, the case docket-number has an "s" suffixed to it.
However, the only way to determine which cases involve a vetoed request for simplified
proceedings is to examine the case files themselves.
298. Except as otherwise indicated in the text, the information was provided in a
letter to the author from Ray H. Darling Jr., Executive Secretary of the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (Jul. 27, 1990). The author wishes to express
his appreciation for the information and for the extra work and effort of OSHRC per-
sonnel in compiling it.
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d. Considerations Involved in Requesting or Agreeing to Simplified
Proceedings
i. Preliminary Observation: Pro Se Parties
There was agreement on one point: pro se parties make most of the
requests for simplified proceedings. There are exceptions, of course, and
sometimes an employer retains an attorney after the initial request is
agreed to or vetoed.2 99 Nevertheless, there was a very strong consensus
that requests for simplified proceedings usually come from pro se
parties.
Furthermore, pro se parties are fairly common in litigation before
the OSHRC. They are by no means limited to simplified proceedings.
The significance of the pro se nature of much OSHRC litigation in
general, and simplified proceedings in particular, will be discussed later
in this Article.300 However, at the present juncture, the pro se element
is emphasized because the pro se party is a significant part of the real-
world framework in which the considerations discussed below operate.
ii. Considerations
(1) Professional Responsibility and Problems of Predicting Suitability
of a Case for Simplified Proceedings
One consideration which needs to be singled out for special attention
is the interaction between an attorney's professional responsibilities and
the calculated risk which is inherent in requesting or agreeing to sim-
plified proceedings. Requesting or agreeing to simplified proceedings
waives potentially important procedural rights. The attorney is not
waiving rights personal to the attorney; the pro se party is. The pro se
party is not encumbered by rules governing the attorney's professional
responsibility toward a client;301 the attorney is. A decision to opt for
simplified proceedings, or any form of ADR, hinges on the client's best
interests and not the attorney's or the judge's.
Although attorneys for a government agency are not in precisely the
same position as attorneys for a private party, the relevant differences
299. For example, filings in Interior Constructors, Inc., 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
1942, 1942 (1986), indicate a request for simplified proceedings filed by the company
superintendent in November 1985. Letter from R. Terry Oates, Superintendent, Inte-
rior Constructors, to OSHRC (Nov. 4, 1989). The transcript implies that an attorney
representing respondent made his first appearance at the hearing. Transcript of Mar.
25, 1986, Hearing, at 4 (Mar. 25, 1986), Secretary of Labor v. Interior Constructors,
Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 85-1185-S.
300. See infra notes 319-38 and accompanying text (discussing pro se parties).
301. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 & comment (1983).
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with respect to core professional responsibilities are minimal.302 Consid-
erations of professional responsibility apply with equal force to an at-
torney representing an employer. If the situations were reversed, an at-
torney representing an employer confronted with a government request
for simplified proceedings certainly should consider the professional im-
plications of waiving hybrid fact pleadings and discovery as a matter of
right. In fact, a private attorney will have even less information on
which to base an informed decision than will the DOL attorney during
the early stages of a case.
The DOL attorney, time permitting, can review the investigative
files, discuss the case with the compliance officer, and even attempt di-
rect contact with a pro se party. Assuming these efforts yield indica-
tions that the case probably could be handled under simplified proceed-
ings, a strong element of calculated risk remains. By investing time and
effort shortly after receipt of the request for simplified proceedings, the
risks would be reduced, but not eliminated.
Moreover, whether representing an employer or the government, the
attorney's necessary information gathering requires time which cannot
always be easily spared from other professional responsibilities. A re-
quest for simplified proceedings must compete with pleadings, discov-
ery, negotiations, trial preparation, hearings, briefs, and a host of other
demands in a lawyer's office.
Of course, the possibility exists, in theory, of reverting to conven-
tional proceedings30 3 or obtaining permission for discovery. At best,
however, this means that the parties will have to resort to the very
"paperwork" complications which could have been avoided if simplified
proceedings were rejected in the first instance. At worst, the attorney
must make an early decision to request or agree to simplified proceed-
ings, especially if the other party is pro se.
(2) Alternatives to Simplified Proceedings
Another general consideration involves the availability of informal
alternatives to simplified proceedings. In light of alternative ways to
"simplify" conventional proceedings, the incentives for an attorney to
use simplified proceedings are weaker. Essentially, simplification is rel-
ative and a state of mind, not absolute and a set of rules. Parties who
genuinely want to simplify the litigation of a case do not need to invoke
302. Id. at Rules 1.2 ("Scope of Representation"), 1.3 ("Diligence"), 1.6 ("Con-
fidentiatlity of Information"), 1.13 ("Organization as Client"), 2.1 ("Advisor"), 3.1
("Meritorious Claims and Contentions").
303. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.204 (1991).
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formally any rules regarding simplified proceedings. The parties can
simplify the process by mutual consent, without the need for early com-
mitment to simplified proceedings and the potential for later complica-
tions, if simplified proceedings turn out to be unsuitable.
For instance, there is absolutely no rule requiring the parties to en-
gage in discovery. As a practical matter, parties can even agree to sim-
plify the pleadings, unless the ALJ wants to act sua sponte and unilat-
erally by issuing a show cause order to both parties."0 4 In other words,
the parties can simplify matters between themselves without making an
early commitment to the all-or-nothing simplification contemplated by
simplified proceedings.
The lawyers who are experienced in OSH Act matters, and perhaps
even the experienced or sophisticated pro se parties, already know that
there are shortcuts and alternatives which can simplify the case on an
ad hoc basis.30 5 A lawyer who is not OSHA-experienced, but who
wants to hold down costs to the client or avoid unnecessary paperwork,
will be motivated to work out shortcuts and accommodations on an ad
hoc basis, lawyer to lawyer, without jeopardizing flexibility at the very
outset of the case. Moreover, a lawyer who is not OSHA-experienced
probably will be very reluctant to waive pleadings and discovery at the
outset of a case precisely because the lawyer is on unfamiliar legal ter-
rain.306 An experienced or sophisticated pro se party who is familiar
with OSHRC proceedings, such as the safety director of a middle-sized
company, can work out accommodations and shortcuts as well as, if not
better than, an inexperienced lawyer. This leaves only the inexperi-
enced or unsophisticated pro se party, who will be discussed in more
detail later in this Article. 07 But even this party is not necessarily go-
ing to encounter the full panoply of procedural niceties.
The continuing substantial percentage of pro se parties in reported
conventional cases3°8 suggests one of two possibilities. Either some sim-
304. Id. § 2200.41(a)(1).
305. Four attorneys with considerable experience in representing employers in
OSHA cases and several DOL attorneys who were contacted during the study con-
curred with this point. Directly or indirectly, they all indicated that considerable sim-
plification can be achieved through bilateral agreement and accommodation. If nothing
else, in describing their approach to handling OSHA cases they indicated that there is
a substantial amount of informal agreement on procedures and substance.
306. The point is not entirely speculative, however. A Little Rock, Arkansas attor-
ney who has considerable experience in representing employers in OSHA cases stated
that he has never used simplified proceedings and described the 10-day requirement for
requesting simplified proceedings as a "weak point."
307. See infra notes 319-38, 365-68 and accompanying text (discussing pro se par-
ties, employers, and complainants).
308. See infra note 328 and accompanying text (citing ratio of ALJ conventional
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plification often occurs in fact, or conventional proceedings are not so
complex as to present insurmountable barriers to substantial numbers
of pro se parties. In short, the availability of informal alternatives is
another consideration which operates against the use of simplified pro-
ceedings. Even the most complex case can be simplified if the parties
cooperate with each other.
(3) Calculated Risk Assessment: Variables and Factors
A third consideration is the risks involved in requesting or agreeing
to simplified proceedings. This consideration subsumes a number of
variables and factors which should be taken into account in determin-
ing whether to use simplified proceedings. For the most part, this con-
sideration applies predominately to DOL attorneys who must decide
whether to agree to a request for simplified proceedings. Therefore,
most of the following discussion will be in terms of the risk assessment,
variables, and factors of special relevance to the DOL. Theoretically,
some of the variables and factors apply to, or have counterparts which
should concern, parties other than the DOL.
Essentially, any decision to veto or to agree to simplified proceedings
should involve a kind of risk assessment. From the DOL standpoint, the
relatively more precise factors and criteria which might be included in
this assessment are:
(1) hazard abatement, such as, a mooted hazard which is unlikely to
recur versus a continuing potential hazard arising from conditions,
equipment, or practices in the workplace;
(2) the safety consequences of a citation being vacated and res judi-
cata's barring of subsequent required abatement;
(3) whether the employer in fact is unequivocally committed to con-
testing only the amount of penalty;309 if the violation is conceded, and
the amount of proposed penalty is small or even fairly substantial, the
range of disputed issues is likely to be limited, with pleadings, discov-
ery, and even a conference/hearing being superfluous;310
proceedings and those involving pro se employers).
309. Complete reliance cannot be placed on the notice of contest itself, in determin-
ing whether the notice of contest is limited solely to the amount of proposed penalty.
Firm and unequivocal commitment to disputing only the penalty is necessary, because
OSHRC will allow an employer to later contest the citation if the employer shows that
the original notice of contest was intended to challenge both the citation and penalty.
Turnbull Millwork Co., 3 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1781-82 (1975). For a more complete
discussion of this matter, see M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 276, and S. BOKAT &
H. THOMPSON, supra note 49, at 350-56.
310. See King Tool, 14 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1342, 1345 (1989) (contesting only
penalty, decision based on stipulations).
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(4) the classification of the violations, whether serious, other than
serious, or repeated;
(5) the number of contested items; as the number of contested items
increases, the case becomes complex and more difficult to treat as
,'simple;" 11
(6) whether the violation can be established definitely by testimony
of the compliance officer(s) alone;
(7) the compliance officer's experience and capability as a witness;
(8) the quality of the investigative file; for example, details on essen-
tial elements of prima facie cases, photographs, and an indication of
affirmative defenses;
(9) the requirements of the cited standards, such as specific, "mea-
surable" requirements versus more open-ended, "general"
requirements;
31 2
(10) whether satisfying the prima facie burden of proof and meeting
foreseeable affirmative defenses will require information or documents
in the possession of the respondent;313
(11) the need for testimony and evidence from witnesses other than
the respondent, especially witnesses who are employees of the
respondent;
(12) the need for expert testimony;
(13) the possibility that the respondent will use expert testimony,
bearing in mind that "expert" witnesses may include a wide range of
individuals who may be de facto experts by virtue of experience and not
just because they possess academic degrees;3"4
(14) overall workload, a factor of increasing importance, which war-
rants separate discussion;31 and
(15) the likelihood, based on initial contacts or prior experience, that
the pro se respondent will be cooperative in narrowing the issues in
dispute.
There are also some less precise variables and factors. These more
nebulous and inchoate factors include: (1) the attorney's sense of pro-
311. See generally Burnetex Industries, Inc., 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1941 (1988)
(addressing eleven violations); see also Appendix (summarizing this case).
312. See supra notes 48-58, 284-92 and accompanying text (discussing simplicity
of some industry standards and complexity of others).
313. Cf. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION, A GUIDE TO
PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW
COMMISSION 17 (Rev. Nov, 1988).
314. Cf. Texas Trident, 13 O.S.H. Cas. 1615 (1988) (emphasizing company man-
ager's 37 years of practical experience and practical, hands-on engineering).
315. See infra notes 339-42 and accompanying text (discussing OSHRC's in-
creased workload).
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fessional responsibility; (2) whether discovery will be needed; and (3)
the prospects for settling the case.
In sum, an informed decision on vetoing or agreeing to simplified
proceedings requires an objective and subjective risk assessment, based
on limited information and, sometimes, initial contact with the pro se
respondent. The DOL attorney has the burden of proof under the "law
enforcement" model, as established by the OSH Act.3 18 The cost-effec-
tiveness of this exercise in risk assessment, however, might be question-
able. The safest, and simplest, option may be to veto a request for sim-
plified proceedings.
(4) The Type of "Simplification" Imposed by Simplified Proceedings
Although this consideration overlaps some of those already discussed,
it has sufficient force to justify separate treatment. Simplified proceed-
ings achieve "simplification" by eliminating hybrid fact pleadings and
discovery as a matter of right.317 How much case simplification results
from this expedient process is open to question. The elimination of both
pleadings and discovery as a matter of right does not convert a difficult
case into a simple one. Indeed, it might result in complicating a simple
case. Minimal need for hybrid fact pleadings and discovery is a symp-
tom of a simple case, not its cause. Elimination of pleadings and dis-
covery per se simplifies nothing about the merits of the case. As will be
discussed toward the end of this Article, insufficient attention has been
paid to what makes a case suitable for simplified proceedings." 8
e. Outcome of Litigated Simplified Proceedings
The Appendix summarizes more than forty reported simplified pro-
ceedings cases. If nothing else, it should confirm that ALJs take seri-
ously the DOL's burden of proof. The Appendix also confirms that the
complexities of proving a case and meeting affirmative defenses cer-
tainly are not eliminated, or even simplifed, by simplified proceedings.
It verifies the need for being highly selective in agreeing to simplified
proceedings.
The win-loss ratio, of course, should not be all-important. However,
316. See supra notes 44, 80-89, 277-92 and accompanying text (discussing proce-
dures and burdens placed on officials representing government, as well as burden of
proof and affirmative defense requirements).
317. See supra notes 244-51 and accompanying text (discussing 1986 OSHRC re-
visions of its procedural rules).
318. See infra notes 373-81 and accompanying text (discussing suitable case for
simplified proceedings).
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the cases in the Appendix indicate that forty-eight alleged violations
were affirmed, two were affirmed but modified, forty-two were vacated,
and two were reduced to "de minimis," which is tantamount to being
vacated.
Certainly, the outcome in every single case might have been the
same even under conventional proceedings. Many variables influence
the outcome of a case and the judge's decision. But a loss rate approxi-
mating forty-seven percent cannot be considered an incentive to agree
to simplified proceedings. This is especially true when the tendency is
to remember the simplified proceedings cases which were lost.
f. Pro Se Parties
A whole constellation of problems and opportunities arise from the
fact that most simplified proceedings are requested by, and involve, pro
se respondents. The pro se litigant is not unique to OSHRC,319 and the
pro se litigant's problems are closely related to the goals and purposes
of ADR.3 2
0
Pro se litigants are not a new phenomena, but they are one of those
discomforting and very neglected problem children 21 of the legal sys-
tem. The system as a whole is distinctly ambivalent about the pro se
party. On the one hand, the right of a party to appear pro se is verita-
ble hornbook law. On the other hand, as one commentator has
observed,
[t]his basic right has created an ordeal in the courts arising from the statement,
"I wish to represent myself." From this point on, the adversary system ... is out
of synchronization. The judge is faced with the task of balancing fundamental
fairness and order in the proceedings. The pro se litigant must struggle with how
to present his or her case. The opposing attorney must protect and advocate his
or her client's interest, while meeting the legal obligation to bring the truth to
the court's attention.
3 22
319. Aspen, Assisting the Pro Se Litigant: Unauthorized Practice of Law or the
Fulfillment of a Public Need?, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 691 (1983); Committee on
Federal Courts of the New York State Bar Association, Pro Se Litigation in the Sec-
ond Circuit, 62 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 571 (1988); Kim, Legal Education for the Pro se
Litigant: A Step Towards a Meaningful Right to Be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641
(1987).
320. See L. SINGER, supra note 112, at 4-5, 16 (explaining origins and growth of
dispute settlement movement and problems associated with dispute resolution where
private party is involved).
321. See Rubin, The Civil Pro Se Litigant v. the Legal System, 20 LoY. U. CHI. L.
J. 999, 1000 n.6 (1989) (noting National Judicial College has very few materials on
pro se parties in its resource bank and those apparently deal with trial disruption
situations).
322. Id. at 1,000.
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The problems are not limited to actual trial proceedings in the court-
room. An attorney dealing with a pro se party prior to trial is in a
somewhat delicate ethical posture. 23 Every pro se litigant is a potential
problem in an adversarial system such as our own. Lawyers' horror sto-
ries about pro se parties are not uncommon, 24 and one writer has re-
ferred to "a special club of paranoid trial lawyers: those who appreciate
the difficulties of pro se litigation."32
To its credit, OSHRC has fostered a litigation atmosphere which is
far from hostile to the pro se litigant. Pro se litigants are officially rec-
ognized, 2 '6 and in fact OSHRC authorizes non-attorneys to represent
parties in its proceedings2
Conventional OSHRC proceedings involving pro se parties are rather
common, especially in the reported ALJ decisions. Even cursory review
of a volume of reported ALJ and OSHRC decisions gives the impres-
sion that a substantial proportion of employers appear pro se in non-
simplified proceedings cases. To confirm this impression, a sampling of
OSHRC ALJ decisions indicates that approximately 37.6 % of the con-
ventional, non-simplified proceedings cases involved pro se parties.3 8
The tally disclosed about sixty-nine conventional proceedings cases de-
cided by ALJs, with pro se employers in at least twenty-six of those
cases.
3 29
323. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (dealing with Un-
represented Person) (1984); G. HAZARD & W. HODES, 1 THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 439-44 (Supp. 1987).
324. Zuydhoek, Litigation Against a Pro Se Plaintiff, 15 LITIGATION 13 (1989).
325. Id. at 61.
326. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.22(a) (1991).
327. Id. See generally Hostetler, Nonlawyer Assistance to Individuals in Federal
Mass Justice Agencies: The Need for Improved Guidelines, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 85 (1988)
(discussing non-lawyer representation; based on study prepared for Administrative
Conference of United States (Administrative Conference)).
328. 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1001-100, 1300-500 (1988).
329. The methodology of this tally is rough. Those interested in the exact figures
can consult the cases in 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA), at 1,001-100 and 1,300-500 (1988), to
make their own count. The ALJ and OSHRC decisions were scanned rapidly, the par-
ties' representatives noted, and totals for each 100-page block were totaled. Only the
ALJ decisions were counted in the final total, because the other decisions were at the
appellate level, rather than the trial level. It should be mentioned that BNA's OSHC
Reporter also includes a number of state and federal court decisions interspersed with
the ALJ and OSHRC decisions. The number of pro se employers actually may be
understated because the only cases which were counted as pro se were those where the
case clearly stated that the party was pro se, or the representative was identified as a
company official, or the name of the company and its representative at the hearing
were virtually identical. For example, Horace Hypothetical appeared for Hypothetical
Construction. If the case merely indicated that a party was represented by a named
individual, whose name was not reflected in the company or corporate name, the case
was counted as not being pro se.
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As far as pro se parties at the trial level are concerned, the following
general description of trial judges' conduct of pro se hearings seems to
apply with equal force to the OSHRC ALJs. "In attempting to be fair
and to further the discovery of truth, a court may find itself explaining
rules and procedures and asking questions of the witnesses. In this re-
gard, the court has broad discretion as to its role in providing a fair
trial to both sides. 330
Even as to a pro se party's pleadings, judicial liberality in allowing
amendments and in construing the pro se's pleadings is something of a
norm."'1 OSHRC seems to follow the pattern of the courts in this re-
spect. According to one text, "[t]he two most common errors made in
answers have been untimeliness in filing and deficiencies in form. Both
types of errors have been excused where there were extenuating cir-
cumstances, but this has usually involved pro se employers."'3 2
OSHRC itself has emphasized its liberality, even when ruling against a
party:
While we attempt to afford parties every indulgence in order to provide them
with their day in court, we cannot do so where a party continually ignores time
limits of which it had actual knowledge, and, upon being requested to do so,
offers no reason for not meeting those limits.
3 3 3
However, OSHRC's latitude and flexibility regarding pro se parties
does not reduce the problems inherent in dealing with pro se parties. In
fact, by fostering an atmosphere favorable to pro se litigation, it in-
creases the frequency with which government lawyers and OSHRC
ALJs will encounter those problems. Indirectly, this probably contrib-
utes to the prosecutorial arm's negative attitude toward simplified pro-
ceedings for at least three reasons. First, all DOL regional offices have
some experience with pro se parties under conventional procedures so.
The DOL attorneys encounter many pro se parties who are quite capa-
ble of handling a case under conventional procedures. They know that
ALJs give due consideration to pro se parties in conventional proceed-
ings. From the attorneys' perspective, the main difference between a
truly simple case under conventional proceedings and simplified pro-
ceedings may be that the government has no right to require the pro-
duction of information from the other party prior to the conference
330. Rubin, supra note 321, at 1,002.
331. Id. at 1,004-05; see Ouzts v. Cummins, 825 F.2d 1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (af-
firming pro se complaint should be liberally construed and not dismissed unless plaintiff
can prove no set of facts to support claim).
332. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 358.
333. Id. (quoting Chopko Construction Co., 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1775, 1976-77
(1976)).
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hearing.
Second, the DOL attorney who has encountered problems with pro
se parties in conventional proceedings is unlikely to favor simplified
proceedings involving a pro se respondent. Those problems can only be
worse under a procedural regime where there is virtually no way to
assure the needed pre-trial development and narrowing of issues if the
pro se party fails to cooperate.
Third, even if the DOL attorney is favorably inclined toward pro se
parties and the case is genuinely simple, the need for simplified pro-
ceedings is minimal. Again, there are alternatives. With a cooperative
or relatively sophisticated pro se party, any number of simplifying mea-
sures can be implemented at the outset of the case, without waiving
procedural rights. Nevertheless, some pro se parties are at a serious
disadvantage in conventional proceedings. However, the word "some" is
crucial.
There is an important aspect of the pro se "problem" which has gone
largely unnoticed and which is responsible for a great deal of confusion,
friction, and misunderstanding. Simply put, the pro se population is di-
verse. Like any other group, pro se parties cannot be stereotyped.
At one extreme is the very small employer who may operate a busi-
ness on a part-time basis with only one or two employees. This may be
an individual with a skilled specialty in the construction industry whose
business may consist of some tools, a truck, and a cleared space on the
kitchen table at home which serves as an office. This pro se employer
may be quite difficult to contact away from the worksite,"3  may be
uncomfortable when dealing with written materials, may genuinely
need simplified proceeedings, and may not even read the OSHRC
"Guide to Procedures" (Guide). 35 This pro se employer may not even
know that simplified proceedings exist, unless informed by someone else
about them. It is this employer who comes to mind when the phrases
"day in court" or "pro se" are uttered.
Many employers who appear pro se are several stages removed from
this stereotype. A company large enough to have a safety supervisor or
enough employees to have some kind of management staff or hierarchy
is likely to be better informed, to have someone who has read the
Guide, and is more likely to request simplified proceedings than is the
stereotypical small employer. The substantial percentage of pro se par-
334. See Knight & Knight Construction, 14 O.S.H.R. Cas. (BNA) 1096 (1989)
(describing scenario where compliance officer hand-delivered citation to employer's
home address).
335. See infra notes 356-58 and accompanying text (discussing OSHRC's "Guide
to Procedures").
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ties in conventional proceedings 8 6 strongly tends to confirm that many
pro se parties are either perfectly capable of handling conventional pro-
ceedings in a relatively simple case or that some kind of simplification
occurs in those conventional proceedings anyway.
Thus, for many pro se parties their "day in court" is unlikely to be
truly jeopardized by conventional proceedings. An individual does not
have to be a lawyer to be capable of filing a sufficient and thorough
answer even in a massive case. 37 For many pro se parties, therefore,
simplified proceedings may be simply a matter of convenience and time
savings. These interests are legitimate but not altogether persuasive. It
is highly questionable whether convenience and time savings alone
would justify simplified proceedings on demand. In any event, the pre-
sent rules governing simplified proceedings indiscriminately lump to-
gether pro se parties who are quite capable of handling conventional
proceedings with pro se parties whose need for simplified proceedings is
much more acute. Furthermore, if the dominant purpose of simplified
proceedings is cost effectiveness then OSHRC's recurrent proposals to
eliminate the absolute veto and to substitute a near absolute right to
simplified proceedings on request338 could backfire. The time and effort
saved by pro se parties who do not have to comply with pleadings and
discovery requirements easily could be offset by the costs of an in-
creased caseload and the inefficiency of sorting out issues at a confer-
ence hearing that could have been resolved during pleadings and
discovery.
g. Increasing Workload
The number of contested cases has been increasing steadily over the
past few years. In fiscal year 1986, OSHRC received 1,729 new
cases. 3 9 In fiscal year 1988, there were 2,746.340 Both the OSHRC and
the DOL are feeling the effects of an increased caseload without a cor-
336. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text (discussing frequency of
OSHRC proceedings involving pro se parties).
337. A good example of a very thorough answer submitted by a company represen-
tative is found in the case file for Anderson-Tully Co., OSHRC Docket No. 87-158.
The answer, denominated "Response to Complaint," addresses more than 180 items in
a massive citation, and does so in a way which regrouped the cited items "by Mill or
Department location to reduce the time lapses involved in locating witnesses .... ..
Letter from Anderson-Tully Company representative to Paul L. Brady, Administrative
Law Judge (Jan. 11, 1988).
338. See supra notes 222, 223, 238-40 and accompanying text (discussing effects of
rulemaking process and rules governing proposals).
339. 1986 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 183, at 4.
340. 1988 PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 104, at 5.
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responding increase in legal staff. The OSHRC is especially vulnerable
to problems created by an increasing workload because it has a smaller
number of ALJs among whom cases can be redistributed in the event
of serious illness, incapacity, or other situations calling for a caseload
reallocation. The number of OSHRC ALJs has remained at a total of
eighteen,341 although the Chief ALJ recently indicated that an addi-
tional ALJ had been hired. With regard to the DOL, there is a distinct
possibility that the pressures of the increasing workload and limited
staff resources may incline more regional offices to make use of simpli-
fied proceedings. Recent statistics provided by OSHRC indicate this
already may be happening. 42
There is both a positive and a negative side to this possible develop-
ment. On the negative side, workload alone is not a sufficient reason for
using simplified proceedings. If simplified proceedings have intrinsic
merit, they should not be used merely as a temporary expedient subject
to the ebb and flow of the workload. On the positive side, a broader
base of recent experience may lead to improvements. If the experience
is satisfactory, reassessment and reevaluation of policies may follow.
Strengths and weaknesses in the present system can be judged on the
basis of actual recent experience in several different regions. A much
better concept of what makes a case suitable for simplified proceedings
may develop, leading to a more informed exercise of the veto power
and perhaps even to a workable consensus between the OSHRC and
the DOL on simplified proceedings.
4. ALJ Experience and Perspective
Summarizing the experience very generally, most ALJs who pro-
vided information for this Article viewed simplified proceedings favora-
bly, although several have had no recent experience with them. Most
but not all of the ALJs contacted believed that the DOL's power of
absolute veto should be modified or eliminated. The AL's experience
and perspectives will be analyzed below, at some risk of oversimplifica-
tion, under three main topic headings: (1) pro se parties; (2) compli-
ance with 29 C.F.R. section 2200.206; and (3) actual conduct of the
conference/hearing.
341. Id.
342. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (discussing cases closed during
March and April of 1990).
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a. Pro Se Parties
Despite considerable differences of opinion between ALJs and DOL
attorneys on many aspects of simplified proceedings, the ALJs tended
to confirm several points already made regarding pro se parties. Among
the few ALJs who were experienced in presiding over simplified pro-
ceedings, there was a fairly strong two-fold consensus: (1) most simpli-
fied proceedings involve pro se respondents; and (2) the ALJs' handling
of cases involving pro se parties, whether in simplified or conventional
proceedings, is different from the way they would handle cases where a
party is represented by an attorney. As suggested by one ALJ, the dif-
ferences are hard to articulate, but for pro se respondents more latitude
is the norm, and the atmosphere is probably more "personal." There
were, of course, variations among these ALJs in style and in substance.
However, some degree of latitude seems commonly accorded pro se
parties in conventional proceedings. Consequently, from the ALJ per-
spective, the differences between a hearing in a pro se simplified pro-
ceedings case and a hearing in a pro se conventional case may be mar-
ginal. In fact, it is difficult to tell, simply by reading an ALl's written
opinion, whether or not a case has been tried under simplified proceed-
ings. If the text of the opinion does not itself mention simplified pro-
ceedings, the only way to determine whether simplified proceedings
were used would be the "s" added to the docket number, or an exami-
nation of the file itself.
The main difference between conventional proceedings and simplified
proceedings, of course, is that conventional proceedings retain a plead-
ing and discovery stage. Even there, the pro se party is not necessarily
going to be held to the standards expected of an attorney. Although a
pro se party in conventional proceedings is subject to the consequences
of inadequate responsive pleadings and failure to respond to discov-
ery, 4" the ALJs have considerable discretion regarding imposition of
sanctions under the relevant OSHRC rules.
344
At any rate, the differences between a pro se hearing in simplified
proceedings cases and conventional cases seem minimal or non-existent.
More specifically, in either type of proceeding, the ALJ may need to be
somewhat active in asking questions, clarifying responses, and to a cer-
tain extent helping the pro se present his side of the case. This is not
necessarily a matter of sympathy for the underdog. The ALJ has some
343. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.41, 2200.52(e) (1991).
344. Id. § 2200.41 (stating that ALJ "in [his] discretion, may enter a decision
against the defaulting party or strike any pleading or document not filed in accordance
with these rules" (emphasis added)); id. § 2200.52(e).
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duty to maintain a coherent record of the proceedings."" Many pro se
parties have very little concept of what is relevant, and framing ques-
tions to elicit testimonial evidence is an art that even some attorneys
fail to cultivate. Moreover, the substance of what the pro se party is
trying to communicate is more important than legal jargon. The pro se
party is very unlikely to say, "I have an affirmative defense of uncon-
trollable employee misconduct." More likely, he will say, "We have
strict rules about wearing hard hats, and we enforce them. If you don't
believe me, I fired a guy last year over it." The pro se party, of course,
may also do things like "objecting" in the form of interrupting a wit-
ness and contradicting or giving his version of the particular mat-
ter-in effect testifying. As an example of the kind of "adjustments"
that can be made in pro se hearing, the ALJ can put the pro se respon-
dent under oath at the start of the proceedings, so that such statements
can be considered evidence.
Although some pro se parties may not have much of a case and are
mainly ventilating generalized grievances, ALJs in one way or another
recognize the importance of a pro se party's "day in court," even if,
and perhaps especially if, the party is mainly ventilating frustrations.
Some pro se parties, however, are quite capable of presenting a case
effectively and focusing on matters validly in dispute, rather than con-
testing anything and everything. As far as simplified proceedings are
concerned, the reported cases demonstrate that pro se parties often fare
rather well.""6 Whether this was in spite of or because of being pro se is
arguable.
b. Compliance with 29 C.F.R. Section 2200.206
The OSHRC regulations contemplate that informal discussions be-
tween the parties will substitute for pleadings and discovery. 47 There-
fore, if simplified proceedings are to be used, it would seem vital for the
parties actually to conduct such discussions prior to the conference/
hearing 48 and for the ALJs to police compliance with this requirement.
The ALs' practices varied somewhat in the means which they used
to assure that the informal communication between the parties would
be attempted. Those who affirmatively "policed" the matter used vari-
ous techniques, which included: a formal pre-hearing order, a required
report from the DOL attorney, sending a notice or letter to the parties,
345. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(c)(5), 556(e) (1988).
346. See Appendix (providing examples of such cases).
347. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.206 (1991).
348. Id.
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and sometimes a conference call. Others made informal inquiry when
checking the status of the case a week or so before the scheduled
hearing.
However, parties did not always adhere to the provisions of 29
C.F.R. section 2200.206, despite its importance. In cases which settled
prior to the conference/hearing the parties had been in contact and in
many instances informal discussions occurred. Still, ALJs mentioned
enough incidents to elicit some cause for concern. A simplified proceed-
ings case, no less than any other, should be developed before the hear-
ing. The narrowing of disputed issues should not be dropped entirely in
the lap of the ALJ at the conference/hearing. To do so invites confu-
sion, complications, and error.
c. Actual Conduct of the Conference/Hearing
The conference/hearing is flexible. ALJs can proceed with more, or
less, formality depending on the circumstances and the parties. For ex-
ample, the conference phase can be, and sometimes is, handled very
much like an ordinary pre-trial conference, the main difference being
that the conference phase is followed immediately by the more formal
hearing. However, the procedure also can operate as a dispute resolu-
tion tool.
The potential for the conference/hearing to serve a dispute resolution
role is indicated by an excerpt from the transcript quoted below. Be-
cause the conference phase was on the record, the ALJ was able essen-
tially to decide the case in the manner contemplated by Commissioner
Cleary, in "an informal conference-type proceeding."349
[ALJ]: This is the beginning of a simplified proceeding. What we do is talk it
over and see if we can resolve the case, if I can help in any way. If not, then we'll
go to an actual hearing .... Since it's simplified, we don't have the Federal Rules
of Evidence. But what I'll do is put a witness chair over by the reporter so that if
someone is testifying, they'll be over here to the right.
[Pro se employer]: They'll be sworn in and everything?
[ALJ]: Be sworn in and everything. It will be just like a regular trial.
[Pro se employer]: Well, I'd prefer to work it out this way.
[ALJ]: Well, let's see what we can do ... . 0
However, ALJs vary in their approach to the conference phase of the
simplified proceedings. The ALJ in the case above essentially converted
349. Cleary, Pleading and Practice Before the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission, 24 LAB. L.J. 779, 787 (1973).
350. Transcript of Proceedings at 6, Dub Rose & Assoc., OSHRC Doc. No. 89-
1128-S (Sept.'25, 1989).
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the conference phase itself into an informal hearing and decided the
case on the basis of the conference since the conference phase was al-
ready on the record. 5 Undoubtedly, other ALJs might have proceeded
differently by concluding the conference phase earlier and having the
parties present their cases more formally. Moreover, the ALJ in the
above case probably would use a different approach under different cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless, the key word and concept is flexibility. The
ALJ can proceed with greater or less formality as the case and the
circumstances warrant.
5. Comparison of ALJ and DOL Perspectives
As might be expected, ALJs' outlook on simplified proceedings is
considerably different from that of the DOL attorneys. Generally, the
differences are attributable to the very different institutional roles
played by ALJs and trial attorneys. DOL attorneys are constrained by
their prosecutorial role under a law enforcement model with its burden
of proof. They are representing a client, albeit a governmental institu-
tional client, so the adversarial model is implicated in their role. ALJs
serve as adjudicators vested with considerable discretion, who dispense
justice under the law. These different perspectives and viewpoints are
not easy to reconcile. These differences in perspective also are more
than academic. Perspectives influence the actions, reactions, and poli-
cies of key participants in two crucial components of the OSH Act sys-
tem. It seems worthwhile to consider the ways in which different as-
pects of simplified proceedings may be viewed from these different
perspectives. Most emphatically, however, neither perspective is
"right." Neither is "wrong." They are merely different because their
institutional roles are different.
At the outset of the case when a request is made for simplified pro-
ceedings, the ALJ usually will have only the citation and notice of con-
test in a thin file. From the AL's perspective, the case may look very
simple. There are three or four cited violations dealing with familiar
subjects. The DOL attorney should have a somewhat thicker file, in-
cluding material from the client agency's investigative file and, per-
haps, some past experience with the compliance officer(s) involved.
From the attorney's perspective, a decision must be made within fif-
teen days or less. The decision on the request must be juggled with the
rest of the attorney's workload. After attempting to reach the compli-
ance officer for a day or two, the attorney talks to the compliance of-
351. Id. at 4, 65.
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ficer who has just returned from a two-day inspection fifty miles away.
"Yes, the machine was being used. Well, the company had modified
the original guard so as to speed up the cutting. Here's the problem
with what they did. Well maybe I should send you a copy of the dia-
gram I drew . . . ." And so forth.
In short, the DOL attorney is confronted with a request for simpli-
fied proceedings early in the case and must respond in a limited time
frame. If time is available, and if the attorney is willing to invest that
time in a fairly labor-intensive risk assessment, rather than simply
starting to draft a complaint, any decision to agree to simplified pro-
ceedings still involves a calculated risk that unforeseen complications
will arise. The simplest, easiest, and safest course is a one-sentence let-
ter objecting to the request. From the AL's perspective, a response
time of fifteen days probably seems ample for the attorney to make an
informed choice in a facially simple case.
From the ALJ's perspective, OSHRC's simplified proceedings were
designed to attract a class of "routine" cases. From the attorney's per-
spective, the class of "routine" cases may be small or non-existent, and
certainly unpredictable. Someone else's frustration, and the goals of
proceedings designed by another agency, are likely to be quite
irrelevant.
A simplified proceedings case may be concluded several months
sooner than a conventional case of similar magnitude. From the ALJs'
perspective, all parties benefit from the more prompt adjudication of
the dispute. However, from the perspective of an attorney, the ALJs
may be seen as reacting to a simplified proceedings case with "let's set
it on the trial calendar," and with some pressure to settle or try the
case immediately as a matter of clearing their own case dockets.
The attorney may view the practical similarities between conven-
tional proceedings involving a pro se party and simplified proceedings
involving a pro se party as reducing the need for, or significance of,
simplified proceedings. From the attorney's perspective, the pleadings
and requests for admissions or interrogatories in a simple case should
be simple enough for any literate pro se to understand. An ALJ may
view the importance of a pro se party's "day in court" as offsetting any
benefits of pleadings and discovery in conventional proceedings where
the issues are relatively simple. From the ALJ's perspective, pleadings
and discovery in a simple case are more likely to be a pitfall for the pro
se litigant than a benefit to the process. Indeed, some ALJs might form
the impression that government attorneys veto requests for simplified
proceedings as a tactical ploy, perhaps hoping that the pro se party will
drop the whole matter.
1991]
646 THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL
An attorney may have formed the impression that simplified pro-
ceedings often are invoked by companies which wish to litigate cheaply
and which can either afford an attorney or have company officials quite
capable of handling a truly simple case. To the attorney, the veto of a
request for simplified proceedings will cause such employers to "get se-
rious" about the case. From the AL's perspective, a pro se party un-
comfortable with unfamiliar written documents in "legal" form and
language often may abandon a potentially meritorious notice of contest
with a sense of frustration and of being unfairly treated, after receiving
the complaint, a request for admissions, or a set of twenty-five interrog-
atories. In the words of one pro se respondent, "I got so many papers
from OSHA, I don't know which is which and what is what. 3 52 It is
easy for an ALJ to remember and be sympathetic with such a lament.
However, from the attorney's perspective, the attorney is likely to re-
member the same pro se respondent who, at the hearing, when he fi-
nally did read the request for admissions, disagreed with only one or
two, and stated as to the rest: "They are facts." '
Then there is the problem where simplified proceedings have not
been vetoed but the case turns out to be unsuitably complex, or the pro
se party is uncooperative about informal discussions to narrow the is-
sues. From the ALJ's perspective, those situations can be dealt with
under OSHRC's rules which provide for a motion to discontinue sim-
plified proceedings for cause and to resume handling the case under
conventional procedures.3 54 From the attorney's perspective, however,
there may be some unwillingness to risk total reliance on the uncertain-
ties inherent in obtaining such relief, especially when there is a pro se
party and when such problems could be avoided by vetoing the request
for simplified proceedings in the first place.
Finally, at least for purposes of the current discussion, those who
have given some thought to the matter must consider the potential im-
pact a surge in the number of simplified proceedings would have on the
entire litigation system's caseload. If the present veto were abolished,
what would be the impact on the quantity and quality of the workload?
There immediately would be more cases, given about a fifteen percent
rate of requests for simplified proceedings. Would there be even more
requests for simplified proceedings if requests were granted as almost a
matter of right? How many of those cases would involve valid dis-
352. Transcript of Proceedings at 7, Phillips Elec., Inc., OSHRC Doc. No. 89-
0503.
353. Id. at 8-11.
354. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.204 (1991).
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putes? How many would essentially be ventilating frustrations? How
many would be invoked on a theory that the pro se party, or a company
official, can invest profitably a half day at a conference/hearing, where
the respondent need prove nothing, the burden of proof is on the gov-
ernment, and at the very least the penalty may be lowered? 355
6. OSHRC's "Guide to Procedures"
OSHRC itself has recently published an excellent revision of its
booklet explaining its litigation procedures, "A Guide to Procedures"
(Guide). 56 An individual who files a notice of contest receives a copy
of the Guide with the notice of docketing. The Guide explains both
conventional and simplified proceedings in layperson's terms, with key
aspects of the procedures often underlined, printed in bold-face type, or
otherwise emphasized. There are several appendices with examples of
pleadings, which make it a useful but not definitive formbook even for
attorneys.
With reference to simplified proceedings, the Guide carefully de-
scribes the differences between simplified proceedings and conventional
proceedings. Of special relevance to this Article, the Guide cautions
respondents:
There are cases that, though technically eligible for simplified proceedings,
should not be considered for litigation under those proceedings. If you foresee the
need to use discovery or to keep certain information confidential, you should not
request simplified proceedings.
When deciding whether to request simplified proceedings, ask yourself the fol-
lowing questions. If the answer to any of them is "yes," you probably should
NOT request simplified proceedings.
Question 1. Will the presentation of my case require me to obtain information in
the possession of any other party?
Remember: In simplified proceedings discovery is allowed only with the permis-
sion of the Judge and his ruling CANNOT be appealed until after the decision is
issued.
Question 2. If I do not intend to have an attorney, will I need the testimony of
expert witnesses to establish my case? . . .s7
The Guide goes on to suggest other potential problems and to explain
355. For examples of cases where the penalty was lowered, see cases summarized in
the Appendix. In theory, a proposed penalty could be raised, but none of the simplified
proceedings cases in the Appendix indicate on their face a higher penalty than origi-
nally proposed.
356. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION, A GUIDE TO
PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW
COMMISSION (rev. Nov. 1988) [hereinafter GUIDE].
357. Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
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carefully the various steps involved in a simplified proceedings case.
The party is reminded that any other party can veto the request for
simplified proceedings. Most significantly, the Guide emphasizes that
the parties are required to discuss the case informally between
themselves.
[Alit parties are to participate in a mandatory discussion. This mandatory dis-
cussion can be conducted in person or by telephone and is to be arranged by the
parties themselves. . . .Even if a settlement cannot be reached, the parties are
required to attempt agreement on as much as possible regarding the case.
The following topics must be discussed:
(1) Narrowing of Issues. - The parties are expected to discuss the substance of
the points on which they differ, called the issues, and to resolve as many of those
issues as possible. The issues upon which agreement cannot be reached, and will
therefore come before the Judge for decision, must be listed. The issues remain-
ing to be resolved might include, for example, specific defenses to the cita-
tion . ..
(2) A Statement of Facts. - The parties are expected to agree on as many of
the facts underlying the case as possible. For example: the size of the business,
the safety history, details of the inspection, and the nature of the worksite as well
as any machinery or equipment involved in the citation.
(3) A Statement of Defenses. - You will be required to list any specific defenses
you might have to the citation. You could, for example, argue that the condition
in violation was the result of an employee acting contrary to a work rule that has
been effectively communicated and enforced .... 8
The effect of the Guide on the number and quality of simplified pro-
ceedings cannot yet be determined. In some cases, it may make little
difference. For example, a "really small" employer may not even read
the Guide. Further, the respondent who merely wants to vent some
frustration is not likely to study it carefully. But the Guide does offer
an opportunity for a pro se party to make an informed request and
places-the party on notice that cooperation in narrowing the issues prior
to any hearing is expected.
Perhaps even more significantly, the Guide comes at an opportune
time when there are indications that some DOL regional offices may be
more favorably inclined toward simplified proceedings. The Guide may
reflect, and provide the potential for, some common ground in the de-
velopment of better consensus between the DOL and the OSHRC.
Coupled with the factors and variables considered by those DOL offices
and attorneys who are more receptive to agreeing to requests for sim-
plified proceedings, the factors recognized in the Guide could provide
the nucleus for further development.
358. Id. at 19-20 (emphasis in original).
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7. Summary Analysis and Synthesis: Incentives and Impediments
Several external factors have affected the use of simplified proceed-
ings. The DOL's implementation in 1980 of informal pre-notice of con-
test conferences, coupled with a dramatic decline in the number of
cases contested before OSHRC, reduced the market for simplified pro-
ceedings from the beginning. The availability of an informal conference
with DOL area officials served some of the same purposes as OSHRC's
simplified proceedings. An employer could discuss the matter and reach
some accommodations in a conference setting.
In 1986, new OSHRC procedural rules applicable to conventional
proceedings altered the context in which the decision is made to request
or veto simplified proceedings. At least on the face of things the stakes
became different and the consequences of agreeing to simplified pro-
ceedings changed. The parties in simplified proceedings would give up
any benefits that might result from hybrid fact pleading and discovery
as a matter of right.
In the meantime, doctrines and precedents regarding the DOL's bur-
den of proof and an employer's affirmative defenses had been develop-
ing in the traditional, incremental, case-by-case manner. By 1986,
enough of these had crystallized to make it fairly clear that simply
showing up at a hearing with the compliance officer would be insuffi-
cient to prove a case.
All along, the occupational safety and health standards were a mixed
bag-some relatively precise and others rather open-ended. As prece-
dents accumulated concerning the more "general" standards, a compli-
ance officer's direct observation of workplace conditions often was only
the beginning and not the end of determining whether a violation of
such standards had occurred. Actual experience with litigation under
simplified proceedings seems to confirm the vicissitudes of proof under
many standards.
Most of the requests for simplified proceedings continuously came
from pro se employers. Apart from the general problems which can
arise when dealing with a pro se party, simplified proceedings severely
curtail any right to obtain information, which may be needed, from
that party prior to the hearing.
The interaction between these external factors and the rules gov-
erning simplified proceedings reduced the incentive to agree to simpli-
fied proceedings. Any decision to agree to simplified proceedings must
be made at an early stage of the proceedings when the amount of infor-
mation is at its lowest point. Obtaining preliminary information from a
pro se party can be labor-intensive at best. Once committed to simpli-
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fled proceedings, there is a theoretical possibility of moving to revert to
conventional proceedings. But the outcome of such a motion would be,
to say the least, uncertain. That uncertainty offers no incentive to incur
the risk of unnecessary complications in extricating oneself from a situ-
ation which could have been avoided by a simple veto in the first
instance.
To a certain extent, many of these considerations became informally
internalized by the prosecutorial arm which was never particularly en-
thusiastic about simplified proceedings anyway. The pure veto rate was
initially forty percent, 59 and even before 1986 probably went much
higher. Yet, on the other side of the coin, that same veto rate indicates
a fair number of early cases where simplified proceedings were not ve-
toed. There seems to have been an early period of some willingness to
experiment with simplified proceedings. That willingness has since
evaporated.
For the most part, a rather strong presumption against agreeing to
simplified proceedings became the norm. From the attorney's perspec-
tive, factors against agreeing to simplified proceedings ordinarily out-
weigh those in favor of agreeing. Experience with conventional proceed-
ings involving pro se parties was likely to reinforce the attorney's
perceptions. Furthermore, if the parties bilaterally wanted to simplify
the proceedings formal invocation of simplified proceedings would be
unnecessary.
Until recently, the incentives for agreeing to simplified proceedings
were minimal. However, with an increasing number of contested cases,
simplified proceedings may become slightly more attractive in direct
proportion to the caseload. Certainly, simplified proceedings are an at-
tractive option to the informed pro se employer. They could become
more attractive to the prosecutorial arm if a gradually expanded use of
the system proves to be cost effective and does not compromise the pro-
fessional responsibility of effective governmental client representation.
8. Concerns for the Future
A tentative trend is discernible. However, even if the prosecutorial
arm becomes, under the pressure of workload, more amenable to sim-
plified proceedings, the use of simplified proceedings should not depend
entirely on the ebb and flow of workload.
Three concerns need to be discussed. The first is one which exists at
359. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text (discussing results of experi-
mental period).
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a practical, more immediate level. The other two are more basic and
fundamental.
a. Compliance with 29 C.F.R. Section 2200.206
At a practical and more immediate level, OSHRC simplified pro-
ceedings regulations contemplate that informal discussions between the
parties will substitute adequately for written pleadings and discovery as
a matter of right. Sometimes they do; sometimes they may not even
occur. If the number of simplified proceedings cases increases, enforce-
ment of this rule would seem to be vital. Although some ALJs take
affirmative measures to police the requirement, others do not.
OSHRC's Guide emphasizes the importance of these informal discus-
sions. This is a good start but there still is a need to be alert to poten-
tial problems.
There is the two-fold problem of the uncooperative pro se party, on
the one side, and the inert attorney, on the other side, who makes little
or no effort to comply with the rule. Neither should be coddled. If the
parties agree to use simplified proceedings they should follow the few
but important rules for narrowing disputed issues. Attorneys who make
no effort to contact the opposing party should suffer the professional
consequences. Attorneys who discover the uncooperative side of a pro
se party in simplified proceedings should be able to move for, and get,
reversion to conventional proceedings. Although the relevant OSHRC
rule may not expressly require a party to be cooperative, the require-
ment to confer and discuss seems to imply some element of good-faith
effort.360 One encounter with an uncooperative pro se party, and one
indifferent response from an ALJ to complaints about lack of coopera-
tion, could be enough to sour an entire regional office on simplified pro-
ceedings for another ten years.
b. Basic Concepts
There are two important problems which must be considered if sim-
plified proceedings are to be used optimally and to their full potential.
The first focuses on the purpose and goals of simplified proceedings.
The second involves the murky threshold question of what kinds of
cases are suitable for simplified proceedings.
360. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.206 (1991).
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i. The Purpose of Simplified Proceedings: Cost Effectiveness or
"Simple Justice"?
From the very outset, there has been a dual vision of simplified pro-
ceedings. One view, noted by former Commissioner Cleary and many
ALJs, focuses on concerns for the pro se party's "day in court," and
tempering the adversariness of an inherently adversarial situation.361
The other is reflected in the "official" goals, cost savings or cost effec-
tiveness, expressed in the formal rulemaking process. 62 While not mu-
tually exclusive, the two visions are not synchronous. The purposes of
simplified proceedings vacillate between the official cost saving goal and
the unofficial concern for pro se parties.
The official purpose seems to focus on holding down the "costs" of
litigation: eliminating unnecessary paperwork, reducing expenses to the
parties and the agency, making adjudication less complex and time
consuming,363 and saving "time and expense while preserving funda-
mental procedural fairness."364 While worthy goals, they apply with
equal theoretical force to all kinds of parties. The "official" idea is that
simplified proceedings can be used in "routine" cases where the benefits
of hybrid fact pleadings and discovery are minimal, whether a party is
pro se or not. The "official" purpose focuses on efficiency-providing a
forum where parties address the dispute without a lot of legalistic
fanfare.
The unofficial purpose, not forcefully explicit in OSHRC's formal
explanation of its rulemaking, is "simple justice"-a two-fold legiti-
mate concern: (1) consideration for pro se parties for whom the costs of
an attorney genuinely are not feasible in a relatively small case, and for
whom even relatively simple adversarial pleadings and litigation are an
intimidating handicap; and (2) reducing the adversariness of an inher-
ently adversary system patterned on the law enforcement model. How-
ever, the "official" justifications for simplified proceedings have down-
played and obscured the element of simple justice. Any official
reference to "pro se" parties has been indirect and left-handed. "It is
hoped that the procedure is simple enough so that parties need not nec-
essarily retain legal counsel to guide them through what might appear
to be complex procedural rules.
'365
361. Cleary, Pleading and Practice Before the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission, 24 LAB. L.J. 779, 787 (1973).
362. 43 Fed. Reg. 36,855 (1978) (proposed July 31, 1978); 29 C.F.R. § 2200.200
(1991).
363., 43 Fed. Reg. 36,855 (1978).
364. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.200 (1991).
365. 43 Fed. Reg. 36,855 (proposed July 31, 1978).
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On the one hand, if the purpose is cost effectiveness simplified pro-
ceedings appear to be an ineffective means to reduce the costs of litiga-
tion. Simplified proceedings virtually operate in an all-or-nothing fash-
ion. True cost savings or cost effectiveness probably involves more than
eliminating some paperwork. For one thing, parties who are repre-
sented by a competent lawyer or who have experience in dealing with
the OSH Act system can trim their costs in ways more carefully tai-
lored to the needs of a particular case without invoking simplified pro-
ceedings. The truly simple cases should "self-simplify" to a certain ex-
tent. For another, eliminating pleadings and discovery of right can be a
false economy. Complex procedures have been cast as something of a
villain throughout the simplified proceedings scenario. The casting has
some validity because procedures that are unnecessarily complex, rela-
tive to the issues, can be a pure waste. However, procedural require-
ments are not always mere niceties and technicalities. The simplest dis-
putes can take on a very complex hue when an ALJ hears them for the
first time at a conference/hearing. 3 " Complex issues and disputed facts
do not become easier to resolve merely because pleadings and discovery
of right have been discarded. The false economy of being penny-wise
and dollar-foolish comes to mind. OSHRC's own Guide quite appropri-
ately counsels caution in requesting simplified proceedings. 36 7 There-
fore, the cost savings achieved under simplified proceedings in truly
simple cases may be marginal if costs to the entire system are taken
into account. In any event, the actual cost savings or cost effectiveness
of simplified proceedings does not appear to have been the subject of
any meaningful, systematic cost benefit or other analysis.
On the other hand, if the purpose is "simple justice" to assure a "day
in court" for the unsophisticated, small, pro se party of limited means,
simplified proceedings are over-inclusive. Simplified proceedings indis-
criminately embrace parties with lawyers, relatively sophisticated pro
se parties who have a marginal need for simplified proceedings in a
truly "simple" case (the only kind which is supposed to be in the sim-
plified proceedings mode anyway), and pro se parties whose "day in
court" may be jeopardized, even in a truly simple case, if reasonable
366. Although ALJs contacted for this study indicated few or no "simple" cases
which became unmanageable at the hearing, it must be remembered that the few ALJs
with recent experience in simplified proceedings cases have presided over a handful of
simplified proceedings. See Appendix (discussing OSHRC and ALJ decisions reported
in BNA's Occupational Safety and Health Cases).
367. See supra note 356 and accompanying text (discussing OSHRC's "Guide to
Procedures" explanation of differences between simplified proceedings and conventional
proceedings); GUIDE, supra note 356, at 17.
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allowances are not made.
The substantial percentage of pro se parties in conventional proceed-
ings, as reflected in the reported cases, seems to compel a conclusion
that some pro se parties are quite capable of litigation before OSHRC
in conventional proceedings in a truly simple case, with appropriate
consideration from the ALJ. For them, simplified proceedings are a
convenient cost-cutting or time-saving device, rather than a necessity.
Fostering a litigation atmosphere conducive to pro se parties is com-
mendable. Reducing the adversariness of an inherently adversary sys-
tem statutorily patterned on the law enforcement model is admirable.
But making the process merely congenial to the economy-minded bar-
gain hunter is another matter. Making a process too inexpensive can
cheapen it, lowering quality, increasing demand, and losing sight of the
purposes of the process.
No matter how obscure the purposes of the OSH Act may become in
the tangle of the law enforcement model, OSHRC is not a small claims
court designed to accommodate pro se parties disputing over return of a
rent deposit, a minor traffic mishap, or a ruined shirt.368 Much more is
at stake. Even though a defective ladder may seem trivial, someone can
get hurt if it is not corrected. For most of us, the only way to get our
attention is to impose some costs.
As to the reduction of adversariness, the conference/hearing format
can be a helpful tool in resolving the dispute rather than just "adjudi-
cating" it. 69 However, the key factor in taking the edge off of adver-
sariness is not the format of the proceedings. The parties and the ALJs
are much more significant factors than procedural format. A pre-trial
conference in conventional proceedings can serve the same purpose as
the "conference" phase of simplified proceedings. An astute ALJ at-
tuned to the dispute resolution model is not limited to simplified
proceedings.
If confined to tinkering with simplified proceedings, the alternatives
seem limited. To date, the absolute veto has allowed easy assertions
about "underutilization" of simplified proceedings. The extent of un-
derutilization, and the number of genuinely "simple" cases arising
under the OSH Act system remain to be seen. Going to the opposite
extreme, an absolute right to simplified proceedings inevitably would
368. See Kulat, supra note 34, at 14 (recounting interesting cases from Chicago
court).
369. Transcript of Proceedings (Jan. 4, 1990) Lone Star Corrugated Container
Corp., OSHRC Doc. No. 89-2119, (case unreported because settled; abatement of ma-
chine guarding violation worked out at conference); Transcript of Proceedings, at 4-7,
65 (Sept. 25, 1989) Dub Rose & Assoc., OSHRC Doc. No. 89-1128-S.
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increase the number of simplified proceedings. The impact on workload
and on the quality of adjudication is unpredictable; however, a funda-
mental tenet of economics seems to be that lowering the cost of some-
thing increases the demand. Opting for ALJ discretion has its own
problems. Certainly, unbridled discretion would be questionable. Vest-
ing authority in ALJs pursuant to some verbal formula or "test" re-
quires the formulation of that "test," which would not be easy. If the
most important goal is to enhance the small pro se party's opportunity
for a "day in court," then tinkering with simplified proceedings may be
a dead end. An alternative worth considering is to bypass simplified
proceedings, as such. It could be possible to take a more direct ap-
proach to the problems of the small pro se party who is genuinely una-
ble to afford an attorney to contest a small penalty case, and who is
genuinely handicapped in dealing with conventional proceedings.
Given the substantial percentage of pro se cases in the system any-
way, the time may have come for the OSHRC and the DOL to address
the problems of the pro se party more directly. However, there are very
few "models" available. Pro se cases are a very neglected feature of our
legal system; indeed, they are barely tolerated. Yet OSHRC estab-
lished the SJ procedures at a time when nobody had much experience
with SJs. OSHRC and the DOL have a long history of experience with
pro se parties. That experience may not always have endeared pro se
parties to the DOL lawyers, but there is a great deal which they and
OSHRC's ALJs may be able to teach other agencies and the rest of
the legal system about pro se cases.
Literature and "models" on pro se cases are limited, but with the
momentum generally for ADR, more will appear. OSHRC's Guide,
moreover, is an excellent start for the relatively sophisticated pro se
party. Special pro se rules could be triggered by objective criteria such
as the number of employees, the number of alleged violations, the clas-
sification of the violations, and the amount of the proposed penalty.
Pleadings could be modified, instead of eliminated, for some categories
of pro se parties or cases. The "paperwork" could be simplified and
stripped of legalese. In one state court jurisdiction pre-printed pro se
form complaints with space for necessary information to be written in
are available for simple contract disputes.3 70 Although such forms are
not directly applicable to "answers," they suggest possibilities. After
all, if the case is truly simple, with only two or three simple alleged
violations, the difficulties of framing a "form answer" could be man-
370. Rubin, The Civil Pro Se Litigant v. The Legal System, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
999, 1010 (1989).
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aged.371 OSHRC and the DOL might collaborate on the development
of some kind of "form answer."
If OSHRC wants to be more venturesome, it might consider a recent
innovation in workers' compensation cases. In at least one state, provi-
sion is made for a pro se claimant to "confer with a legal advisor on the
staff of the [Workers' Compensation Commission] . . . ."I Additional
OSHRC staff and an "800" number might be a sound investment, if it
were carefully handled, and led to better-informed pro se parties.
At the very least, addressing the pro se party's problems directly
would have the virtue of considering those problems individually, rather
than lumping them in with cost-saving goals and generalizations. The
problems of the pro se party deserve more direct attention. Continuing
to subsume them under simplified proceedings may not do justice to
either the pro se party or simplified proceedings.
ii. Carts and Horses: Cases Suitable for Simplified Proceedings
Little systematic attention has been paid to the crucial threshold
question of what makes a particular case "simple" and therefore suita-
ble for simplified proceedings. To say that a case is simple because the
parties do not need fact pleadings and discovery as a matter of right is
flagrant question begging. Likewise, this Article must ignore the temp-
tation to offer a definition such as: "A simple case is one which turns
out not to have any complications."
On an abstract level, the type of case which is suitable for simplified
proceedings may be easy to describe: a routine case involving a few
"other-than-serious" violations, low penalties, the facts at issue prova-
ble by "occurrence witnesses" with little need for "expertise" or expert
testimony, and preferably with a hazard which essentially has been
mooted. Added to these elements should be a factor which OSHRC
recognizes in its Guide: whether presentation of the case will require
information in the possession of any other party.
3 73
However, the number of alleged violations to which the above crite-
ria would apply in the "real world" remains to be seen. The amount of
371. A potential "form" answer might read as follows: "Mr. Jones, we want to
know more about your problem with OSHA. Why do you think they're wrong? Below
are several questions, with space after each question, for any answer you would like to
make. (1) Are you claiming that there wasn't a violation? If so, please explain. (2) Are
you claiming that the citation involves conditions that were not your fault? If so, please
explain."
372. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-703 (1987).
373. See supra note 356 and accompanying text (quoting OSHRC's "Guide to
Procedures" exploration of difference between simplified proceedings and conventional
proceedings).
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the proposed penalty, the number of alleged violations, and the classifi-
cation of the alleged violation are simple enough. But crucial problems
arise from the nature of many OSHA standards and the statutory im-
position of a law enforcement model with its burden of proof. Although
noncompliance with some standards can be established by simple obser-
vation and measuring, noncompliance with many other standards in-
volves a much larger zone of potential dispute.
3 74
Quite possibly, a very large cart may have been put before a small
horse. Essentially OSHRC decided how to simplify, but was rather
vague on what to simplify. What is it that makes a case suitable for
simplified proceedings? What kinds of cases are suitable for a proce-
dural regime which eliminates pleadings and discovery as a matter of
right? The simplified proceedings' answer, or non-answer, to such ques-
tions has been to: (1) establish a procedural regime eliminating plead-
ings and discovery of right; (2) exclude certain categories of cases
wholesale, such as cases arising under the general duty clause and cer-
tain health standards; and (3) leave the rest up to agreement by the
parties.
As previously suggested,376 simplified proceedings cannot by them-
selves simplify issues and factual disputes which are not simple. The
procedures in simplified proceedings may be the cart which has been
put in front of the horse. The horse may be small, because the number
of cases suitable for simplified proceedings over the objections of a
party may be limited. Of course, if both parties agree to use simplified
proceedings that is an entirely different matter. Even if the horse were
made larger, as by eliminating the present veto power, the cart would
still be in front of the animal. Legal and factual issues do not oblig-
ingly go away just because the procedural rules dispense with pleadings
and discovery as a matter of right. A good litigator does more than
maneuver a course through procedural niceties. A good litigator must
be prepared to argue both the facts and merits of the case. Again, very
little systematic attention has been paid to the threshold question of
what constitutes a case that is suitable for simplified proceedings.
OSHRC rules and rulemaking imply a few hints here and there. At
one extreme, general duty clause cases and certain generic kinds of
cases arising under certain health standards have been made categori-
cally ineligible for simplified proceedings.3 76 Beyond the categorical ex-
374. See supra notes 277-93 and accompanying text (discussing burden of proof
and affirmative defenses).
375. See supra note 317 and accompanying text (discussing type of simplification
imposed by simplified proceedings).
376. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.202 (1991). See generally supra notes 212-13 and accompa-
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clusions, however, vagueness prevails. In the explanatory statement ac-
companying the experimental, one-year rule that first established
simplified proceedings in 1979, OSHRC's response to comments ob-
jecting to the limitations on discovery and interlocutory appeals was,
"[it is expected that simplified proceedings will be used in cases where
the factual and legal issues are relatively uncomplicated.'' " To the
very significant point that many cases arising under non-health stan-
dards might likewise be too complex for handling under simplified pro-
ceedings, OSHRC responded: OSHRC "recognizes that many non-
health cases may be too complex for simplified proceedings, but is con-
fident that the right of any party, including the Secretary, to preclude
simplified proceedings in such case is an adequate safeguard at this
time." 78
Therefore, it is obvious that OSHRC has recognized the unsuitabil-
ity of many cases theoretically eligible for simplified proceedings. How-
ever, it has not gone much further. Subsequent rulemaking has not re-
fined or clarified the concept of what kinds of cases are suitable for
simplified proceedings.3 79 The aborted proposal to hinge everything on
"due process" certainly represented no refinement or clarification.3 80
Overall, OSHRC implicitly seems to have recognized the difficulties
of providing an alternative to the present scheme through rulemaking.
To a suggestion that the objecting party be required to state a reason
for its objection, OSHRC responded: "Such a requirement would be
likely to lead to litigation over the validity of the reasons given and
delay the progress of cases." '381 OSHRC might well have added, "and
besides, what reasons would be acceptable, under what principles and
criteria? How do we write the rule? What guidance do we give ALJs
and the parties?" OSHRC has maintained a shaky status quo to date:
hying text (explaining categorical exclusions). The rationale for the health standard
exclusion has been, and more or less continues to be, the presumed or inherent com-
plexity of cases under those standards. Most, if not all, of the excluded health stan-
dards "require engineering controls as a primary method of abatement and require
personal protective equipment as a secondary measure. Cases involving such standards
are unusually complex and involve a certain amount of necessary discovery." 43 Fed.
Reg. 36,856 (1978) (proposed July 31, 1978).
377. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,110 (1979) (explanatory statement accompanying Final
Rule) (emphasis added).
378. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,109 (emphasis added) (explanatory statement accompanying
final rule).
379. See 47 Fed. Reg. 29,525-26 (1982) (containing explanatory statement accom-
panying amendment of rule).
380. See supra notes 252-68 and accompanying text (discussing proposed rulemak-
ing on simplified proceedures).
381. 47 Fed. Reg. 29,526 (1982) (explanatory statement accompanying amend-
ment of rules).
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certain broad categories of cases' are ineligible for simplified proceed-
ings, and the rest is up to the agreement of the parties. The status quo
is not without advantages: (1) it is simple to administer because
OSHRC and its ALJs do not have to become embroiled in drawing fine
lines between cases that are "relatively simple" and cases which are
unsuitably complex for simplified proceedings; (2) it essentially moots
the need for any rules or criteria which attempt to "test" the suitability
of a case for simplified proceedings; (3) it allows the parties to make a
decision in the first twenty-five days after docketing the case, that they
both conclude it is suitable for simplified proceedings; and (4) it pro-
motes simplified proceedings as a form of ADR by establishing a con-
sensual regime, rather than a proceeding imposed at the unilateral will
of one party or the third-party adjudicator.
The status quo is not without disadvantages, however. The main dis-
advantages of the status quo are "under-utilization" and the dissatis-
faction among pro se parties, or would-be pro se parties, caused by the
frequent use of the veto. However, the number of cases in which simpli-
fied proceedings would be suitable is uncertain, so "under-utilization"
may not be the proper word. Criteria for suitabililty are virtually non-
existent. The dissatisfaction among pro se parties may need to be ad-
dressed by means more direct and more tailored to the needs of pro se
parties than simplified proceedings.
None of this necessarily compels a conclusion that the status quo
should be maintained. However, if changes are to be made in the rules
for simplified proceedings, it would seem necessary to develop a better
idea of what kinds of cases are suitable for simplified proceedings.
V. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
A. Settlement Judges
The procedures are working well. Some of the cases in which SJs
have been used are textbook examples of how the process should work.
Concerns about the relatively small number of SJ cases may be prema-
ture. The main reason for any under-use of SJs lies primarily in the
novelty of the procedure, lack of knowledge of its very existence, and
lack of sensitivity to its possibilities in a system where historically there
has been a ninety percent settlement rate. The SJ procedure is an ex-
traordinary procedure, so the number of SJ cases should be relatively
small. The greatest potential problem with SJs lies not in under-use,
but potential over-use, and even abuse. Over-use could develop, strain-
ing OSHRC's resources, if SJs were invoked short of true impasse.
Abuse could occur because the "preview" feature might be very attrac-
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tive to a lawyer who is alert to the potential of a free "mock jury."
B. Simplified Proceedings
Simplified proceedings probably are under-utilized. However, the de-
gree of genuine under-utilization is indeterminable under present cir-
cumstances. A fair assessment regarding under-use can only be made if
there is some clear concept of, or consensus on, what makes a case
suitable for simplified proceedings. It is distinctly possible that the uni-
verse of cases objectively suitable for proceedings which eliminate
pleadings and discovery as a matter of right may be relatively small,
given, among other things: (1) the OSH Act's law enforcement model
and the appropriateness under that model of a fairly strict burden of
proof; (2) the large number of "general" or open-ended standards; (3)
the number of affirmative defenses; and (4) the number of cases which
hinge on evidence and information in the possession of one party.
Two major issues must be settled before simplified proceedings be-
come an effective means of dispute resolution. First, the goals and pur-
poses of simplified proceedings must be more clearly settled. Is the
main goal cost effectiveness? If so, then calculate the costs, all of them,
in all parts of the system: OSHRC, the prosecutorial arm, employers,
employees, and the public. If the most important goal is to provide fair
treatment for the small pro se party with a small case, then the ques-
tion arises whether simplified proceedings are the optimal way to reach
this goal, or whether the problems of the pro se parties should be
treated more directly by rules tailored to their special needs.
Second, OSHRC, the DOL, and all others concerned, need to de-
velop a more clear picture or idea of what kinds of cases are suitable
for simplified proceedings. It is not enough to conclude that some cases
do not need hybrid fact pleadings and discovery as a matter of right,
and leave it at that, unless the status quo is deemed to be satisfactory.
AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The DOL should encourage regional solicitors to selectively and
carefully experiment with simplified proceedings. A broader base of ex-
perience, carefully tracked and analyzed, could be beneficial in two
ways. First, if experience is satisfactory more efficient case processing
could result from careful use- of simplified proceedings in the future.
Second, if experience is unsatisfactory there will be data and a base of
recent experience justifying use of the veto.
2. The OSHRC and the DOL both should consider developing rules
and policies pertaining to cases involving pro se parties, especially pro
[VOL. 5:555
JUDGES AND SIMPLIFIED PROCEEDINGS
se parties of limited means in simple cases involving few violations and
low penalties.
3. The OSHRC should consider ways in which to make the informal
discussion provisions, presently "required" by 29 C.F.R. section
2200.206, more effective. As it stands, these informal discussions are
the only substitute for hybrid fact pleadings and discovery as a matter
of right. OSHRC's "Guide to Procedures" sets the proper tone. The
rules and their enforcement should follow suit. Although parties cannot
be made to reach any particular result, good faith contact and discus-
sion should be a condition precedent to further proceedings. For in-
stance, complete failure to cooperate in the informal discussions should
be express grounds for reverting to conventional proceedings.
4. To the extent feasible and allowable under applicable law, in the
future all major OSHRC rulemaking on simplified proceedings should
be preceded by some form of advisory committee studies. In the alter-
native, "negotiated rulemaking" might be considered. Purely in-house
committees composed of ALJs and OSHRC officials are undoubtedly
competent but they are limited to the OSHRC adjudicative perspec-
tive. They do not bring the perspective of all participants in the litiga-
tion process to the crucial formative stages of rulemaking. Those repre-
senting major principals are reduced to reacting to a written proposal.
Among those who might serve on advisory or developmental commit-
tees are representatives from the DOL, employer associations, the rele-
vant American Bar Association committee(s), and unions. In any event,
pure notice-and-comment rulemaking may be insufficient if major
changes are being considered or developed.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix is a summary of more than forty OSHRC and ALJ
decisions reported in BNA's Occupational Safety and Health Cases.
Although BNA refers to its treatment of ALJ decisions as "digests,"
these "digests" seem fairly thorough, relative to the substantive points
in the case.
For each case summarized, the Appendix gives the name of the re-
spondent, docket number, the DOL regional office which tried the case,
whether the respondent appeared pro se (where information on pro se
status was available), and the cite to the BNA reporting service. Next,
it identifies the standard(s) allegedly violated, and summarizes perti-
nent information about the decision. The final item generally concerns
whether the citation, as to the alleged violation, was affirmed, vacated,
modified, or reduced to de minimis. The Appendix was originally
presented in chart form; for purposes of this Article, the chart was
transformed into this summary, so there may have been some minor
errors made in the transition.
SIMPLIFIED PROCEEDINGS CASES
(1) Vacu Maid (80-1509-S, Dallas, pro se, 9 OSHC 1429 (1981)).
Standard: 1910.212(a)(1) - machine guarding (several citations for va-
rious machines).
a) That standard not applicable to type of lathe; Defenses as-
serted were the impossibility of guarding; and cost. Citation
was affirmed because the employer failed to prove impossibility
and made no attempt to use guards on swing lathes.
b) As to South Bend Lathe, DOL failed to prove lathe was ever
used with jaws uncovered. Vacated.
(2) Haring Contractors (80-1987-S, Cleveland, pro se, 9 OSHC 1301
(1981)). Standards:
a) 1926.300(b)(2) - guard moving parts of mortar mixer - oper-
ating it with motor housing in "up" position. Defense asserted
was that the employee violated company work rules - unpre-
ventable employee misconduct. Vacated.
b) 1903.2(a)(1) - poster. Defense asserted was that it was a
small, transitory, work force, therefore, posting at office was
sufficient. Vacated.
(3) Campton Constr. (80-226-S, Denver, pro se, 9 OSHC 1303
(1981)). Standards:
a) 1926.652(c) - trenching; slope and shoring; hard or compact
soil. Evidence: conflict of testimony. Vacated.
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b) 1926.652(i)(1) - store or retain excavated material at least 2
feet from edge of trench. Evidence: testimony showed trench
not finished yet and no proof that any employees were in the
trench. Vacated.
(4) Marine Terminals Corp. (80-2540-S, Los Angeles, pro se (safety
director), 9 OSHC 1341 (1981)). Standard:
a) 1918.81(a) - failure to safety sling concrete pilings before
hoisting them by crane. Evidence: employer did not determine
proper way to secure. Compliance Officer was eyewitness. Seri-
ous classification upheld. Affirmed.
(5) Novak & Co. (80-2946-S, New York, pro se, OSHRC decision, 11
OSHC 1783 (1984)). Standard:
a) 1926.500(b)(1) - unguarded floor holes - subcontractor. Evi-
dence: insufficient to establish Novak knew or should have
known of condition. Subcontractor's own employees not shown
on regular route near holes (multi-employer worksite). Vacated.
(6) Nester Bros. (80-5271-S, Region not indicated, 9 OSHC 1962
(1981)). Standards: (4 cites, all serious)
a) 1926.28(a) - safety toed shoes, handling concrete blocks, pro-
tective equipment. Evidence: reasonable person would not be on
notice that shoes were needed; AGC manual (construction con-
tractors' association manual) only recommends. Vacated.
b) 1926.152(a)(1) - failure to store flammable liquid in ap-
proved container. Evidence: compliance officer testimony unre-
futed. Affirmed.
c) 1926.450(a)(1) - ladders for safe access to all elevations of
construction. Evidence: compliance officer testimony unrefuted.
Affirmed.
d) 1926.451(a)(4) - lack of guardrails and toeboards more than
ten feet above ground. Evidence: compliance officer testimony
unrefuted. Affirmed.
(7) Southwestern Sound Control (80-5288-S, Dallas, pro se, 9 OSHC
2048 (1981)). Standard:
a) 1926.500(b)(1) - removing temporary guardrails at front and
side of elevator shaft while work going on. Defense: affirmative
defense of impossibility of performance. Vacated.
(8) Colorado Aggregate (80-5575-S, Denver, pro se, 9 OSHC 1295
(1981)). Procedural: notice of contest not timely filed. Motion to dis-
miss notice of contest granted.
(9) Eckel Mfg. Co. (80-7140-S, Dallas, pro se (safety director), 9
OSHC 2145 (1981)). Standards:
a) 1910.212(a) - machine guard, turning lathe. Evidence: haz-
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ard did not exist at 20 r.p.m. Vacated.
b) 1903.2(a)(1) - poster display. Evidence: absence undisputed.
Affirmed.
c) 1910.178(1) - failure to train forklift operators in safe opera-
tion. Evidence: rested on interpretation of standards. Affirmed.
d) 1910.179(j) (2) (iv) - monthly inspections of hoist chains (load-
bearing chains). Evidence: record does not adequately describe
the equipment to' determine applicability of the standard.
Vacated.
e) 1910.179(m)(1) - no monthly inspection program for running
ropes on cranes, including written, dated signed reports. Condi-
tion: admitted; later checklist insufficient. Affirmed.
f) 1910.252(a)(2)(i)(b) - failure to legibly mark gas content of
compressed gas. Evidence: rested on interpretation of standard.
Affirmed.
g) 1910.252(e)(2)(iii) - lack of flameproof screens and required
goggles in welding area. Evidence: plywood screens not accept-
able; goggles not of the required type. Affirmed.
(10) Was Bros. Constr. (80-7175-S, Boston, pro se, 10 OSHC 1030
(1981)). Standards:
a) 1926.651(c) - adequate slope, shore, support walls of excava-
tion. Evidence: -photos, testimony. Affirmed.
b) 1926.651(q) - failing to protect, shore, brace, walls of exca-
vation due to superimposed loads. Evidence: established heavy
equipment and traffic close by, but Secretary failed to present
evidence which applied specifically to the need for shoring at
this site. Vacated.
(11) Universal Rundle (80-7351-S, Dallas, 9 OSHC 2168 (1981)).
Standard:'
a) 1910.132(a) - failing to require employees handling heavy
objects to wear safety-toed workshoes. Defense: only 12 foot in-
juries over the past four years; defense rejected. Affirmed.
(12) Crayton's Southern Sausage (81-346-S, Cleveland, 10 OSHC
1366 (1982)). Standard:
a) 1910.23(d)(1)(ii) - unguarded stairways; two flights around
loading dock. Defense: no injuries and compliance with stan-
dard would create greater hazard. Affirmed.
(13) NL Industries (81-223-S, Dallas, 11 OSHC 1124 (1983)).
Standard:
a) 1910.132(a) or alternatively 1926.28(a) - failure to require
use of safety belt and line while working 30-50 feet above
ground. Defense: impossible to tie off and employee misconduct.
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Affirmed.
(14) Syntron (81-1491-S, Dallas, not pro se, OSHRC decision, 11
OSHC 1158, 11 OSHC 1868 (1984)). Standards:
a) 1910.212(a)(1) - machine guarding, saw. Case had been re-
manded to ALJ in 1982 because ALJ decision lacked sufficient
specificity in findings of fact. ALJ held on remand that evi-
dence insufficient (photo not a photo of saw at issue; employer
testimony credited; DOL failed to show hazard existed).
OSHRC decision: employee normally a foot away from un-
guarded blade. Dissent: physical guards needed. Vacated.
b) 1903.2(a)(1) - poster. Evidence: no notice of contest filed.
Affirmed.
c) 1904.2 - poster. Evidence: no notice of contest filed.
Affirmed.
(15) Pengo Oil Tool Div. (81-1655-S, Dallas, 10 OSHC 1669 (1982)).
Standard:
a) 1910.132(a) - use of personal protective equipment. Fatality
case. Defense: unforeseeable employee misconduct in failing to
wear hard hat. Vacated.
(16) Farrell Roofing & Sheet Metal (81-0954-S & 81-1121-S, Dallas
10 OSHC 1430 (1982)). Standards:
a) 1926.500(g)(1) - protection against fall from low-pitched
roof. Evidence: failure to call witness (compliance officer) who
observed the violation. Vacated.
b) 1926.500(g)(1)(iii) - safety monitoring system. Affirmed.
c) 1926.500(b)(l) - skylight opening. Defense: multi-employer
worksite; independent contractors responsible for violation.
Vacated.
d) 1926.500(fP(6) - side rails of ladder not 36 inches above land-
ing. Defense: same as (c). Vacated.
(17) Volk Construction (81-2669, Dallas, pro se, 10 OSHC 1843
(1982)). Standard:
a) 1926.451(c)(6) - tube and coupler scaffolds must post on
"suitable base." Issue 1 - interpretative; did "suitable base" in-
clude sills? Held: no, affirmed but modified - failure to have
metal base under scaffold post. Issue 2 - whether the scaffold
base was on frozen ground, therefore posts and scaffold could
not be easily dislodged? Held: yes, violation found to be de
minimis.
(18) Robert P. Loveland (82-136-S, Denver, pro se, 11 OSHC 1096
(1982)). Procedural issue - agreed to file settlement agreement but
never filed; no response; no forwarding address. Default Judgment.
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Affirmed.
(19) APAC-Ga., Inc. (82-1215-S, Atlanta, not pro se, II OSHC 1774
(1983)). Standard:
a) 1926.602(a)(9)(ii) - reverse signal alarms must be sufficiently
audible to distinguish from surrounding noise level (wheel
loader and scraper paving a parking lot). Evidence: compliance
officer made readings at an angle to the movement of vehicle;
standard merely requires signal to be distinguishable from sur-
rounding noise level. Vacated.
(20) Firman Carswell (83-104-S, Kansas City, pro se, 11 OSHC 1871
(1984)). Standard:
a) 1910.212(a)(3) - failure to guard point of operation on series
of press brakes. Defense: feasibility - employer failed to show
hazards of compliance greater than hazards of noncompliance,
or otherwise justify lack of guards; did not even attempt to
guard. Affirmed.
(21) Weinland Constr. (83-322-S, Kansas City, pro se, 11 OSHC 1736
(1984)). Standards:
a) 1926.651(i)(1) - failure to store or retain excavated or other
material two feet or more from edge of excavation. Evidence:
clear violation, with photos, etc. Affirmed.
b) 1926.652(c) - failure to slope or shore walls of trench. Evi-
dence: failure to establish prima facie case; did not establish
that significant portion of trench sides was hard or compact
soil. Vacated.
c) 1926.50(c) - failure to have a person at worksite with valid
first aid certificate, if hospital, clinic etc., is not "reasonably ac-
cessible." Evidence: DOL failed to prove violation. Vacated.
(22) United Sheet Metal (83-363-S, Philadelphia, 11 OSHC 1766
(1983)). Standards:
a) 1926.28 (a) - failure to provide safety belts (employees on
edge of roof). Evidence: employee held to hoist with one hand
while reaching beyond roof to swing materials onto roof - seri-
ous violation. Affirmed.
b) 1926.500(g)(1) and (g)(6) - working along unprotected edge
of roof and failure to provide safety training programs. Inter-
pretation of standard: applicable by its terms to "employees en-
gaged in built-up roofing work," which was not the case here.
Vacated.
c) 1926.400(h)(1) and .401(a)(1) - electric grounding prong;
lack of ground fault protection. Evidence: virtually admitted by
employer. Serious violation affirmed.
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d) 1904.5 - failure to post at worksite annual summary of inju-
ries, illnesses, etc. Affirmed.
e) 1926.450(b)(12) - rungs of ladder not inset into edges of side
rails and similar deficiencies (job-made ladder). Evidence: sup-
ports citation, non-serious violation. Affirmed.
(23) Michael Duff (83-0366-S, New York, pro se, 11 OSHC 1839
(1984)). Standards:
a) 1926.400(h)(1) and .401(a)(1) - "Sawzall" which was not
double insulated, grounding prong broken and plugged into
temporary wiring lacking ground-fault circuit protection; also
electric drill not double insulated and not plugged into power
source. Evidence: No evidence that tools were used in a wet
environment (basement was wet but employees were not work-
ing there at time of inspection). Reduced from serious to non-
serious violation. No penalty. Affirmed as modified.
(24) Component Struct., Inc. (84-173-S, Kansas City, 12 OSHC 1056
(1984)). Penalty Calculation - penalties reduced by 50% from $800 to
$400 and $480 to $240.
(25) Fisherman's Boat Shop (84-411-S, Seattle, pro se, 12 OSHC
1151 (1984)). Standard:
a) 1915.71(j)(1) - guardrails on over-the-water staging required
over bow of vessel (being repaired). Repeat Violation. Evidence:
Different vessel 18 mos. earlier. Held: repeat violation $100.
Affirmed.
(26) A.G. Building Specialists. Inc. (84-1020-S, Dallas, pro se, 12
OSHC 1424 (1985)). Standard:
a) 1926.451(e)(8) - casters or wheels on scaffold must be locked,
to prevent movement. Evidence: employer admitted employees
rarely used locks; just troublesome and time consuming to com-
ply when moving small scaffold along doing acoustical tile
work. Affirmed.
(27) Interior Constructors, Inc. (85-1185-S, Dallas, not pro se, 12
OSHC 1942 (1986)). Standards:
a) 1926.451(i)(8) - employee on scaffold without approved
safety belt. Affirmed.
b) 1926.451(i)(9) - failure to secure scaffold lashed to building
to prevent swaying. Employees observed by compliance officer
painting walls of building on scaffold. Evidence: supported
DOL as employees had been working for three hours before
compliance officer inspection and scaffold in plain view of man-
agement employee. Defense: unpreventable employee miscon-
duct (OSHA then had "national emphasis program" on two-
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point suspension scaffolds). Affirmed.
(28) Structural Dev. Corp. (85-1370-S, Dallas, no appearance (DOL
still required to prove case), 12 OSHC 1872 (1986)). Standard:
a) 1926.500(d)(1) - failure to guard openings into elevator
shafts with standard guardrails. Evidence: violation readily ap-
parent; existed for two days; firm's superintendant expressed no
surprise - $120 for serious violation. Affirmed.
(29) Western Steel & Boiler (85-1433-S, Denver, pro se, 12 OSHC
1943 (1986)). Standard:
a) 1910.212(a)(3)(ii) - failure to guard saw blade (metal band
saw). No dispute over violation. Contended $300 proposed pen-
alty would put strain on its business. Reduced from $300 to
$150.
(30) Kry-Lin (85-1444-S, Dallas, no appearance (DOL still required to
prove case), 12 OSHC 1888 (1986)). Standard:
a) 1926.350(h) - failure to maintain oxygen and fuel gas pres-
sure regulators and gauges in proper working order. Evidence:
proved violation. Affirmed.
(31) Wes's Inc. (86-29-S, Seattle, pro se, 12 OSHC 2147 (1986)).
Standards:
a) 1910.179(f)(1)(J) - failure to equip a 10-ton overhead crane
with a holding brake. Evidence: undisputed. Affirmed.
b) 1910.212(a)(3)(ii) - guard hydraulic press brake. Evidence:
prior citation dismissed by Secretary same machine. Vacated.
Failure to guard shearing station on "Ironworker." No factual
dispute. Affirmed.
(32) HRD Masonry (86-221-S, Dallas, pro se, 13 OSHC 1029 (1986)).
Standards:
a) 1926.451(a)(4) - guardrails on scaffold. Defense: feasibility-
burden on DOL to prove compliance is feasible when in-
feasibility is raised as a defense. Held: DOL failed to meet bur-
den of proof. Vacated.
b) 1926.500(d)(1) - failure to guard open-sided floors. Violation
not proved and employee misconduct. Vacated.
c) 1926.500(d)(1) and .552(b)(2) - unguarded hoistway. Evi-
dence: held for DOL. Also, issue as to repeated violation; ear-
lier citation regarding earlier violation had been settled with
area director and never contested. Affirmed.
(33) Texas Trident (87-0442-S, Dallas, 13 OSHC 1615 (1988)).
Standards:
a) 1926.300(b)(1) - When power-operated tools designed to ac-
commodate guards are used, they shall be equipped with guards
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when in use. Defense: infeasible. Evidence: burden of proof not
satisfied. Employer's witness more credible than DOL's compli-
ance officer. Vacated.
b) 1926.304(f) - radial saw not equipped with adjustment stop
and cutting head to return gently when released by operator.
Defense: infeasible, and also greater hazard (fairly detailed
ALJ discussion of facts). Employer's witness more credible.
Vacated.
(34) Hoggatt, Inc., (87-522-S, Dallas, pro se, 13 OSHC 1642 (1988)
(two consolidated cases)). Standards:
a) 1903.2(a)(4) - failure to provide adequate lanyard on safety
belt. DOL withdrew citation. Vacated.
b) 1926.404(b)(J)(i) - failure to have either an assured ground-
ing conductor (AEGC) or operable ground-fault circuit inter-
rupter (GFCI) on 120-volt receptacle outlet. Evidence: Em-
ployer claimed GFCI operable when tested that morning. Held:
employer proved reasonable diligence. Vacated.
c) 1926.451(d)(10) - lack of guardrails on 3rd tier of scaffold
and proper toeboards on second tier. Evidence: Employee pho-
tographed on violative scaffold. Affirmed.
d) 1904.5(b), (c) and (d)(1) - prepare and post annual summary
of injuries. Evidence: Employer told compliance officer were no
summaries prepared; unsworn employer statements during
hearing to the effect that he had prepared and sent copy before
the deadline. Held: DOL failed to meet burden of proof.
Vacated.
e) 1926.416(e)(1) - use of frayed or worn electric cables. Proof
showed only splice. No amendment of citation allowed.
Vacated.
(35) Peterson Bros. (87-0805-S, Dallas, pro se, 13 OSHC 1936
(1988)). Standard:
a) 1926.750(b)(1)(i) - decking or planking on derrick or erected
floors be laid tight and secured to prevent movement. Two seri-
ous violations cited. First, defense: cited under wrong standards;
held - standards clearly applicable, undisputed evidence. Heavy
planks, hard to move. Affirmed, but de minimis. Second, on 9th
floor, obvious gap, danger of fall. Affirmed.
b) 1926.350(a)(9) - failure to secure compressed gas cylinders
in an upright position except when being hoisted or carried. Ev-
idence: employer owned and controlled the cylinders. Affirmed.
c) 1926.350(j) - failure to separate oxygen acetylene cylinders
in-storage minimum of 20 feet. OSHRC precedent regarding
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storage - not in storage if being used intermittently. Held: not
in storage here. Vacated.
(36) Dodd & Frerich Welding Co. (87-8585, Dallas, pro se, 13 OSHC
1838 (1988)). Standards:
a) 1926.450(a)(9) - requiring ladder to extcnd 36 inches above
landing or provide guardrails as to handhold, for secure grip.
Evidence: photographic; only 12 inches above landing. Defense:
compliance impossible and column nearby was sufficient hand-
hold (detailed discussion by ALJ). Affirmed.
b) 1903.2(a)(1) - OSHA poster. Repeated violation. Evidence
clear. Affirmed.
(37) Burnetex Industries, Inc. (87-1936-S, Dallas, 13 OSHC 1941
(1988)). Standards:
a) 1910.133(a)(1) - failure to require employee operating a
woodsander to wear eye protection where hazards of flying ob-
jects, glare, liquids, etc. Evidence: nature of particles ("bil-
lowed") and goggles clouded by dust. Affirmed.
b) 1910.213(h)(1) - failure to guard blade of radial saw. Evi-
dence: lower portion of blade was unguarded - 20% of cuts
could not be made with guard in place. Held: guard could be
removed for that 20%. Affirmed.
c) 1910.213(h)(4) - failure to ensure cutting head of radial arm
saw returned automatically after use to starting position. Evi-
dence: saw was equipped with automatic return device which
did not work because it was dirty. Defense: claimed compliance
would require elevation of front of unit creating hazard. De-
fense: had adjusted saw so it would not move when released and
trained employees not to release handle until it was safe.
Affirmed.
d) 1910.213(i)(1) - failure to guard non-working part of band-
saw blade. Evidence: compliance officer did not testify to seeing
the saw in operation. Employer claimed guard was provided
and used. Vacated.
e) 1910.219(d)(1) & (e)(1) - failure to guard pulleys and belts
on small bandsaw. Evidence: similar to (d). Vacated.
f) 1910.305(j)(2)(i) - using an extension cord with 15 amp ca-
pacity to connect 30 amp outlet to 40 amp drill press. Evidence:
"apparent" that compliance officer misread the label on the ex-
tension cord. Vacated.
g) 1910.141(a)(3)(i) - failure to keep toilet clean and sanitary.
Held: de minimis (accumulated dirt and rust in restroom).
Vacated.
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h) 1910.106(e)(2)(iv)(a) - failure to keep flammable liquid in
covered containers when not in use. Citation listed cans of oil,
adhesive MPT and 3M, but compliance officer in testifying
identified as "a spray can of some kind of flammable material."
Vacated.
i) 1910.212(a)(3)(ii) - failure to guard broken bit return spring
(point of operation guarding). Vacated.
j) 1910.212(b) - failure to anchor drill press designed for a fixed
location. "Designed for fixed location" - compliance officer tes-
tified that drill press had slots in the base for bolts and could
fall over in use. Evidence: small portable press, labeled "heavy
duty" by Taiwan manufacturer, but no machine shop in United
States would classify it as "heavy duty." When used on a bench
it was clamped down. Vacated.
k) 1910.242(a) - cracked handle of ball peen hammer. Vacated.
(38) Flasher, Co. (88-0353-S, Dallas, Okla. City, 13 OSHC 2134
(1989)). Standards:
a) 1926.200(g)(2) - Fatality - failure to provide effectively lo-
cated traffic controls to protect highway construction workers.
Secretary argued additional protective measures needed (chan-
nelizing and traffic cones, etc.). Employer had used barrels,
warning signs, etc., ALJ referred to "general language" of gen-
eral standard. Vacated.
b) 1926.21(b)(2) - Failure to instruct employees in recognition
and avoidance of unsafe conditions. Evidence: employee testi-
fied that he had received no preliminary training; no safety
meeting; some general warnings (e.g., keep eyes open for traffic,
wear orange vest, hard hat). Employer representative admitted
never determined if supervisors convey safety information to
employees. Basic safety training limited to drivers and supervi-
sors. $320 penalty. Affirmed.
(39) L.H. Land Painting Co. (88-1087-S, Dallas, pro se, 13 OSHC
2130 (1989)). Standards:
a) 1910.20(g)(1)(i), (ii) and (g)(2 ) - requiring that employees be
informed of existence, location, availability of records access,
etc. for material safety data sheets (MSDS) for coat primer,
lacquer thinning and wood primer. MSDS are included in defi-
nition of employee records covered by standard. Evidence: em-
ployer stipulated that painting materials are toxic substance.
No penalty. Affirmed.
(40) Derr Constr., (88-1672-S, Dallas, pro se, 14 OSHRC 1023
(1989)). Standards:
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a) 1926.450(a)(10) - portable extension ladder not tied or se-
cured. Multi-employer worksite. Two employees using 25 foot
ladder without securing it. Possible defense, unpreventable em-
ployee misconduct not explicitly raised and first element of de-
fense not proved. Serious, but reduced from $350 to $200.
Affirmed.
b) 1926.351(e) - failing to shield employees from arc welding
and cutting operations. Evidence: established violation.
Affirmed.
(41) Knight & Knight Constr. (88-1487-S, Dallas, pro se, 14 OSHRC
1096 (1989)). Standards:
a) Timely notice of contest - held timely; earlier certified mail
service returned unclaimed. Compliance officer hand delivered
to employers home. Multi-employer worksite.
b) 1926.403(i)(2)(i) - failure to guard properly the live parts of
a breaker box. Serious. Evidence: employer admitted knowledge
of violative conditions. Employee pulling out circuit breaking
boxes from wall and could have contacted live parts of circuit
breaker. $180 reduced to $75. Affirmed.
(42) King Tool (89-66-S, Kansas City, pro se, 14 OSHC 1342,
(1989)). Standard:
a) 1910.217(b)(3)(i) - failure to have single-stroke mechanism
on 25 ton power press which used full revolution clutch. Con-
tested penalty only; reduced from $280 to $100.
(43) Austin Crider (89-610-S, Dallas, pro se, 14 OSHC 1397 (1989)).
Six violations. DOL failed to present any evidence establishing em-
ployer engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce. All
vacated.
(44) Dub Rose & Associates (89-1128-S, Dallas, pro se, 14 OSHC
1313 (1989)). Standards:
a) 1926.451(a)(4) - requires guardrails and toeboards on all
open sides and ends of platforms more than seven to ten feet
above ground. During conference, violations determined to exist
and employer agreed. Affirmed.
b) 1926.500(b)(5) - requires pit and trap door floor openings to
be guarded. Penalties lowered for both violations.
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